What does it mean for consciousness to be multidimensional? A narrative review
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 100 of the 110 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 7 of the 32 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
A recent development in the psychological and neuroscientific study of consciousness has been the tendency to conceptualize consciousness as a multidimensional phenomenon. This narrative review elucidates the notion of dimensionality of consciousness and outlines the key concepts and disagreements on this topic through the viewpoints of several theoretical proposals. The reviewed literature is critically evaluated, and the main issues to be resolved by future theoretical and empirical work are identified: the problems of dimension selection and dimension aggregation, as well as some ethical considerations. This narrative review is seemingly the first to comprehensively overview this specific aspect of consciousness science.
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## TL;DR
This narrative review surveys major ways consciousness has been described as multidimensional, focusing on human consciousness in cognitive science and philosophy. Its main conclusion is that the field still lacks a clear way to identify which dimensions genuinely belong to consciousness and how, if at all, they should be aggregated into overall comparisons.
## Key findings
- The review distinguishes dimensional description of consciousness from the stronger claim that consciousness itself has a dimensional structure; most models discussed do not clearly commit to one or the other.
- The paper identifies a recurring problem across models: there is no clear criterion for selecting true dimensions of consciousness versus biological confounds or unrelated psychological constructs.
- In the bidimensional model, the paper discusses a level dimension and a content/awareness dimension; the Ictal Consciousness Inventory’s content subscale was explained by a single factor with little cross-loading from level, but the author argues that the content dimension likely remains multidimensional in itself.
- The review notes that the Temporo-spatial Theory of Consciousness posits 4 dimensions—level/state, content/form, phenomenal features, and global cognitive access—each tied to a specific neural mechanism.
## Methods
- Narrative review of theoretical and empirical work on the dimensionality of human consciousness.
- Scope was limited to models from cognitive science and philosophy; it excluded artificial systems, non-human animals, religion/spirituality, and quantum theories.
- The review organizes the literature into sections on general issues, several theoretical models, and empirical approaches, then critically compares their assumptions and limitations.
## Limitations
- The paper explicitly states that it is a narrative review, and it does not claim a systematic search or meta-analysis; it also says the review is limited in scope to human consciousness and to models that clearly endorse dimensionality.
- The author notes that few research papers directly study the dimensions of consciousness, and that many proposals remain intangible and too far from current psychological and neuroscientific methods to be easily tested.
- A limitation evident in the text is that many models are underspecified about how to distinguish real dimensions of consciousness from confounds, and about how multiple dimensions should be aggregated into an overall ordering.
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Claims the paper makes
4 Valid · 4 Not valid · 18 Not checked · 38 Own results and interpretations
At least one cited source doesn’t support this claim or points to a different paper, and none confirmed it — see the verdicts below.
In the paper
“Additionally, IIT, as it is presented by its original authors ( Albantakis et al., 2023 ), seems incompatible with any dimensionality of consciousness other than an overall Φ value”
What the sources say
- Disputedcites Albantakis et al., 2023 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Our copy directly contradicts the attributed point: in 'Postulates of physical existence' the paper states that 'The Φ-structure unfolded from a complex corresponds to the quality of consciousness,' while only 'the sum total of the φ values ... measures its structure integrated information Φ ... and corresponds to the quantity of consciousness' — i.e. IIT 4.0 posits a multi-component structure, not a single scalar. 'The explanatory identity between experiences and Φ-structures' requires 'a one-to-one correspondence between the way the experience feels and the way distinctions and relations are structured,' and the Conclusions (p. of Results and discussion) predict qualities of spatial, temporal and object experience from the composition of Φ-structures and Φ-folds. So IIT as presented here is compatible with, indeed built on, dimensions of consciousness beyond an overall Φ value. (LLM, conf=0.80)
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hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Disputed
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Using dimensionality reduction on resting state fMRI data, they identified three neurofunctional gradients that were differentially affected by the administration of propofol or ketamine and in pathological conditions like unresponsive wakefulness syndrome and schizophrenia.”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Huang et al., 2023 source
Split into 2 atoms — 2 confirmed, 0 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
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The sources with a verdict support this claim; the rest weren’t checked yet, have no full text we could read, or their verdicts aren’t rated yet.
In the paper
“On the other hand, a weak point remains in the step from the four outlined dimensions being considered criteria for defining consciousness ( Jonkisz, 2012 ) to becoming dimensions of consciousness itself ( Jonkisz et al., 2017 ).”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Jonkisz, 2012
- Supportedcites Jonkisz et al., 2017 source
The Four Dimensions of Consciousness section explicitly proposes phenomenological, semantic, physiological, and functional dimensions of consciousness. The judgment that this step is a 'weak point' is the citing authors' critique, not a claim attributed to Jonkisz et al. (2017). (LLM, conf=0.92)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Evidence on the exact nature of the relationship between intelligence and complexity measures is currently mixed ( Saxe et al., 2018 ; Dreszer et al., 2020 ; Wang, 2021 ; Thiele et al., 2023 ).”
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Saxe et al., 2018 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Conclusion says further work is needed to establish the precise nature of the relationship between brain entropy and intelligence. But the Results and Discussion report a consistent positive association in this study; the paper does not establish that evidence across complexity measures is mixed. (LLM, conf=0.84)
- Supportedcites Dreszer et al., 2020 source
The Introduction says existing evidence on intelligence and resting-state EEG complexity has yielded ambiguous outcomes: one study found greater complexity with higher intelligence, while another did not confirm it. The Discussion also reports relationships that differ by timescale and says more studies are needed to clarify them. (LLM, conf=0.94)
- Partly supportedcites Wang, 2021 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Results and Discussion report that higher fluid intelligence was associated with lower resting-state brain entropy in parts of the executive-control and default-mode networks. This supplies one finding about the intelligence–complexity relationship, but the paper does not establish that evidence across studies is mixed. (LLM, conf=0.82)
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“This variable cannot be seen as identical to the intuitive or clinical conception of a level of consciousness, as will be seen in the overview of the theory below.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
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Citations
Cites
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“Any interested readers are therefore referred to the pivotal texts establishing the theory (Tononi, 2004; Oizumi et al., 2014; Albantakis et al., 2023).”
BackgroundIntegrated information theory: from consciousness to its physical substrate
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Vagueness and grammar: the semantics of relative and absolute gradable adjectives
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“While their comparative forms (“is taller than”), given the correct context, are relatively unproblematic, the positive form (“is tall”) often introduces vagueness, resulting in statements with unclear truth values (Kennedy, 2007).”
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A theoretically based index of consciousness independent of sensory processing and behavior
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“Any interested readers are therefore referred to the pivotal texts establishing the theory (Tononi, 2004; Oizumi et al., 2014; Albantakis et al., 2023).”
BackgroundTo See or Not to See: Prestimulus α Phase Predicts Visual Awareness
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“This is evidenced by the phenomenon of “phase preference” (Northoff and Huang, 2017), where the pre-stimulus phase of brain oscillations affects whether a near-threshold percept reaches consciousness (Mathewson et al., 2009; Glim et al., 2020).”
BackgroundActive interoceptive inference and the emotional brain
Seth, A. K., & Friston, K. J. (2016) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2016.0007 · Cited by 945 · cited 1×
“Lastly, the functional dimension of consciousness is not assigned to any experimental paradigm in psychology or neuroscience but is instead related to the “Bayesian brain” hypothesis (Friston, 2012; Seth and Friston, 2016).”
BackgroundGlobal workspace theory of consciousness: toward a cognitive neuroscience of human experience
Baars, B. J. (2005) · Progress in Brain Research · doi:10.1016/s0079-6123(05)50004-9 · Cited by 888 · cited 4×
“The authors also note that the multidimensional approach seems at odds with both major theories of consciousness: the Global Workspace Theory (GWT; Baars, 2005) and IIT (Tononi et al., 2016).”
BackgroundInfluentialThe neural correlate of (un)awareness: lessons from the vegetative state
Laureys, S. (2005) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2005.10.010 · Cited by 813 · cited 2×
“However, the content dimension of consciousness is also associated with the function of specialized modules providing the neural correlate for a specific kind of experience 3 (Laureys, 2005; Monaco et al., 2005).”
BackgroundMethodPsychometric evaluation of the altered states of consciousness rating scale (OAV)
Studerus, E., Gamma, A., & Vollenweider, F. X. (2010) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012412 · Cited by 683 · cited 1×
“While there are other questionnaires describing altered states of consciousness using a number of dimensions (Pekala et al., 1986; Studerus et al., 2010; Ali et al., 2012), the ICI is directly related by its authors to the two dimensions of consciousness in their model.”
Background(1965) · Annals of Internal Medicine · doi:10.7326/0003-4819-63-4-738_2 · Cited by 640
Boly, M., Massimini, M., Tsuchiya, N., Postle, B. R., Koch, C., & Tononi, G. (2017) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.3218-16.2017 · Cited by 557
What does phase information of oscillatory brain activity tell us about cognitive processes?
Sauseng, P., & Klimesch, W. (2008) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2008.03.014 · Cited by 532
Introspection and subliminal perception
Ramsøy, T. Z., & Overgaard, M. (2004) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1023/b:phen.0000041900.30172.e8 · Cited by 527 · cited 2×
“Jonkisz et al. (2017) hypothesize that directly asking subjects to report on their experience (for example, by using the Perceptual Awareness Scale; Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004; Overgaard and Sandberg, 2021) is more closely related to varying phenomenal quality, while using confidence ratings as an…”
BackgroundAre there levels of consciousness?
Bayne, T., Hohwy, J., & Owen, A. M. (2016) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2016.03.009 · Cited by 438 · cited 10×
“Responding to the article of Bayne et al. (2016a), Fazekas and Overgaard (2016) agree with their proposal of multidimensional global states, but they argue that this account omits another way in which consciousness is dimensional: the conscious awareness of contents coming in degrees.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialThe history of the future of the Bayesian brain
Friston, K. (2012) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.10.004 · Cited by 350 · cited 1×
“Lastly, the functional dimension of consciousness is not assigned to any experimental paradigm in psychology or neuroscience but is instead related to the “Bayesian brain” hypothesis (Friston, 2012; Seth and Friston, 2016).”
BackgroundShould a Few Null Findings Falsify Prefrontal Theories of Conscious Perception?
Odegaard, B., Knight, R. T., & Lau, H. (2017) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.3217-16.2017 · Cited by 316
Measuring information integration
Tononi, G., & Sporns, O. (2003) · BMC Neuroscience · doi:10.1186/1471-2202-4-31 · Cited by 294
Albantakis, L., Barbosa, L., Findlay, G., Grasso, M., Haun, A. M., Marshall, W., Mayner, W. G. P., Zaeemzadeh, A., Boly, M., Juel, B. E., et al. (2023) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1011465 · Cited by 292
A Typology of Multidimensional Adjectives
Sassoon, G. W. (2013) · Journal of Semantics · doi:10.1093/jos/ffs012 · Cited by 252 · cited 2×
“Dimensional adjectives depend on the value of some scalar variable, such as tall depending on the height of a person (Sassoon, 2013).”
BackgroundNorthoff, G., & Lamme, V. (2020) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2020.07.019 · Cited by 247
Northoff, G., & Huang, Z. (2017) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2017.07.013 · Cited by 229 · cited 3×
“This is evidenced by the phenomenon of “phase preference” (Northoff and Huang, 2017), where the pre-stimulus phase of brain oscillations affects whether a near-threshold percept reaches consciousness (Mathewson et al., 2009; Glim et al., 2020).”
BackgroundMethodConsciousness and complexity: a consilience of evidence
Sarasso, S., Casali, A. G., Casarotto, S., Rosanova, M., Sinigaglia, C., & Massimini, M. (2021) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niab023 · Cited by 171
Resting state fMRI entropy probes complexity of brain activity in adults with ADHD
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“…dimension of consciousness (assuming the validity of the multidimensionality thesis), there is no way to decide whether lowered complexity in ADHD (Sokunbi et al., 2013) or anorexia nervosa (Tóth et al., 2004; Collantoni et al., 2020) represents a real attenuation of some dimensions of experience…”
BackgroundAre there islands of awareness?
Bayne, T., Seth, A. K., & Massimini, M. (2020) · Trends in Neurosciences · doi:10.1016/j.tins.2019.11.003 · Cited by 145 · cited 1×
“While Bayne et al. (2016a) and Bayne and Carter (2018) reject the possibility of a single gradable dimension of consciousness, elsewhere, Bayne et al. (2020a,b) argue for the use of unidimensional complexity measures as indications of the presence of islands of awareness.”
BackgroundWhy Does Space Feel the Way it Does? Towards a Principled Account of Spatial Experience
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“Composition means that experiences have a structure, that they consist of phenomenal distinctions and relations, such as those between places in subjective space (Haun and Tononi, 2019).”
BackgroundMethodDimensions of consciousness and the psychedelic state
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“Following from the proposal of Bayne et al. (2016a), Bayne and Carter (2018) apply the argument against gradedness of consciousness to the psychedelic state, arguing that it deviates from normal waking consciousness in different directions on different putative dimensions.”
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Doerig, A., Schurger, A., Hess, K., & Herzog, M. H. (2019) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2019.04.002 · Cited by 140
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Brain entropy and human intelligence: a resting-state fMRI study
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“Evidence on the exact nature of the relationship between intelligence and complexity measures is currently mixed (Saxe et al., 2018; Dreszer et al., 2020; Wang, 2021; Thiele et al., 2023).”
BackgroundOn the axiomatic foundations of the integrated information theory of consciousness
Bayne, T. (2018) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niy007 · Cited by 132 · cited 2×
“IIT’s concept of Φ has been criticized from various perspectives (Cerullo, 2015; Barrett and Mediano, 2019; Pautz, 2019), as has been the theory itself (e.g., Bayne, 2018; Doerig et al., 2019; Michel and Lau, 2020; Herzog et al., 2022; Fleming et al., 2023).”
BackgroundWhat the brain's intrinsic activity can tell us about consciousness? A tri-dimensional view
Northoff, G. (2012) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2012.12.004 · Cited by 130 · cited 1×
“Northoff (2013) postulated, based on the influence the brain’s baseline activity fluctuations have on contents entering consciousness, a third dimension of consciousness: form.”
BackgroundVagueness and zombies: why ‘phenomenally conscious’ has no borderline cases
Simon, J. A. (2016) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0790-4 · Cited by 117 · cited 1×
“This specific kind of vagueness has usually been denied to the property of consciousness on philosophical grounds (Antony, 2008; Simon, 2017).”
BackgroundThe Problem with Phi: A Critique of Integrated Information Theory
Cerullo, M. A. (2015) · PLOS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004286 · Cited by 114 · cited 1×
“IIT’s concept of Φ has been criticized from various perspectives (Cerullo, 2015; Barrett and Mediano, 2019; Pautz, 2019), as has been the theory itself (e.g., Bayne, 2018; Doerig et al., 2019; Michel and Lau, 2020; Herzog et al., 2022; Fleming et al., 2023).”
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The strength of weak integrated information theory
Mediano, P. A. M., Rosas, F. E., Bor, D., Seth, A. K., & Barrett, A. B. (2022) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2022.04.008 · Cited by 108
Measurement of Phenomenological Experience: Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory
Pekala, R. J., Steinberg, J., & Kumar, V. K. (1986) · Perceptual and Motor Skills · doi:10.2466/pms.1986.63.2.983 · Cited by 105
Functional geometry of the cortex encodes dimensions of consciousness
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Reforming the taxonomy in disorders of consciousness
Bayne, T., Hohwy, J., & Owen, A. M. (2017) · Annals of Neurology · doi:10.1002/ana.25088 · Cited by 94 · cited 1×
“A different branch of research that has been associated with the dimensions of consciousness by some of the authors reviewed above (Bayne et al., 2017; Walter, 2021) is the multidimensional assessment of disorders of consciousness.”
BackgroundAre Gaps Preferred to Gluts? A Closer Look at Borderline Contradictions
Égré, P., & Zehr, J. (2018) · Language, cognition and mind · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-77791-7_2 · Cited by 94
Brain organoids, consciousness, ethics and moral status
Jeziorski, J. J., Brandt, R., Evans, J. H., Campana, W. M., KALICHMAN, M. W., Thompson, E. T., Goldstein, L. S. B., Koch, C., & Muotri, A. R. (2022) · Seminars in Cell and Developmental Biology · doi:10.1016/j.semcdb.2022.03.020 · Cited by 80
The neurocognitive correlates of brain entropy estimated by resting state fMRI
Wang, Z. (2021) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2021.117893 · Cited by 77 · cited 1×
“Evidence on the exact nature of the relationship between intelligence and complexity measures is currently mixed (Saxe et al., 2018; Dreszer et al., 2020; Wang, 2021; Thiele et al., 2023).”
BackgroundThe Perceptual Awareness Scale—recent controversies and debates
Overgaard, M. S., & Sandberg, K. (2021) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niab044 · Cited by 76 · cited 1×
“…that directly asking subjects to report on their experience (for example, by using the Perceptual Awareness Scale; Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004; Overgaard and Sandberg, 2021) is more closely related to varying phenomenal quality, while using confidence ratings as an indicator of consciousness…”
BackgroundCavanna, A. E., Mula, M., Servo, S., Strigaro, G., Tota, G., Barbagli, D., Collimedaglia, L., Viana, M., Cantello, R. M., & Monaco, F. (2008) · Epilepsy & Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.yebeh.2008.01.009 · Cited by 73
Sergent, C., Faugeras, F., Rohaut, B., Perrin, F., Valente, M., Tallon-Baudry, C., Cohen, L., & Naccache, L. (2017) · NeuroImage: Clinical · doi:10.1016/j.nicl.2016.12.004 · Cited by 72 · cited 1×
“For example, Sergent et al. (2017) have developed an EEG protocol made up of eight tasks that require no behavioral response, such as global incongruence detection or own name perception.”
MethodThe Altered States Database: Psychometric Data of Altered States of Consciousness
Schmidt, T. T., & Berkemeyer, H. (2018) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01028 · Cited by 68 · cited 1×
“However, there is also a group of questionnaires assessing altered states of consciousness that have seen extensive use in research (Schmidt and Berkemeyer, 2018), some of which describe altered states using dimensions.”
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“One would have to accept the possibility of states that are neither conscious nor unconscious (Schwitzgebel, 2023).”
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A Multi‐Factor Account of Degrees of Awareness
Fazekas, P., & Overgaard, M. (2018) · Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/cogs.12478 · Cited by 60 · cited 2×
“For example, it has been claimed that dream content can be described along the dimensions of intensity, specificity, and stability (Nemeth and Fazekas, 2018; Fazekas et al., 2019; Fazekas, 2024).”
BackgroundConsciousness, epilepsy, and emotional qualia
Monaco, F., Mula, M., & Cavanna, A. E. (2005) · Epilepsy & Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.yebeh.2005.05.018 · Cited by 58
Consciousness: A Neurological Perspective
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Lee, A. Y. (2023) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12421 · Cited by 57 · cited 8×
“Lee (2023) identifies two main lines of reasoning presented by Bayne et al. (2016a) against the gradability of consciousness: the Determinacy Objection and the Ordering Objection.”
BackgroundInfluentialPhenomenal Consciousness, Defined and Defended as Innocently as I Can Manage
Schwitzgebel, E. (2016) · Journal of Consciousness Studies · Cited by 56
Are Our Concepts conscious state and conscious creature Vague?
Antony, M. V. (2007) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-007-9061-2 · Cited by 55 · cited 1×
“This specific kind of vagueness has usually been denied to the property of consciousness on philosophical grounds (Antony, 2008; Simon, 2017).”
BackgroundThe Phi measure of integrated information is not well-defined for general physical systems
Barrett, A. B., & Mediano, P. A. M. (2019) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1902.04321 · Cited by 53 · cited 1×
“IIT’s concept of Φ has been criticized from various perspectives (Cerullo, 2015; Barrett and Mediano, 2019; Pautz, 2019), as has been the theory itself (e.g., Bayne, 2018; Doerig et al., 2019; Michel and Lau, 2020; Herzog et al., 2022; Fleming et al., 2023).”
BackgroundMultidimensional models of degrees and levels of consciousness
Fazekas, P., & Overgaard, M. (2016) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2016.06.011 · Cited by 52 · cited 7×
“Bayne et al. (2016b) disagree with Fazekas and Overgaard (2016) on the basis of the argument that while consciousness can differ in its content, it does not differ in the fact that the subject is conscious; one cannot have “more of” a subjective point of view.”
BackgroundInfluentialOn the dangers of conflating strong and weak versions of a theory of consciousness
Michel, M., & Lau, H. (2020) · Philosophy and the Mind Sciences · doi:10.33735/phimisci.2020.ii.54 · Cited by 52
On the dangers of conflating strong and weak versions of a theory of consciousness
Lau, H., & Michel, M. (2019) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/hjp3s · Cited by 52 · cited 2×
“IIT’s concept of Φ has been criticized from various perspectives (Cerullo, 2015; Barrett and Mediano, 2019; Pautz, 2019), as has been the theory itself (e.g., Bayne, 2018; Doerig et al., 2019; Michel and Lau, 2020; Herzog et al., 2022; Fleming et al., 2023).”
BackgroundFazekas, P., Nemeth, G., & Overgaard, M. (2019) · Sleep Medicine Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.smrv.2018.10.005 · Cited by 47 · cited 1×
“For example, it has been claimed that dream content can be described along the dimensions of intensity, specificity, and stability (Nemeth and Fazekas, 2018; Fazekas et al., 2019; Fazekas, 2024).”
BackgroundNorthoff, G., & Zilio, F. (2022) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e24020270 · Cited by 46
Schizophrenia, dissociation, and consciousness
Bob, P., & Mashour, G. A. (2011) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2011.04.013 · Cited by 45 · cited 1×
“The possibility of such altered forms of consciousness has been considered, among possibly others, in the case of depression (Whiteley, 2021), autism (Yatziv and Jacobson, 2015), and schizophrenia (Bob and Mashour, 2011; Bob, 2012).”
BackgroundConsciousness: a neurological perspective.
Cavanna, A. E., Shah, S. U., Eddy, C. M., et al. (2011) · PubMed · doi:10.3233/ben-2011-0322 · Cited by 44
Cortical Complexity in Anorexia Nervosa: A Fractal Dimension Analysis
Collantoni, E., Madan, C. R., Meneguzzo, P., Chiappini, I., Tenconi, E., Manara, R., & Favaro, A. (2020) · Journal of Clinical Medicine · doi:10.3390/jcm9030833 · Cited by 44
Quantifying States of Consciousness via an Empirical-Phenomenological Approach
Pekala, R. J., & Levine, R. L. (1982) · Imagination, Cognition and Personality · doi:10.2190/2d3h-ckp8-dynh-4kv3 · Cited by 40
D’Ambrosio, J., & Hedden, B. (2023) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048402.2023.2277923 · Cited by 40 · cited 2×
“Depending on the number of admissible dimension aggregation functions (D’Ambrosio and Hedden, 2023), a multidimensional property can be strictly unorderable (no aggregation of dimensions), vague (only some pairs of objects are ordered according to all possible aggregation functions), or even…”
BackgroundWhat is a global state of consciousness?
Mckilliam, A. (2020) · Philosophy and the Mind Sciences · doi:10.33735/phimisci.2020.ii.58 · Cited by 37 · cited 2×
“McKilliam (2020) provides an analysis of several possible more precise definitions of the term: a global state could be a kind of subjective experience itself, a certain structuring of experience, or the totality of everything experienced at some time point.”
BackgroundThe assessment of consciousness during partial seizures
Ali, F., Rickards, H. E., & Cavanna, A. E. (2012) · Epilepsy & Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.yebeh.2011.11.021 · Cited by 36 · cited 1×
“While there are other questionnaires describing altered states of consciousness using a number of dimensions (Pekala et al., 1986; Studerus et al., 2010; Ali et al., 2012), the ICI is directly related by its authors to the two dimensions of consciousness in their model.”
BackgroundMeasuring the Complexity of Consciousness
Arsiwalla, X. D., & Verschure, P. (2018) · Frontiers in Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnins.2018.00424 · Cited by 35 · cited 1×
“Since its use is impractical for real neuroimaging data, it has been proposed that complexity measures provide a sufficient approximation of the brain’s Φ (Arsiwalla and Verschure, 2018; Sarasso et al., 2021).”
BackgroundFazekas, P., Németh, G., & Overgaard, M. S. (2020) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691620924039 · Cited by 32 · cited 1×
“Three dimensions of the quality of conscious awareness have been proposed: intensity, specificity, and temporal stability (Fazekas and Overgaard, 2018; Fazekas et al., 2020).”
BackgroundWalter, J. (2021) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niab047 · Cited by 31 · cited 4×
“Or, at least, this is the claim of a number of recent papers in the field of consciousness research (Fazekas and Overgaard, 2016; Jonkisz et al., 2017; Bayne and Carter, 2018; Walter, 2021; Huang et al., 2023).”
BackgroundInfluentialFour-dimensional graded consciousness
Jonkisz, J., Wierzchoń, M., & Binder, M. (2017) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00420 · Cited by 30 · cited 9×
“Or, at least, this is the claim of a number of recent papers in the field of consciousness research (Fazekas and Overgaard, 2016; Jonkisz et al., 2017; Bayne and Carter, 2018; Walter, 2021; Huang et al., 2023).”
BackgroundInfluentialDepression as a Disorder of Consciousness
Whiteley, C. M. K. (2021) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/716838 · Cited by 29 · cited 1×
“The possibility of such altered forms of consciousness has been considered, among possibly others, in the case of depression (Whiteley, 2021), autism (Yatziv and Jacobson, 2015), and schizophrenia (Bob and Mashour, 2011; Bob, 2012).”
BackgroundFarisco, M., & Changeux, J.-P. (2023) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niad016 · Cited by 29 · cited 1×
“However, GWT is not conceptually incompatible with the dimensional description or structure of consciousness, and neither is it, as has been recently argued (Farisco and Changeux, 2023), incompatible with the use of complexity measures to characterize states of consciousness.”
BackgroundWhat Is the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness
Pautz, A. (2019) · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · Cited by 25
Nonlinear and linear EEG complexity changes caused by gustatory stimuli in anorexia nervosa
Tóth, E., Kondákor, I., Túry, F., Gáti, Á., Weisz, J., & Molnár, M. (2003) · International Journal of Psychophysiology · doi:10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2003.10.003 · Cited by 23 · cited 4×
“Or, at least, this is the claim of a number of recent papers in the field of consciousness research (Fazekas and Overgaard, 2016; Jonkisz et al., 2017; Bayne and Carter, 2018; Walter, 2021; Huang et al., 2023).”
BackgroundInfluentialDreszer, J., Grochowski, M., Lewandowska, M., Nikadon, J., Gorgol, J., Bałaj, B., Finc, K., Duch, W., Kałamała, P., Chuderski, A., et al. (2020) · Human Brain Mapping · doi:10.1002/hbm.25162 · Cited by 23 · cited 1×
“Evidence on the exact nature of the relationship between intelligence and complexity measures is currently mixed (Saxe et al., 2018; Dreszer et al., 2020; Wang, 2021; Thiele et al., 2023).”
BackgroundConsciousness: individuated information in action
Jonkisz, J. (2015) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01035 · Cited by 20 · cited 2×
“Over time (Jonkisz, 2015, 2021; Jonkisz et al., 2017), these criteria were developed into fundamental features of a singular concept of consciousness in the form of gradable dimensions: phenomenological, semantic, physiological, and functional.”
BackgroundFortier, M., & Millière, R. (2020) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niaa004 · Cited by 20
IIT, half masked and half disfigured
Tononi, G., Boly, M., Grasso, M., Hendren, J., Juel, B. E., Mayner, W. G. P., Marshall, W., & Koch, C. (2022) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x21001990 · Cited by 19
Multimodal Brain Signal Complexity Predicts Human Intelligence
Thiele, J. A., Richter, A., & Hilger, K. (2023) · eNeuro · doi:10.1523/eneuro.0345-22.2022 · Cited by 19
The scientific study of consciousness cannot and should not be morally neutral
Mazor, M., Brown, S., Ciaunica, A., Demertzi, A., Fahrenfort, J., Faivre, N., Francken, J. C., Lamy, D., Lenggenhager, B., Moutoussis, M., et al. (2023) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/17456916221110222 · Cited by 17
Fazekas, P. (2023) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/mila.12455 · Cited by 16 · cited 1×
“For example, it has been claimed that dream content can be described along the dimensions of intensity, specificity, and stability (Nemeth and Fazekas, 2018; Fazekas et al., 2019; Fazekas, 2024).”
BackgroundFirst-person experience cannot rescue causal structure theories from the unfolding argument
Herzog, M. H., Schurger, A., & Doerig, A. (2022) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2021.103261 · Cited by 14
Consciousness, schizophrenia and complexity
Bob, P. (2011) · Cognitive Systems Research · doi:10.1016/j.cogsys.2011.05.001 · Cited by 13 · cited 1×
“The possibility of such altered forms of consciousness has been considered, among possibly others, in the case of depression (Whiteley, 2021), autism (Yatziv and Jacobson, 2015), and schizophrenia (Bob and Mashour, 2011; Bob, 2012).”
BackgroundFrom Complexity to Consciousness
Bayne, T., Seth, A. K., & Massimini, M. (2020) · Trends in Neurosciences · doi:10.1016/j.tins.2020.05.008 · Cited by 12
Variability, convergence, and dimensions of consciousness
Klein, C., & Hohwy, J. (2015) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199688890.003.0014 · Cited by 11
Systema Temporis: A time-based dimensional framework for consciousness and cognition
Kent, L., Doorn, G. H. V., & Klein, B. (2019) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2019.102766 · Cited by 11 · cited 1×
“The idea that some of their putative dimensions could really be families of dimensions was already advanced by Bayne et al. (2016a), and one recent theoretical proposal framed consciousness in direct comparison to hierarchical models of intelligence (Kent et al., 2019).”
ResultGlim, S., Ries, A., Sorg, C., & Wohlschläger, A. M. (2020) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2020.102993 · Cited by 10 · cited 1×
“This is evidenced by the phenomenon of “phase preference” (Northoff and Huang, 2017), where the pre-stimulus phase of brain oscillations affects whether a near-threshold percept reaches consciousness (Mathewson et al., 2009; Glim et al., 2020).”
BackgroundHow much consciousness is there in complexity?
Koculak, M., & Wierzchoń, M. (2022) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2022.983315 · Cited by 10 · cited 1×
“In fact, Koculak and Wierzchoń (2022b) advocate conceptually decoupling complexity measures research from IIT and adopting a neutral, less theory-driven stance on the relationship between consciousness and complexity.”
BackgroundSeparating weak integrated information theory into inspired and aspirational approaches
Leung, A., & Tsuchiya, N. (2023) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niad012 · Cited by 9 · cited 1×
“However, there may be potential in adopting a weaker version of the theory (Michel and Lau, 2020; Mediano et al., 2022; Leung and Tsuchiya, 2023), relaxing some of its metaphysical assumptions and treating integrated information as a useful correlate of consciousness, rather than as a necessary and…”
BackgroundAnzulewicz, A., & Wierzchoń, M. (2018) · Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/cogs.12578 · Cited by 8 · cited 1×
“Anzulewicz and Wierzchoń (2018) instead dispute the simplicity of the relationship between neural code and subjective features.”
BackgroundBeyond the REM-NREM Dichotomy: A Multidimensional Approach to Understanding Dreaming
Németh, G., & Fazekas, P. (2018) · Cited by 8
Consciousness: A Four-fold taxonomy
Jonkisz, J. (2012) · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · Cited by 7
Response to Fazekas and Overgaard: degrees and levels
Bayne, T., Hohwy, J., & Owen, A. M. (2016) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2016.06.010 · Cited by 7 · cited 3×
“This problem is illustrated by a disagreement between Bayne et al. (2016b) and Fazekas and Overgaard (2016) in section 3.4 below, which concerns whether the conscious awareness of perceptual content comes in degrees.”
BackgroundInfluentialKoculak, M., & Wierzchoń, M. (2022) · Frontiers in Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnins.2022.836758 · Cited by 6
Understanding visual consciousness in autism spectrum disorders
Yatziv, T., & Jacobson, H. (2015) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2015.00204 · Cited by 3
Consciousness, Subjectivity, and Gradedness
Jonkisz, J. (2021) · Studia Semiotyczne · Cited by 2
Research works printed but not linked: 1
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Cited by
Preliminaries to artificial consciousness: A multidimensional heuristic approach
Evers, K., Farisco, M., Chatila, R., Earp, B. D., Freire, I. T., Hamker, F. H., Németh, E., Verschure, P. F. M. J., & Khamassi, M. (2025) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2025.01.002 · Cited by 27
Network approach in psychology
Farahani, H., Kovač, N., Simeunović, M., Watson, P., & Zhang, J. (2025) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-443-30248-0.00016-4
Bochdansky, T. (2026) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-662-71737-0_1
Metadata
- Authors
- Páleník, J.
- Affiliations
- Masaryk University (CZ)
- Corresponding author
- Páleník, Julie
- Venue
- Frontiers in Psychology
- Publisher
- Frontiers Media SA
- Published
- 2024-06-20
- Volume
- 15
- Pages
- 1430262-1430262
- ISSN
- 1664-1078 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC11222411
- OpenAlex
- W4399868278
- Cited by
- 4
- References
- 110
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 2
- FWCI
- 0.29
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Frontiers in Psychology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Veřejné služby Informačního systému (Masarykiana Brunensis Universitas) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- European Commission (LX22 NPO5107)
- Ministerstvo Školství, Mládeže a Tělovýchovy (LX22NPO5107)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Keywords
- consciousness, multidimensional consciousness, dimension selection
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
The claim verdicts this report counts are experimental: their accuracy is not yet measured.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-11, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-11 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).
Cited sources are checked with a language model’s help (qwen3.8-omni-flash and gpt-6-sol).
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.