The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
Abstract
We examine the possibility of cooperation in a long term relationship, where agents receive diverse imperfect information about each other's actions. Secret price cutting in the industrial organization literature is a leading example. In a differentiated product market, a firm cannot directly observe rival firms' secret price cutting, but its own sales can imperfectly indicate what is going on. Since the firms' sales levels are subject to random shocks, they may well end up having diverse expectations: firms with low sales may suspect price cutting while others may not. This causes a serious difficulty in sustaining collusion in such a market. In fact, the characterization of equilibria of this class of games-discounted repeated games where each player receives a different signal -has been an open question, despite the large body of literature on repeated games. The present paper shows that communication is a powerful way of resolving the possible confusion among the players in this class of games. In particular, we construct equilibria where players voluntarily communicate what they have observed and prove folk theorems. Our results thus provide a theoretical support for the conventional wisdom that communication plays an important role in sustaining collusion.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
Fudenberg, D., & Maskin, E. (1986) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911307 · Cited by 2,395
Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
Green, E. J., & Porter, R. H. (1984) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911462 · Cited by 1,998
Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
Abreu, D., Pearce, D., & Stacchetti, E. (1990) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2938299 · Cited by 1,203
Trade Association Disclosure Rules, Incentives to Share Information, and Welfare
Vives, X. (1990) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555617 · Cited by 233
Efficiency in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring
Sekiguchi, T. (1997) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.1997.2313 · Cited by 146
An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information
Drew Fudenberg, B., & Levine, D. K. (1991) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(91)90103-b · Cited by 69
Cited by
Relational Incentive Contracts
Levin, J. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803322157115 · Cited by 1,099
Gibbons, R. (1998) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.12.4.115 · Cited by 1,022
Repeated Games and Reputations
Mailath, G. J., & Samuelson, L. (2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.001.0001 · Cited by 810
Eliciting Informative Feedback: The Peer-Prediction Method
Miller, N., Resnick, P., & Zeckhauser, R. (2005) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1050.0379 · Cited by 506
Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation
Macleod, W. B. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803321455232 · Cited by 424
Metadata
- Authors
- Kandori, M., & Matsushima, H.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1998-05
- Volume
- 66
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 627
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3122618161
- Cited by
- 333
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 10.16
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.