Temporal structure of consciousness and minimal self in schizophrenia
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The concept of the minimal self refers to the consciousness of oneself as an immediate subject of experience. According to recent studies, disturbances of the minimal self may be a core feature of schizophrenia. They are emphasized in classical psychiatry literature and in phenomenological work. Impaired minimal self-experience may be defined as a distortion of one's first-person experiential perspective as, for example, an "altered presence" during which the sense of the experienced self ("mineness") is subtly affected, or "altered sense of demarcation," i.e., a difficulty discriminating the self from the non-self. Little is known, however, about the cognitive basis of these disturbances. In fact, recent work indicates that disorders of the self are not correlated with cognitive impairments commonly found in schizophrenia such as working-memory and attention disorders. In addition, a major difficulty with exploring the minimal self experimentally lies in its definition as being non-self-reflexive, and distinct from the verbalized, explicit awareness of an "I." In this paper, we shall discuss the possibility that disturbances of the minimal self observed in patients with schizophrenia are related to alterations in time processing. We shall review the literature on schizophrenia and time processing that lends support to this possibility. In particular we shall discuss the involvement of temporal integration windows on different time scales (implicit time processing) as well as duration perception disturbances (explicit time processing) in disorders of the minimal self. We argue that a better understanding of the relationship between time and the minimal self as well of issues of embodiment require research that looks more specifically at implicit time processing. Some methodological issues will be discussed.
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Citations
Cites
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(Bud) Craig, A. D. (2009) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2555 · Cited by 6,657 · cited 1×
“These empirical findings confirm embodied notions of subjective time (Craig, 2009) and link the experiences of emotion, time, and interoception for the creation of a self (Seth, 2013).”
BackgroundWhat are the functional consequences of neurocognitive deficits in schizophrenia?
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“Moreover, some models of the minimal self (Gallagher, 2000) distinguish between two components: the sense of “agency” involving forward models, and the sense of “ownership.””
BackgroundNeurocognitive deficit in schizophrenia: A quantitative review of the evidence.
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Das Reafferenzprinzip: Wechselwirkungen zwischen Zentralnervensystem und Peripherie
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“The following clinical examples help further define what we mean by minimal SDs.”
BackgroundMethodInteroceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied self
Seth, A. K. (2013) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2013.09.007 · Cited by 1,816 · cited 2×
“This loop could be supplied by the recurrent system of information processing described within the predictive coding framework (Friston, 2008), which is in accordance with an embodied approach of predictive interoceptive coding (Seth, 2013).”
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“Skodlar, B., and Parnas, J. (2010). Self-disorder and subjective dimensions of suicidality in schizophrenia.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialEASE: Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience
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The Early Symptoms of Schizophrenia
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Cited by
The self and its prolonged intrinsic neural timescale in schizophrenia
Northoff, G., Sandsten, K. E., Nordgaard, J., Kjaer, T. W., & Parnas, J. (2021) · Schizophrenia Bulletin · doi:10.1093/schbul/sbaa083 · Cited by 91
Narrative identity in the psychosis spectrum: A systematic review and developmental model
Cowan, H. R., Mittal, V. A., & McAdams, D. P. (2021) · Clinical Psychology Review · doi:10.1016/j.cpr.2021.102067 · Cited by 82
Allé, M. C., d'Argembeau, A., Schneider, P., Potheegadoo, J., Coutelle, R., Danion, J.-M., & Berna, F. (2016) · Comprehensive Psychiatry · doi:10.1016/j.comppsych.2016.05.001 · Cited by 39
Self-citationGraham‐Schmidt, K. T., Martin‐Iverson, M. T., & Waters, F. A. V. (2019) · PsyCh Journal · doi:10.1002/pchj.274 · Cited by 11
Metadata
- Authors
- Martin, B., Wittmann, M., Franck, N., Cermolacce, M., Berna, F., & Giersch, A.
- Venue
- Frontiers in Psychology
- Publisher
- Frontiers Media SA
- Published
- 2014-10-21
- Volume
- 5
- Pages
- 1175-1175
- ISSN
- 1664-1078 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2077375418
- Cited by
- 86
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 44.26
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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