Cognitive Accommodation, Language, and Social Responsibility
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The two studies reported here examine cognitive accommodation in a betting situation where a decision-maker perceives that the person for whom he is making judgments has a legitimate right to have an explanation ofthe judgments. In the first study, it was found that under these conditions of personal responsibility, decision-makers' self reports of their judgment policies were highly similar to mathematically-derived descriptions based on their judgments. Seemingly, decision-makers shift to a form of thinking that is analytic and easily described to another person when they believe that they are personally accountable for their judgments. In contrast, persons making judgments for or for someone not having a legitimate reason to question their thinking were significantly less accurate at describing their judgment policies. These decision-makers evidently shift to aform of thinking that is rapid, intuitive, and dijficult to describe. Results of the second study further support these conclusions by indicating that reportability of judgments by socially accountable decision-makers is seemingly ensured by their use of language-based thinking. That is, when making judgments for which they are accountable, decision-makers seem to be talking to themselves as they would to the person for whom the judgments are being made.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
(2007) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.4135/9781446212967.n15 · Cited by 3,749
Nature and uses of immaturity.
Bruner, J. S. (1972) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/h0033144 · Cited by 842
Cited by
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.90.4.293 · Cited by 3,991
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
Bottom, W. P., Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., & Kahneman, D. (2004) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/20159081 · Cited by 3,536
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives.
Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. (1986) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.93.2.136 · Cited by 3,024
Accounting for the effects of accountability.
Lerner, J. S., & Tetlock, P. E. (1999) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.125.2.255 · Cited by 2,383
“…hypothesis, regression models demonstrated that accountable (versus unaccountable) participants recalled judgment policies with greater accuracy (Cvetkovich, 1978), applied a judgment strategy with greater consistency (Hagafors & Brehmer, 1983, as indexed by the multiple correlation between the…”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSlovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.025 · Cited by 2,349
“Clinical versus Actuarial Judgment.”
Dawes, R. M., Faust, D., & Meehl, P. E. (1989) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.2648573 · Cited by 2,298
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
(2002) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098 · Cited by 2,192
The weighing of evidence and the determinants of confidence
Griffin, D., & Tversky, A. (1992) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/0010-0285(92)90013-r · Cited by 1,841
The Hot Hand in Basketball: On the Misperception of Random Sequences
Gilovich, T., Vallone, R., & Tversky, A. (1985) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/0010-0285(85)90010-6 · Cited by 1,649
Support theory: a nonextensional representation of subjective probability
Tversky, A., & Koehler, D. J. (1994) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.101.4.547 · Cited by 1,167
Accountability and complexity of thought.
Tetlock, P. E. (1983) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.45.1.74 · Cited by 995
The Impact of Accountability on Judgment and Choice: Toward A Social Contingency Model
Tetlock, P. E. (1992) · Advances in Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/s0065-2601(08)60287-7 · Cited by 926
The use of statistical heuristics in everyday inductive reasoning.
Nisbett, R. E., Krantz, D. H., Jepson, C., & Kunda, Z. (1983) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.90.4.339 · Cited by 811
Accountability: A Social Check on the Fundamental Attribution Error
Tetlock, P. E. (1985) · Social Psychology Quarterly · doi:10.2307/3033683 · Cited by 776
Dunning, D., Meyerowitz, J. A., & Holzberg, A. D. (1989) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.57.6.1082 · Cited by 758
Dunning, D., Meyerowitz, J. A., & Holzberg, A. D. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.020 · Cited by 678
Accountability and judgment processes in a personality prediction task.
Tetlock, P. E., & Kim, J. I. (1987) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037//0022-3514.52.4.700 · Cited by 562
Minding Matters: The Consequences of Mindlessness–Mindfulness
Langer, E. J. (1989) · Advances in Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/s0065-2601(08)60307-x · Cited by 560
Unpacking, repacking, and anchoring: Advances in support theory.
Rottenstreich, Y., & Tversky, A. (1997) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.104.2.406 · Cited by 425
Incorporating the Irrelevant: Anchors in Judgments of Belief and Value
Chapman, G. B., & Johnson, E. J. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.008 · Cited by 410
Sloman, S. A. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.024 · Cited by 395
Sherman, S. J., Cialdini, R. B., Schwartzman, D. F., & Reynolds, K. D. (1985) · Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin · doi:10.1177/0146167285111011 · Cited by 382
Accountability and automation bias
SKITKA, L. J., MOSIER, K., & BURDICK, M. D. (2000) · International Journal of Human-Computer Studies · doi:10.1006/ijhc.1999.0349 · Cited by 324
Assessing uncertainty in physical constants
Henrion, M., & Fischhoff, B. (1986) · American Journal of Physics · doi:10.1119/1.14447 · Cited by 316
Introduction – Heuristics and Biases: Then and Now
Gilovich, T., & Griffin, D. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.002 · Cited by 305
Norm Theory: Comparing Reality to Its Alternatives
Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.022 · Cited by 289
Condoning stereotyping? How awareness of stereotyping prevalence impacts expression of stereotypes.
Duguid, M. M., & Thomas-Hunt, M. C. (2015) · Journal of Applied Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0037908 · Cited by 200
Mental Contamination and the Debiasing Problem
Wilson, T. D., Centerbar, D. B., & Brekke, N. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.012 · Cited by 160
The calibration of expert judgment: heuristics and biases beyond the laboratory
Koehler, D. J., Brenner, L., & Griffin, D. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.041 · Cited by 146
Metadata
- Authors
- Cvetkovich, G.
- Venue
- Social Psychology
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1978-06
- Volume
- 41
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 149
- ISSN
- 0147-829X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2771698633
- Cited by
- 115
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.