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The Liar’s Dividend: Can Politicians Claim Misinformation to Evade Accountability?

Open access
Schiff, Kaylyn Jackson, Schiff, Daniel S., Bueno, Natalia · 2023

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 65 of the 65 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 37 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

Abstract

This study addresses the phenomenon of misinformation about misinformation, or politicians "crying wolf"' over fake news. Strategic and false claims that stories are fake news or deepfakes may benefit politicians by helping them maintain support after a scandal. We posit that this benefit, known as the "liar's dividend," may be achieved through two politician strategies: by invoking informational uncertainty or by encouraging oppositional rallying of core supporters. We administer five survey experiments to over 15,000 American adults detailing hypothetical politician responses to stories describing real politician scandals. We find that claims of misinformation representing both strategies raise politician support across partisan subgroups. These strategies are effective against text-based reports of scandals, but are largely ineffective against video evidence and do not reduce general trust in media. Finally, these false claims produce greater dividends for politicians than alternative responses to scandal, such as remaining silent or apologizing.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

Five pre-registered survey experiments with 15,296 U.S. adults find that politicians can gain support by falsely claiming real scandals are misinformation, especially for text-based scandals. These “liar’s dividend” claims are broadly effective across partisan subgroups, generally ineffective against video evidence, and often more effective than silence or apology.

Key findings

  • Claims of misinformation increased politician support for text-based scandals: pooled effects were 0.17 SD for informational uncertainty and 0.21 SD for oppositional rallying; support was higher in 7 of 8 text cases across four studies, with consistent or stronger results among attentive respondents.
  • Claims against video scandals were largely ineffective: only one non-null video effect appeared out of four cases across two studies—Study 4 oppositional rallying increased support by 0.14 SD—while informational uncertainty against video did not.
  • Compared with alternatives, Study 3 found informational uncertainty claims were more effective than apologizing (0.10 SD, p = 0.012); simple denials were not significantly more effective than apologies (p = 0.252), and misinformation claims were not significantly different from simple denials (0.06 SD, p = 0.167).
  • Study 5 found claims reduced belief in the scandal: informational uncertainty by 0.15 SD (p = 0.001) and oppositional rallying by 0.14 SD (p = 0.002); 44% of control respondents believed the scandal versus 36% and 35% in those treatment groups. Trust in media was generally unaffected versus nonresponse, though Study 3 found misinformation claims reduced trust versus apology by 0.12 SD and simple denial by 0.09 SD; Study 2 fact-checking eliminated support gains.

Methods

  • Five IRB-approved, pre-registered online survey experiments with a total of 15,296 U.S. adults, using four real politician scandals (two Democrats, two Republicans) presented as text or video; treatments included no response, an informational uncertainty rebuttal, and an oppositional rallying rebuttal, with Study 3 adding apology and simple denial and Study 2 adding fact-checking.
  • Samples were recruited via Lucid (Studies 1, 2, 3, 5) and Prolific (Study 4); outcomes used 5-point Likert items combined into pre-registered indices for belief in the scandal, politician support, and trust in media, analyzed by regressing outcomes on treatment with covariates and robust standard errors.
  • Study sizes were Study 1 n = 2,503; Study 2 n = 2,518; Study 3 n = 2,996; Study 4 n = 4,441; Study 5 n = 2,838.

Limitations

  • The paper states that the scandals concern identity politics (three race/ethnicity, one gender/abortion), use inactive politicians, and are not especially salient today, limiting generalizability; it also notes the experimental near-simultaneous scandal and rebuttal may overstate real-world effects and simplifies timing, repetition, and countermessaging.
  • The paper states belief-in-scandal findings were mixed (insignificant in Studies 1, 2, and 4; significant in Study 5), trust-in-media effects were mostly null, and samples were not weighted, with the Prolific sample underrepresenting Hispanic individuals and Republicans.
  • Evident in the text: text and video treatments differed in wording—video treatments alleged a deepfake while text treatments denied the story’s truth while claiming misinformation—which may partly explain format differences; the study also involved deception by attributing fabricated politician responses to real politicians.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.31235/osf.io/x43ph

Cites

65 of 65 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

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Claims the paper makes

0 Valid · 1 Not valid · 30 Not checked · 197 Own results and interpretations

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Citations

Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 7

  1. [11]11. Hao, Karen. 2019. "The Biggest Threat of Deepfakes Isn't the Deepfakes Themselves." MIT Technology Review, https : / / www . technologyreview . com / 2019 / 10 / 10 / 132667 / the - biggest-threat-of-deepfakes-isnt-the-deepfakes-themselves/.
  2. [19]19. Little, Andrew T. 2018. "Fake News, Propaganda, and Lies Can Be Pervasive Even If They Aren't Persuasive." Critique 11 (1): 21-34.
  3. [22]22. O'Shaughnessy, Nicholas Jackson. 2004. Politics and Propaganda. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
  4. [29]29. Coppock, Alexander. 2022. "Persuasion in parallel." In Persuasion in Parallel. University of Chicago Press.
  5. [31]31. Schiff, Kaylyn Jackson, B Pablo Montagnes, and Zachary Peskowitz. 2022. "Priming Self- Reported Partisanship: Implications for Survey Design and Analysis." Public Opinion Quarterly 86 (3): 643-667.
  6. [37]37. Berinsky, Adam J., Michele F. Margolis, and Michael W. Sances. 2014. "Separating the Shirk- ers from the Workers? Making Sure Respondents Pay Attention on Self-Administered Surveys." American Journal of Political Science 58 (3): 739-753.
  7. [43]43. Kling, Jeffrey R., Jeffrey B. Liebman, and Lawrence F. Katz. 2007. "Experimental Analysis of Neighborhood Effects." Econometrica 75 (1): 83-119.

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Metadata

Authors
Schiff, K. J., Schiff, D. S., & Bueno, N.
Affiliations
Purdue University West Lafayette (US)
Published
2023-08-10
OpenAlex
W4385766589
Cited by
8
References
61
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 1
Type
posted content
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • SocArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
  • SocArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nd)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
  • Social Sciences › Communication › Social Media and Politics
Keywords
misinformation, fake news, political scandal, information uncertainty, media trust, deepfakes, political support

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