Sentience and the Origins of Consciousness: From Cartesian Duality to Markovian Monism
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Abstract
This essay addresses Cartesian duality and how its implicit dialectic might be repaired using physics and information theory. Our agenda is to describe a key distinction in the physical sciences that may provide a foundation for the distinction between mind and matter, and between sentient and intentional systems. From this perspective, it becomes tenable to talk about the physics of sentience and ‘forces’ that underwrite our beliefs (in the sense of probability distributions represented by our internal states), which may ground our mental states and consciousness. We will refer to this view as Markovian monism, which entails two claims: (1) fundamentally, there is only one type of thing and only one type of irreducible property (hence monism). (2) All systems possessing a Markov blanket have properties that are relevant for understanding the mind and consciousness: if such systems have mental properties, then they have them partly by virtue of possessing a Markov blanket (hence Markovian). Markovian monism rests upon the information geometry of random dynamic systems. In brief, the information geometry induced in any system—whose internal states can be distinguished from external states—must acquire a dual aspect. This dual aspect concerns the (intrinsic) information geometry of the probabilistic evolution of internal states and a separate (extrinsic) information geometry of probabilistic beliefs about external states that are parameterised by internal states. We call these intrinsic (i.e., mechanical, or state-based) and extrinsic (i.e., Markovian, or belief-based) information geometries, respectively. Although these mathematical notions may sound complicated, they are fairly straightforward to handle, and may offer a means through which to frame the origins of consciousness.
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![Figure 3 (Markov blankets and other formulations): This schematic illustrates the various interpretations of a gradient flow on surprisal. Recall that the existence of a Markov blanket implies a certain lack of influences among internal, blanket, and external states. At nonequilibrium steady-state, these independencies have an important consequence; internal and active states are the only states that are not influenced by external states, which means their dynamics (i.e., perception and action) are a function of, and only of, particular states; i.e., a particular surprisal.8 This surprisal has a number of interesting interpretations. Given it is the negative log probability of finding a particle or creature in a particular state, minimising particular surprisal corresponds to maximising the value of a particle’s state. This interpretation is licensed by the fact that the states with a high probability are, by definition, attracting states. On this view, one can then spin-off an interpretation in terms of reinforcement learning [30], optimal control theory [31] and, in economics, expected utility theory [39]. Indeed, any scheme predicated on the optimisation of some objective function can now be cast in terms of minimising a particular surprisal—in terms of perception and action (i.e., the flow of internal and active states). The minimisation of particular surprisal leads to a series of influential accounts of neuronal dynamics; including the principle of maximum mutual information [40,41], the principles of minimum redundancy and maximum efficiency [33] and—as we will see later—the free energy principle [42]. Crucially, the average or expected surprisal (over time or particular states of being) corresponds to entropy. This means that action and perception look as if they are minimising a particular entropy. The implicit resistance to the second law of thermodynamics leads us to theories of self-organisation, such as synergetics in physics [29,43,44] or homoeostasis in physiology [35,45,46]. Finally, the probability of any particular states given a Markov blanket (m) is, on a statistical view, model evidence [18,47]. This means that all the above formulations are internally consistent with things like the Bayesian brain hypothesis, evidence accumulation and predictive coding; most of which inherit from Helmholtz’s motion of unconscious inference [48], later unpacked in terms of perception as hypothesis testing in 20th century psychology [49] and machine learning [50]. In short, the very existence of something leads in the natural way to a whole series of optimisation frameworks in the physical and life sciences that lends each a construct validity in relation to the others.](https://figures.cochat.ai/paper-figures/636b597f07434884b4e42702c40960bd/sentience-and-the-origins-of-consciousness-from-cartesian-duality-to-markovian-figure-3.jpg)

![Figure 2 (density dynamics and pullback attractors): This figure illustrates the fundaments of density or ensemble dynamics in random dynamical systems—of the sort described by the Langevin equation. The left panel pictures some arbitrary random attractor (a.k.a., a pullback attractor) that can be thought of in two ways: first, it can be considered as the trajectory of (two) systemic states as they evolve over time. For example, these two states could be the depolarisation and current of a nerve cell, over several minutes. At a larger timescale, this trajectory could reflect your daily routine, getting up in the morning, having a cup of coffee, going to work and so on. It could also represent the slow fluctuations in two meteorological states over the period of a year. The key aspect of this trajectory is that it will—after itinerant wandering and a sufficient period of time—revisit particular regimes of state space. These states constitute the attracting set or pullback attractor. The second interpretation is of a probability density over the states that the system will be found in, when sampled at random. The evolution of the probability density is described by the Fokker-Planck equation. Crucially, when any system has attained nonequilibrium steady state, we know that this density does not change with time. This affords the solution to the Fokker-Planck equation—a solution that means that there is a lawful relationship between the flow of states at any point in state space and the probability density. This solution expresses the flow in terms of gradients of log density or surprisal and the amplitude of random fluctuations. In turn, the nonequilibrium steady-state solution can always be expressed, via the Helmholtz decomposition, in terms of two orthogonal components. One component is a gradient flow that rebuilds probability gradients in a way that is exactly countered by the dispersion of states due to random fluctuations. The other component is a solenoidal or divergence-free flow that circulates on isoprobability contours. These two components are shown in the schematic on the right, in terms of a curl-free gradient flow—that depends only on the amplitude of random fluctuations Γ– and a divergence-free solenoidal flow—that depends upon an antisymmetric matrix Q. This example shows the flow around the peak of a probability density, with a Gaussian form. Please see [1,25] for details.](https://figures.cochat.ai/paper-figures/b2f1a881e82d4316a188b7dc10782f11/sentience-and-the-origins-of-consciousness-from-cartesian-duality-to-markovian-figure-2.jpg)
![Figure 4 (autonomous movement). This figure shows the results of simulating active inference (i.e., writing), in terms of conditional expectations about hidden states of the world, consequent predictions about sensory input and the ensuing behaviour. The autonomous dynamics that underlie this behaviour rest upon prior expectations about states with Lotka-Volterra dynamics (c.f., a central pattern generator): these are the six (arbitrarily) coloured lines in the upper left panel. In this generative model, each state is associated with a location in Euclidean space that attracts the agent’s finger. In effect, the internal states then supply predictions of what sensory states should register, if these prior beliefs were true. Active states try to suppress the ensuing prediction error (i.e., sensory surprisal) by reflexively fulfilling expected changes in angular velocity, through exerting forces on the agent’s joints (not shown). The subsequent movement of the arm is traced out in the lower left panel. This trajectory has been plotted in a moving frame of reference, so that it looks like synthetic handwriting (e.g., a succession of ‘j’ and ‘a’ letters). The lower left panels show the activity of one (the fourth attractor) conditional expectation under ‘action’, and ‘action-observation’. During action, sensory states register both the visual and proprioceptive consequences of movement, while under action observation, only visual sensations are available—as if the agent was watching another agent. The red dots correspond to the time bins during which this state exceeded an amplitude threshold of two arbitrary units. They key thing to note here is that this unit responds preferentially when, and only when, the motor trajectory produces a down-stroke, but not an up-stroke. Please see [94] for further details. Furthermore, with a slight delay, this internal state responds during action and action observation. From a biological perspective, this is interesting because it speaks to an empirical phenomena known as mirror neuron activity [95,96,97].](https://figures.cochat.ai/paper-figures/61438594a4874f04825ebc9cacdd600a/sentience-and-the-origins-of-consciousness-from-cartesian-duality-to-markovian-figure-4.jpg)
![Figure 5 (epistemic foraging). This figure shows the results of a simulation in which a face was presented to an agent, whose responses were simulated by selecting active states that minimise expected free energy following an eye movement. The agent had three internal images or hypotheses about the stimuli she might sample (an upright face, and inverted face and a rotated face). The agent was presented with an upright face and her conditional expectations were evaluated over 16 (12 ms.) time bins, until the next saccade was emitted. This was repeated for eight saccades. The ensuing eye movements are shown as red dots at the end of each saccade in the upper row. The corresponding sequence of eye movements is shown in the insert on the upper left, where the red circles correspond roughly to the proportion of the visual image sampled. These saccades are driven by prior beliefs about the direction of gaze based upon the saliency maps in the second row. These saliency maps are the expected free energy as a function of policies; namely, where to look next. Note that these maps change with successive saccades as posterior beliefs about external states, including the stimulus, become progressively more precise or confident. Note also that salience is depleted in locations that were foveated in the previous saccade because these locations no longer have an epistemic affordance (i.e., the ability to reduce uncertainty or expected free energy). This is a nice illustration of a ubiquitous phenomenon, known as inhibition of return. Oculomotor responses are shown in the third row in terms of the two hidden oculomotor states, corresponding to vertical and horizontal eye movements. The associated portions of the image sampled (at the end of each saccade) are shown in the fourth row. The final two rows show the posterior beliefs in terms of their sufficient statistics and the stimulus categories, respectively. The posterior beliefs are plotted here in terms of conditional expectations and the 90% confidence interval about the true stimulus. The key thing to note here is that the expectation about the true stimulus supervenes over its competing expectations and, as a result, conditional confidence about the stimulus category increases (the confidence intervals shrink to the expectation). This illustrates the nature of evidence accumulation when selecting a hypothesis or percept the best explains sensory data. Within saccade accumulation is evident even during the initial fixation with further stepwise decreases in uncertainty as salient information is sampled at successive saccades. Please see [98] for further details.](https://figures.cochat.ai/paper-figures/4959fe6209214b1994325e4ec76d3c99/sentience-and-the-origins-of-consciousness-from-cartesian-duality-to-markovian-figure-5.jpg)
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“the FEP framework’s central hypothesis is that systems do represent the outer world via their internal states”
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“Hence, the dual information geometry itself does not entail property dualism”
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“So far, the majority of researchers in the field have tried to make theoretical advancements through more precise conceptual specifications (for the latest examples see Clark et al. 2019; Friston et al. 2020; Limanowski and Friston 2020; Wiese and Friston 2020).”
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What Might Interoceptive Inference Reveal about Consciousness?
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“This makes it challenging to combine the two approaches, a project that is far beyond the scope of this paper – but see (K. J. Friston et al., 2020) for a discussion, in terms of the information geometry of active inference.”
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“First, from a purely technical perspective, a commitment to a dual aspect monism requires the existence of a dual aspect information geometry that links neuronal dynamics to belief updating (10).”
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Self-citationA response to claims of emergent intelligence and sentience in a dish
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A Drive to Survive: The Free Energy Principle and the Meaning of Life
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Sandved-Smith, L., Bogotá, J. D., Hohwy, J., Kiverstein, J. D., & Lutz, A. (2025) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niaf016 · Cited by 34
“It connects the ‘intrinsic ’ dynamics of the internal states (e.g . brain activity) of the target system to the ‘extrinsic’ dynamics of the beliefs parameterized by the internal states (Friston et al. 2020, Fig.”
Casey, C. P., Tanabe, S., Farahbakhsh, Z. Z., Parker, M., Bo, A. Y., White, M., Ballweg, T., Mcintosh, A., Filbey, W., Banks, M. I., et al. (2023) · British Journal of Anaesthesia · doi:10.1016/j.bja.2023.09.031 · Cited by 25
Sims, M. (2021) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02876-w · Cited by 24
“Adjacent points on a statistical manifold represent densities that are alike, and the distance between points (i.e., “information length”) along a manifold path scores distances between probability densities encoded as points on that path respectively (Friston 2019a, b; Friston et al. 2020).”
BackgroundInfluentialEvers, K., Farisco, M., & Pennartz, C. M. A. (2024) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2024.103668 · Cited by 22
Neurons Embodied in a Virtual World: Evidence for Organoid Ethics?
Kagan, B. J., Duc, D., Stevens, I., & Gilbert, F. (2022) · AJOB Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/21507740.2022.2048731 · Cited by 27
“For the purpose of this commentary the term consciousness is used in line with phenomenological consciousness as per Sawai et al. (2022) Sentience on the other hand has been formally defined as “responsive to sensory impressions” (Friston, Wiese, and Hobson 2020).”
MethodArtificial consciousness: a perspective from the free energy principle
Wiese, W. (2024) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-024-02182-y · Cited by 33
“This presupposes that there is a meaningful computational difference between conscious and non-conscious processing (at least in living organisms).”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationTucker, D. M., Luu, P., & Friston, K. J. (2025) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e27080829 · Cited by 23
“…the very structure of the organism’s information processing, mediating between the intrinsic domain of information that generates affor-dance predictions and the extrinsic domain that self-corrects in light of environmental data, describes a basis from which consciousness is likely to emerge [28].”
Self-citationBiological mechanisms contradict AI consciousness: The spaces between the notes
Miller, W. B., Baluška, F., Reber, A. S., & Slijepčević, P. (2024) · Biosystems · doi:10.1016/j.biosystems.2024.105387 · Cited by 26
Scientific communication and the semantics of sentience
Kagan, B. J., Razi, A., Bhat, A., Kitchen, A. C., Tran, N. T., Habibollahi, F., Khajehnejad, M. A., Parker, B. J., Rollo, B., & Friston, K. J. (2023) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2023.02.008 · Cited by 21
Self-citationThe paradox of the self-studying brain
Battaglia, S., Servajean, P., & Friston, K. J. (2025) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2024.12.009 · Cited by 21
Self-citationRamstead, M. J. D., Friston, K. J., & Hipólito, I. (2020) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e22080889 · Cited by 103
“Crucially, they need not reflect the existence of anything in reality [66,84,109].”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationThe Free Energy Principle: Good Science and Questionable Philosophy in a Grand Unifying Theory
Sánchez-Cañizares, J. (2021) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e23020238 · Cited by 16
“Notwithstanding, Friston and colleagues have recently published a discussion of the FEP’s compatibility with different philosophical perspectives, ranging from monism to dualism [13], and explicitly adopting what they dub Markovian Monism (MM).”
BackgroundInfluentialOn the minimal theory of consciousness implicit in active inference
Whyte, C. J., Corcoran, A. W., Robinson, J., Smith, R., Moran, R. J., Parr, T., Friston, K. J., Seth, A. K., & Hohwy, J. (2026) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2025.11.002 · Cited by 15
“…the many valuable qualitative and conceptual models relevant to the neuroscience of consciousness (e.g., Ciaunica et al., 2022; Safron, 2020; Seth & Tsakiris, 2018), and accounts of the metaphysics of consciousness implied by active inference (Friston, Wiese, et al., 2020; Ramstead et al., 2023).”
Self-citationZahedi, A., Lynn, S. J., & Sommer, W. (2024) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1388347 · Cited by 19
“…such as sleep and dreaming (Hobson and Friston, 2012; Friston et al., 2020), in the sense that in the absence of any sensory feedback, the agent is engaged in minimizing the complexity of the generative model via reducing the disparity between the posterior and prior beliefs (Friston et al., 2020).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialTucker, D. M., Luu, P., & Friston, K. J. (2025) · Cerebral Cortex · doi:10.1093/cercor/bhaf122 · Cited by 16
Self-citationZhang, T., Goldstein, A., & Levin, M. G. (2024) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/10597123241269740 · Cited by 22
“…intelligence as problem-solving, utilizing an objectively observable, third person perspective to distinguish these highly tractable and empirically testable questions from the thorny debates around fi rst-person consciousness (Friston et al., 2020; Frith & Metzingher, 2016; Tononi & Koch, 2015).”
Shreesha, L., & Levin, M. G. (2024) · Biochemical and Biophysical Research Communications · doi:10.1016/j.bbrc.2024.150396 · Cited by 19
Understanding Predictive Processing. A Review
Piekarski, M. (2021) · Avant · doi:10.26913/avant.2021.01.04 · Cited by 18
Milford, S. R., Shaw, D., & Starke, G. (2023) · Science and Engineering Ethics · doi:10.1007/s11948-023-00457-x · Cited by 14
“In comparison, Kagan et al. define sentience rather minimally “as being ‘responsive to sensory impressions’ through adaptive internal processes” (Kagan et al., 2022b , p. 3952, citing Friston et al. ( 2020 ).”
BackgroundSafron, A. (2020) · Communications in computer and information science · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-64919-7_15 · Cited by 14
Tal, H., Wright, M., Prest, S., Sandved-Smith, L., & Sacchet, M. D. (2025) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2025.106539 · Cited by 15
Bayesian theories of consciousness: a review in search for a minimal unifying model
Rorot, W. (2021) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niab038 · Cited by 23
“MM (Friston et al. 2020) is advanced from the first principles (Colombo and Wright 2018) as a theory of the origin of consciousness.”
BackgroundExtended Predictive Minds: do Markov Blankets Matter?
Facchin, M. (2021) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-021-00607-9 · Cited by 15
Disgust as a primary emotional system and its clinical relevance
Tolchinsky, A., Ellis, G., Levin, M. G., Kaňková, Š., & Burgdorf, J. S. (2024) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1454774 · Cited by 11
“…is not a hardwired, inevitable, genetically-determined process but an active example of autopoiesis during which the emergent system must autonomously determine where it ends and the “outside world” begins (Fields and Levin, 2020, 2023; Friston, 2013; Friston et al., 2015; Friston et al., 2020).”
BackgroundBeni, M. D. (2021) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2021.103257 · Cited by 13
Friston, K. J. (2020) · Neuropsychoanalysis · doi:10.1080/15294145.2021.1878610 · Cited by 11
“This means free energy gradients drive beliefupdating to equip the brain with a physics of sentience (Friston et al., 2020).”
BackgroundSelf-citationA transcendental materialist frame for neuropsychoanalysis: rethinking dual-aspect monism
Dall’Aglio, J. (2024) · Neuropsychoanalysis · doi:10.1080/15294145.2024.2402287 · Cited by 9
“Friston et al. (2020) claim that this structure implies the existence of two distinct “information geometries.””
InfluentialOlesen, C., Waade, P. T., Albantakis, L., & Mathys, C. D. (2023) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1011346 · Cited by 17
“See Albantakis (2020) for a brief discussion and criticism of these claims.”
Between pebbles and organisms: weaving autonomy into the Markov blanket
van Es, T., & Kirchhoff, M. D. (2021) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03084-w · Cited by 13
Dosis sola facit venenum: reconceptualising biological realism
Beni, M. D. (2022) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10539-022-09884-9 · Cited by 8
“Now, if we translate the notion of “approximate truth” to the jargon of model-based science, we can say that idealised descriptions are approximately true (Godfrey-Smith 2009).”
BackgroundA Mathematical Walkthrough and Discussion of the Free Energy PrinciplePreprint
Millidge, B., Seth, A. K., & Buckley, C. L. (2021) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2108.13343 · Cited by 12
Piekarski, M. (2023) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-023-04292-2 · Cited by 10
Panpsychism and dualism in the science of consciousness
Yurchenko, S. B. (2024) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2024.105845 · Cited by 13
Goldreich, M. (2025) · Neuropsychoanalysis · doi:10.1080/15294145.2024.2449324 · Cited by 8
“Friston et al. (2020) also ascribe an ontological status to predictive informational laws, casting their position as Markovian monism , but express a preference for a grounding in reductive materialism rather than dual-aspect monism.”
InfluentialWhat Is Consciousness? Integrated Information vs. Inference
Cooke, J. E. (2021) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e23081032 · Cited by 10
“If Bayesian beliefs are understood as models that an observer uses to describe how a system relates to its environment, then they do not have the property of existing from the organisms own side and cannot underwrite subjectivity, as argued by Albantakis [62].”
BackgroundA metaphysics for predictive processing
Hohwy, J. (2025) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-025-05169-2 · Cited by 8
Fields, C., Albarracin, M., Friston, K. J., Kiefer, A. B., Ramstead, M. J. D., & Safron, A. (2025) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niaf009 · Cited by 23
Self-citationA free energy reconstruction of arguments for panpsychism
Beni, M. D. (2021) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-021-09739-w · Cited by 7
“This construal has been recently advocated by Friston et al. (2020) and before that by Beni on several occasions (Beni, 2019b, chapter five 2019a, c).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialMessage Passing and Metabolism
Parr, T. (2021) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e23050606 · Cited by 8
“While it might seem a bit strange to formulate the dynamics of one component of a system in relation to a functional of beliefs about other components, this move is central to the Markovian monism that underwrites active inference [50].”
BackgroundInflating the social aspects of cognitive structural realism
Beni, M. D. (2021) · European Journal for Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1007/s13194-021-00401-5 · Cited by 7
“There already exist biologically plausible accounts of generative models that simulate communication between synthetic subjects who talk to each other on the basis of active inferences and variational free energy minimisation (Friston et al., 2020a).”
BackgroundSafron, A. (2021) · PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/aud6e · Cited by 6
Consciousness and Energy Processing in Neural Systems
Pepperell, R. (2024) · Brain Sciences · doi:10.3390/brainsci14111112 · Cited by 6
Kanaev, I. A. (2023) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e25030418 · Cited by 7
“The outer world introduces constraints on the excessive freedom of this system, pushing it towards “criticality” [20,115].”
BackgroundSafron, A. (2023) · Communications in computer and information science · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-28719-0_18 · Cited by 6
Mental Gravity: Depression as Spacetime Curvature of the Self, Mind, and Brain
Kent, L. (2023) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e25091275 · Cited by 6
Shodikin, A., Murniasih, T. R., Faizah, S. U., & Ekawati, D. W. (2023) · Jurnal Pedagogi dan Pembelajaran · doi:10.23887/jp2.v6i3.60960 · Cited by 5
Quantifying the Autonomy of Structurally Diverse Automata: A Comparison of Candidate Measures
Albantakis, L. (2021) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e23111415 · Cited by 9
Making and breaking symmetries in mind and life
Safron, A., Sakthivadivel, D. A. R., Sheikhbahaee, Z., Bein, M., Razi, A., & Levin, M. G. (2023) · Interface Focus · doi:10.1098/rsfs.2023.0015 · Cited by 7
“Perhaps we may even think of pre-theoretic intuitions relating to the nature of living phenomena, where the notion of ‘elan vital’ and ‘life force’ may receive some (limited) support from abstract formalisms [43,44].”
What Is Psychological Spin? A Thermodynamic Framework for Emotions and Social Behavior
Déli, É. (2023) · Psych · doi:10.3390/psych5040081 · Cited by 6
Rational decision making in biological systems
Taborsky, E. (2022) · Biosystems · doi:10.1016/j.biosystems.2022.104685 · Cited by 5
Luppi, A. I., Mediano, P. A. M., Rosas, F. E., Harrison, D. J., Carhart-Harris, R. L., Bor, D., & Stamatakis, E. A. (2021) · PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/g9p3r · Cited by 5
The role of active inference in conscious awareness
Robinson, J., Corcoran, A. W., Whyte, C. J., Sárközy, A., Seth, A. K., Kovács, G., Friston, K. J., Pennartz, C. M. A., Tononi, G., & Hohwy, J. (2025) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0328836 · Cited by 7
Self-citationMoral dimensions of synthetic biological intelligence: Unravelling the ethics of neural integration
Kataoka, M., Gyngell, C., Savulescu, J., & Sawai, T. (2024) · Developments in neuroethics and bioethics · doi:10.1016/bs.dnb.2024.02.012 · Cited by 8
Metadata
- Authors
- Friston, K. J., Wiese, W., & Hobson, J. A.
- Affiliations
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging (GB)
- Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz (DE)
- Harvard University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Friston, Karl J.
- Wiese, Wanja
- Hobson, J. Allan
- Venue
- Entropy
- Publisher
- MDPI AG
- Published
- 2020-04-30
- Volume
- 22
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 516
- ISSN
- 1099-4300 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC7517007
- OpenAlex
- W3023671316
- Cited by
- 186
- References
- 143
- Citations by year
- 2026: 18 · 2025: 25 · 2024: 31 · 2023: 27 · 2022: 29 · 2021: 40 · 2020: 15
- FWCI
- 26.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- dx.doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Entropy (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Wellcome Trust (088130/Z/09/Z)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Keywords
- sentience, consciousness, Cartesian dualism, Markov blanket, information geometry, probability distributions, internal state, origin of consciousness, intentional systems
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