Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal
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Claims other papers make about this one
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In the citing paper
“Setting the level of inductive risk is, ultimately, an ethical decision that decision makers must make (Douglas 2009).”
From Explainable AI Isn't Enough! Rethinking Algorithmic Contestability (2026) · cites this paper as Douglas 2009
Citations
Cited by
Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics
(2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198801856.001.0001 · Cited by 482
Kieser, A., Nicolai, A. T., & Seidl, D. N. (2015) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.1080/19416520.2015.1011853 · Cited by 314
Constructing sustainability science: emerging perspectives and research trajectories
Miller, T. R. (2013) · Sustainability Science · doi:10.1007/s11625-012-0180-6 · Cited by 272
Algorithmic bias: Senses, sources, solutions
Fazelpour, S., & Danks, D. (2021) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/phc3.12760 · Cited by 272
Wilholt, T. (2013) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axs007 · Cited by 268
Transforming knowledge for sustainability: towards adaptive academic institutions
Miller, T. R., Muñoz‐Erickson, T., & Redman, C. L. (2011) · International Journal of Sustainability in Higher Education · doi:10.1108/14676371111118228 · Cited by 256
In defence of the value free ideal
Betz, G. (2013) · European Journal for Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1007/s13194-012-0062-x · Cited by 252
The Edge of Sentience: Risk and Precaution in Humans, Other Animals, and AI
Birch, J. (2024) · doi:10.1093/9780191966729.001.0001 · Cited by 236
Public Misunderstanding of Science? Reframing the Problem of Vaccine Hesitancy
Goldenberg, M. J. (2016) · Perspectives on Science · doi:10.1162/posc_a_00223 · Cited by 218
JUSTIFIED BELIEF IN A DIGITAL AGE: ON THE EPISTEMIC IMPLICATIONS OF SECRET INTERNET TECHNOLOGIES
Miller, B., & Record, I. (2013) · Episteme · doi:10.1017/epi.2013.11 · Cited by 153
The Ethical Challenges of Socially Responsible Science
Resnik, D. B., & Elliott, K. C. (2016) · Accountability in Research · doi:10.1080/08989621.2014.1002608 · Cited by 131
In Conversation with Artificial Intelligence: Aligning language Models with Human Values
Kasirzadeh, A., & Gabriel, I. (2023) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-023-00606-x · Cited by 127
“32Heather Douglas [31] has explored how judgements about the seriousness of social consequences im- pact the amount of evidence scientists demand before declaring a chemical toxic.”
BackgroundBeyond generalization: a theory of robustness in machine learning
Freiesleben, T., & Grote, T. (2023) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-023-04334-9 · Cited by 106
“…the deployment distribution ; if the model’s performance is highly sensitive to expected changes in the deployment distribution, this should be deemed as a red-flag for utilizing the model— especially if the resulting epistemic risks (Douglas, 2009) culminate in financial, legal, or health concerns.”
BackgroundThe promise and perils of industry‐funded science
Holman, B., & Elliott, K. C. (2018) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/phc3.12544 · Cited by 88
A Plurality of Pluralisms: Collaborative Practice in Archaeology
Wylie, A. (2015) · Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-14349-1_10 · Cited by 86
Expert Trespassing Testimony and the Ethics of Science Communication
Gerken, M. (2018) · Journal for General Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1007/s10838-018-9416-1 · Cited by 74
Explainable machine learning practices: opening another black box for reliable medical AI
Ratti, E., & Graves, M. (2022) · AI and Ethics · doi:10.1007/s43681-022-00141-z · Cited by 61
“But it can also be that the very notion of what constitutes representativeness or good quality of data is shaped by values, and in this case the values will play a direct role, because it is the value itself that acts as “stand-alone reasons to motivate our choice” [11], p 96).”
BackgroundYergeau, M., & Huebner, B. (2017) · Journal of Social Philosophy · doi:10.1111/josp.12191 · Cited by 61
Science, Values, and the New Demarcation Problem
Resnik, D. B., & Elliott, K. C. (2023) · Journal for General Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1007/s10838-022-09633-2 · Cited by 49
“Science itself should remain as free as is humanly possible from external values (Douglas 2009).1 Although some philosophers (e.g., Haack 2004; Betz 2013; Hudson 2016) still accept some version of the value-free ideal for science, others reject the value-free ideal and argue that scientists should…”
BackgroundInfluentialIllegitimate Values, Confirmation Bias, and Mandevillian Cognition in Science
Peters, U. (2021) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axy079 · Cited by 45
Expert responsibility in AI development
Hedlund, M., & Persson, E. (2024) · AI & SOCIETY · doi:10.1007/s00146-022-01498-9 · Cited by 39
In conversation with Artificial Intelligence: aligning language models with human values
Kasirzadeh, A., & Gabriel, I. (2022) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2209.00731 · Cited by 128
“32Heather Douglas [31] has explored how judgements about the seriousness of social consequences im- pact the amount of evidence scientists demand before declaring a chemical toxic.”
BackgroundScience Communication and the Problematic Impact of Descriptive Norms
Peters, U. (2023) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/715001 · Cited by 13
Wishful Thinking and Values in Science
Steel, D. (2018) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/699714 · Cited by 13
“Choice-supportive bias” in science: Explanation and mitigation
Kafaee, M., Marhamati, H., & Gharibzadeh, S. (2021) · Accountability in Research · doi:10.1080/08989621.2021.1872377 · Cited by 12
The Precautionary Principle Meets the Hill Criteria of Causation
Steel, D., & Yu, J. (2019) · Ethics, Policy & Environment · doi:10.1080/21550085.2019.1581420 · Cited by 4
Aydeniz, M. (2026) · Sociology Compass · doi:10.1111/soc4.70230 · Cited by 1
Birch, J. (2024) · The Edge of Sentience · doi:10.1093/9780191966729.003.0003 · Cited by 1
Explainable AI Isn't Enough! Rethinking Algorithmic Contestability
Freiesleben, T., Meding, K., & König, G. (2026) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2605.16041
Metadata
- Authors
- DOUGLAS, H. E.
- Publisher
- University of Pittsburgh Press
- Published
- 2009-07-15
- Cited by
- 1,096
- References
- 0
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.