The Liar’s Dividend: Can Politicians Claim Misinformation to Evade Accountability?
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Abstract
This study addresses the phenomenon of misinformation about misinformation, or politicians "crying wolf"' over fake news. Strategic and false claims that stories are fake news or deepfakes may benefit politicians by helping them maintain support after a scandal. We posit that this benefit, known as the "liar's dividend," may be achieved through two politician strategies: by invoking informational uncertainty or by encouraging oppositional rallying of core supporters. We administer five survey experiments to over 15,000 American adults detailing hypothetical politician responses to stories describing real politician scandals. We find that claims of misinformation representing both strategies raise politician support across partisan subgroups. These strategies are effective against text-based reports of scandals, but are largely ineffective against video evidence and do not reduce general trust in media. Finally, these false claims produce greater dividends for politicians than alternative responses to scandal, such as remaining silent or apologizing.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
Five pre-registered survey experiments with 15,296 U.S. adults find that politicians can gain support by falsely claiming real scandals are misinformation, especially for text-based scandals. These “liar’s dividend” claims are broadly effective across partisan subgroups, generally ineffective against video evidence, and often more effective than silence or apology.
Key findings
- Claims of misinformation increased politician support for text-based scandals: pooled effects were 0.17 SD for informational uncertainty and 0.21 SD for oppositional rallying; support was higher in 7 of 8 text cases across four studies, with consistent or stronger results among attentive respondents.
- Claims against video scandals were largely ineffective: only one non-null video effect appeared out of four cases across two studies—Study 4 oppositional rallying increased support by 0.14 SD—while informational uncertainty against video did not.
- Compared with alternatives, Study 3 found informational uncertainty claims were more effective than apologizing (0.10 SD, p = 0.012); simple denials were not significantly more effective than apologies (p = 0.252), and misinformation claims were not significantly different from simple denials (0.06 SD, p = 0.167).
- Study 5 found claims reduced belief in the scandal: informational uncertainty by 0.15 SD (p = 0.001) and oppositional rallying by 0.14 SD (p = 0.002); 44% of control respondents believed the scandal versus 36% and 35% in those treatment groups. Trust in media was generally unaffected versus nonresponse, though Study 3 found misinformation claims reduced trust versus apology by 0.12 SD and simple denial by 0.09 SD; Study 2 fact-checking eliminated support gains.
Methods
- Five IRB-approved, pre-registered online survey experiments with a total of 15,296 U.S. adults, using four real politician scandals (two Democrats, two Republicans) presented as text or video; treatments included no response, an informational uncertainty rebuttal, and an oppositional rallying rebuttal, with Study 3 adding apology and simple denial and Study 2 adding fact-checking.
- Samples were recruited via Lucid (Studies 1, 2, 3, 5) and Prolific (Study 4); outcomes used 5-point Likert items combined into pre-registered indices for belief in the scandal, politician support, and trust in media, analyzed by regressing outcomes on treatment with covariates and robust standard errors.
- Study sizes were Study 1 n = 2,503; Study 2 n = 2,518; Study 3 n = 2,996; Study 4 n = 4,441; Study 5 n = 2,838.
Limitations
- The paper states that the scandals concern identity politics (three race/ethnicity, one gender/abortion), use inactive politicians, and are not especially salient today, limiting generalizability; it also notes the experimental near-simultaneous scandal and rebuttal may overstate real-world effects and simplifies timing, repetition, and countermessaging.
- The paper states belief-in-scandal findings were mixed (insignificant in Studies 1, 2, and 4; significant in Study 5), trust-in-media effects were mostly null, and samples were not weighted, with the Prolific sample underrepresenting Hispanic individuals and Republicans.
- Evident in the text: text and video treatments differed in wording—video treatments alleged a deepfake while text treatments denied the story’s truth while claiming misinformation—which may partly explain format differences; the study also involved deception by attributing fabricated politician responses to real politicians.
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Claims the paper makes
0 Valid · 1 Not valid · 30 Not checked · 197 Own results and interpretations
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Finally, these false claims produce greater dividends for politicians than alternative responses to scandal, such as remaining silent or apologizing.”
- Also stated in: § Abstract · plain
“Claims of misinformation also generate larger support gains for politicians than simply ignoring the scandal (non-response) or apologizing, arguably a normatively preferable strategy, and are at least as effective as a more simple denial.”
§ The Liar's Dividend: Can Politicians Claim Misinformation to Evade Accountability? > Abstract
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Also stated in: § Abstract · plain
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Overall, our findings are consistent, if not stronger, amongst more attentive participants (also see SM Sections A.3 and A.6).”
§ The Liar's Dividend: Can Politicians Claim Misinformation to Evade Accountability? > 13.
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“These strategies are effective against text-based reports of scandals, but are largely ineffective against video evidence and do not reduce general trust in media.”
- Also stated in: § Abstract · hedged
“Furthermore, we also originally conjectured that these claims of misinformation could further undermine trust in media, but we generally find insignificant impacts on trust in media.”
§ The Liar's Dividend: Can Politicians Claim Misinformation to Evade Accountability? > Abstract
plainn = 15,000- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Also stated in: § Abstract · hedged
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Finally, we find evidence in one study that claims invoking the oppositional rallying strategy can discredit scandals caught on video.”
§ The Liar's Dividend: Can Politicians Claim Misinformation to Evade Accountability? > Abstract
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“These strategies are effective against text-based reports of scandals, but are largely ineffective against video evidence and do not reduce general trust in media.”
- Also stated in: § Abstract · plain
“We find that false claims of misinformation do pay a liar's dividend, primarily when used against scandals reported in text format.”
§ The Liar's Dividend: Can Politicians Claim Misinformation to Evade Accountability? > Abstract
plainstates a causen = 15,000- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Also stated in: § Abstract · plain
115 more claims
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Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ The Liar's Dividend: Can Politicians Claim Misinformation to Evade Accountability? > B.3.2 Demographic Questions
“Race/ethnicity is coded as a factor variable with White, Black or African American, and Other as the three race/ethnicity categories.”
§ The Liar's Dividend: Can Politicians Claim Misinformation to Evade Accountability? > A.5 Pre-Registered Hypotheses and Deviations from Pre-Analysis Plan
“we instead coded race/ethnicity with five levels: White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, and Other.”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ The Liar's Dividend: Can Politicians Claim Misinformation to Evade Accountability? > 4.1 Video and Text Scandals
“For Study 2, we recruited 2,518 participants in April 2021 via Lucid.”
§ The Liar's Dividend: Can Politicians Claim Misinformation to Evade Accountability? > 24.
“Study 2 (Lucid, May 2021, n = 2518 Text)”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ The Liar's Dividend: Can Politicians Claim Misinformation to Evade Accountability? > A.1 Ethical Considerations
“Also importantly, all participants were compensated for participation in the three studies, regardless of overall survey completion or satisfaction of attention check questions.”
§ The Liar's Dividend: Can Politicians Claim Misinformation to Evade Accountability? > 3 Experimental Design
“we conducted five IRB-approved, online survey experiments based on pre-registered designs 5 with a total of 15,296 respondents.”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Schiff, K. J., Schiff, D. S., & Bueno, N.
- Affiliations
- Purdue University West Lafayette (US)
- Publisher
- Center for Open Science
- Published
- 2023-08-10
- OpenAlex
- W4385766589
- Cited by
- 8
- References
- 61
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 1
- Type
- posted content
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- SocArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
- SocArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nd)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
- Social Sciences › Communication › Social Media and Politics
- Keywords
- misinformation, fake news, political scandal, information uncertainty, media trust, deepfakes, political support
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