Intentionalism Defended
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Traditionally, perceptual experiences—for example, the experience of seeing a cat—were thought to have two quite distinct components. When one sees a cat, one’s experience is “about ” the cat: this is the representational or intentional component of the experience. One’s experience also has phenomenal character: this is the sensational component of the experience. Although the intentional and sensational components at least typically go together, in principle they might come apart: the intentional component could be present without the sensational component or vice versa. Recently a number of philosophers have argued that this picture of perception is incorrect. According to them, the sensational component of a perceptual experience cannot vary independently of its intentional component: the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is entirely determined by the experience’s propositional content—that is, by what it represents. Usually this is supposed to hold also of “bodily sensations”: experiences of pain, twinges, tickles, and the like. The phenomenal character of such experiences, it is claimed, is likewise entirely determined by their propositional contents. This view comes in a number of variants, and also goes under a number of names:
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Citations
Cites
Nagel, T. (1974) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183914 · Cited by 7,440
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind
Searle, J. R. (1983) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173452 · Cited by 4,575
On a confusion about a function of consciousness
Block, N. (1995) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00038188 · Cited by 3,364
Jackson, F. (1982) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2960077 · Cited by 2,477
The Intrinsic Quality of Experience
Harman, G. (1990) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.2307/2214186 · Cited by 1,409
Rosenthal, D. M. (1986) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/bf00355521 · Cited by 1,019
Block, N. (1996) · Philosophical Issues · doi:10.2307/1522889 · Cited by 450
The Division of Phenomenal Labor: A Problem for Representational Theories of Consciousness
Neander, K. (1998) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/0029-4624.32.s12.18 · Cited by 124
Cited by
Perception and the Fall from Eden
Chalmers, D. J. (2006) · Perceptual Experience · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289769.003.0003 · Cited by 576
Justification without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism
Bergmann, M. (2006) · doi:10.1093/0199275742.001.0001 · Cited by 504
The Border Between Seeing and Thinking
Block, N. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197622223.001.0001 · Cited by 367
Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception
Matthen, M. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0199268509.001.0001 · Cited by 333
Schellenberg, S. (2011) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00791.x · Cited by 253
Metadata
- Authors
- Byrne, A.
- Venue
- The Philosophical Review
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 2001-04
- Volume
- 110
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 199
- ISSN
- 0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4249018138
- Cited by
- 212
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 1.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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