Sentience and the Origins of Consciousness: From Cartesian Duality to Markovian Monism
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 145 of the 145 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This essay addresses Cartesian duality and how its implicit dialectic might be repaired using physics and information theory. Our agenda is to describe a key distinction in the physical sciences that may provide a foundation for the distinction between mind and matter, and between sentient and intentional systems. From this perspective, it becomes tenable to talk about the physics of sentience and ‘forces’ that underwrite our beliefs (in the sense of probability distributions represented by our internal states), which may ground our mental states and consciousness. We will refer to this view as Markovian monism, which entails two claims: (1) fundamentally, there is only one type of thing and only one type of irreducible property (hence monism). (2) All systems possessing a Markov blanket have properties that are relevant for understanding the mind and consciousness: if such systems have mental properties, then they have them partly by virtue of possessing a Markov blanket (hence Markovian). Markovian monism rests upon the information geometry of random dynamic systems. In brief, the information geometry induced in any system—whose internal states can be distinguished from external states—must acquire a dual aspect. This dual aspect concerns the (intrinsic) information geometry of the probabilistic evolution of internal states and a separate (extrinsic) information geometry of probabilistic beliefs about external states that are parameterised by internal states. We call these intrinsic (i.e., mechanical, or state-based) and extrinsic (i.e., Markovian, or belief-based) information geometries, respectively. Although these mathematical notions may sound complicated, they are fairly straightforward to handle, and may offer a means through which to frame the origins of consciousness.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Figures
![Figure 3 (Markov blankets and other formulations): This schematic illustrates the various interpretations of a gradient flow on surprisal. Recall that the existence of a Markov blanket implies a certain lack of influences among internal, blanket, and external states. At nonequilibrium steady-state, these independencies have an important consequence; internal and active states are the only states that are not influenced by external states, which means their dynamics (i.e., perception and action) are a function of, and only of, particular states; i.e., a particular surprisal.8 This surprisal has a number of interesting interpretations. Given it is the negative log probability of finding a particle or creature in a particular state, minimising particular surprisal corresponds to maximising the value of a particle’s state. This interpretation is licensed by the fact that the states with a high probability are, by definition, attracting states. On this view, one can then spin-off an interpretation in terms of reinforcement learning [30], optimal control theory [31] and, in economics, expected utility theory [39]. Indeed, any scheme predicated on the optimisation of some objective function can now be cast in terms of minimising a particular surprisal—in terms of perception and action (i.e., the flow of internal and active states). The minimisation of particular surprisal leads to a series of influential accounts of neuronal dynamics; including the principle of maximum mutual information [40,41], the principles of minimum redundancy and maximum efficiency [33] and—as we will see later—the free energy principle [42]. Crucially, the average or expected surprisal (over time or particular states of being) corresponds to entropy. This means that action and perception look as if they are minimising a particular entropy. The implicit resistance to the second law of thermodynamics leads us to theories of self-organisation, such as synergetics in physics [29,43,44] or homoeostasis in physiology [35,45,46]. Finally, the probability of any particular states given a Markov blanket (m) is, on a statistical view, model evidence [18,47]. This means that all the above formulations are internally consistent with things like the Bayesian brain hypothesis, evidence accumulation and predictive coding; most of which inherit from Helmholtz’s motion of unconscious inference [48], later unpacked in terms of perception as hypothesis testing in 20th century psychology [49] and machine learning [50]. In short, the very existence of something leads in the natural way to a whole series of optimisation frameworks in the physical and life sciences that lends each a construct validity in relation to the others.](https://figures.cochat.ai/paper-figures/636b597f07434884b4e42702c40960bd/sentience-and-the-origins-of-consciousness-from-cartesian-duality-to-markovian-figure-3.jpg)

![Figure 2 (density dynamics and pullback attractors): This figure illustrates the fundaments of density or ensemble dynamics in random dynamical systems—of the sort described by the Langevin equation. The left panel pictures some arbitrary random attractor (a.k.a., a pullback attractor) that can be thought of in two ways: first, it can be considered as the trajectory of (two) systemic states as they evolve over time. For example, these two states could be the depolarisation and current of a nerve cell, over several minutes. At a larger timescale, this trajectory could reflect your daily routine, getting up in the morning, having a cup of coffee, going to work and so on. It could also represent the slow fluctuations in two meteorological states over the period of a year. The key aspect of this trajectory is that it will—after itinerant wandering and a sufficient period of time—revisit particular regimes of state space. These states constitute the attracting set or pullback attractor. The second interpretation is of a probability density over the states that the system will be found in, when sampled at random. The evolution of the probability density is described by the Fokker-Planck equation. Crucially, when any system has attained nonequilibrium steady state, we know that this density does not change with time. This affords the solution to the Fokker-Planck equation—a solution that means that there is a lawful relationship between the flow of states at any point in state space and the probability density. This solution expresses the flow in terms of gradients of log density or surprisal and the amplitude of random fluctuations. In turn, the nonequilibrium steady-state solution can always be expressed, via the Helmholtz decomposition, in terms of two orthogonal components. One component is a gradient flow that rebuilds probability gradients in a way that is exactly countered by the dispersion of states due to random fluctuations. The other component is a solenoidal or divergence-free flow that circulates on isoprobability contours. These two components are shown in the schematic on the right, in terms of a curl-free gradient flow—that depends only on the amplitude of random fluctuations Γ– and a divergence-free solenoidal flow—that depends upon an antisymmetric matrix Q. This example shows the flow around the peak of a probability density, with a Gaussian form. Please see [1,25] for details.](https://figures.cochat.ai/paper-figures/b2f1a881e82d4316a188b7dc10782f11/sentience-and-the-origins-of-consciousness-from-cartesian-duality-to-markovian-figure-2.jpg)
![Figure 4 (autonomous movement). This figure shows the results of simulating active inference (i.e., writing), in terms of conditional expectations about hidden states of the world, consequent predictions about sensory input and the ensuing behaviour. The autonomous dynamics that underlie this behaviour rest upon prior expectations about states with Lotka-Volterra dynamics (c.f., a central pattern generator): these are the six (arbitrarily) coloured lines in the upper left panel. In this generative model, each state is associated with a location in Euclidean space that attracts the agent’s finger. In effect, the internal states then supply predictions of what sensory states should register, if these prior beliefs were true. Active states try to suppress the ensuing prediction error (i.e., sensory surprisal) by reflexively fulfilling expected changes in angular velocity, through exerting forces on the agent’s joints (not shown). The subsequent movement of the arm is traced out in the lower left panel. This trajectory has been plotted in a moving frame of reference, so that it looks like synthetic handwriting (e.g., a succession of ‘j’ and ‘a’ letters). The lower left panels show the activity of one (the fourth attractor) conditional expectation under ‘action’, and ‘action-observation’. During action, sensory states register both the visual and proprioceptive consequences of movement, while under action observation, only visual sensations are available—as if the agent was watching another agent. The red dots correspond to the time bins during which this state exceeded an amplitude threshold of two arbitrary units. They key thing to note here is that this unit responds preferentially when, and only when, the motor trajectory produces a down-stroke, but not an up-stroke. Please see [94] for further details. Furthermore, with a slight delay, this internal state responds during action and action observation. From a biological perspective, this is interesting because it speaks to an empirical phenomena known as mirror neuron activity [95,96,97].](https://figures.cochat.ai/paper-figures/61438594a4874f04825ebc9cacdd600a/sentience-and-the-origins-of-consciousness-from-cartesian-duality-to-markovian-figure-4.jpg)
![Figure 5 (epistemic foraging). This figure shows the results of a simulation in which a face was presented to an agent, whose responses were simulated by selecting active states that minimise expected free energy following an eye movement. The agent had three internal images or hypotheses about the stimuli she might sample (an upright face, and inverted face and a rotated face). The agent was presented with an upright face and her conditional expectations were evaluated over 16 (12 ms.) time bins, until the next saccade was emitted. This was repeated for eight saccades. The ensuing eye movements are shown as red dots at the end of each saccade in the upper row. The corresponding sequence of eye movements is shown in the insert on the upper left, where the red circles correspond roughly to the proportion of the visual image sampled. These saccades are driven by prior beliefs about the direction of gaze based upon the saliency maps in the second row. These saliency maps are the expected free energy as a function of policies; namely, where to look next. Note that these maps change with successive saccades as posterior beliefs about external states, including the stimulus, become progressively more precise or confident. Note also that salience is depleted in locations that were foveated in the previous saccade because these locations no longer have an epistemic affordance (i.e., the ability to reduce uncertainty or expected free energy). This is a nice illustration of a ubiquitous phenomenon, known as inhibition of return. Oculomotor responses are shown in the third row in terms of the two hidden oculomotor states, corresponding to vertical and horizontal eye movements. The associated portions of the image sampled (at the end of each saccade) are shown in the fourth row. The final two rows show the posterior beliefs in terms of their sufficient statistics and the stimulus categories, respectively. The posterior beliefs are plotted here in terms of conditional expectations and the 90% confidence interval about the true stimulus. The key thing to note here is that the expectation about the true stimulus supervenes over its competing expectations and, as a result, conditional confidence about the stimulus category increases (the confidence intervals shrink to the expectation). This illustrates the nature of evidence accumulation when selecting a hypothesis or percept the best explains sensory data. Within saccade accumulation is evident even during the initial fixation with further stepwise decreases in uncertainty as salient information is sampled at successive saccades. Please see [98] for further details.](https://figures.cochat.ai/paper-figures/4959fe6209214b1994325e4ec76d3c99/sentience-and-the-origins-of-consciousness-from-cartesian-duality-to-markovian-figure-5.jpg)
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“the FEP framework’s central hypothesis is that systems do represent the outer world via their internal states”
From The Free Energy Principle: Good Science and Questionable Philosophy in a Grand Unifying Theory (2021) · cites this paper as [13]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“Hence, the dual information geometry itself does not entail property dualism”
From The Free Energy Principle: Good Science and Questionable Philosophy in a Grand Unifying Theory (2021) · cites this paper as [13]
The cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“Friston and colleagues adopt MM as the better metaphysical position to support the FEP framework.”
From The Free Energy Principle: Good Science and Questionable Philosophy in a Grand Unifying Theory (2021) · cites this paper as [13]
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction
Sutton, R. S., & Barto, A. G. (1998) · IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks · doi:10.1109/tnn.1998.712192 · Cited by 27,225 · cited 1×
“On this view, one can then spin-off an interpretation in terms of reinforcement learning [30], optimal control theory [31] and, in economics, expected utility theory [39].”
BackgroundReinforcement Learning: An Introduction
(2005) · IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks · doi:10.1109/tnn.2004.842673 · Cited by 24,496
(1988) · Cited by 16,582
Information theory and statistical mechanics
Jaynes, E. T. (1957) · Physical Review · doi:10.1103/physrev.106.620 · Cited by 12,931
Kass, R. E., & Raftery, A. E. (1995) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.1080/01621459.1995.10476572 · Cited by 12,558
The Origins of Order: Self-Organization and Selection in Evolution
Kauffman, S. A. (1993) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780195079517.001.0001 · Cited by 7,855
Rizzolatti, G., & Craighero, L. (2004) · Annual Review of Neuroscience · doi:10.1146/annurev.neuro.27.070203.144230 · Cited by 7,433
Information theory, inference, and learning algorithms
(2004) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.41-5949 · Cited by 6,362
Nonequilibrium Equality for Free Energy Differences
Jarzynski, C. (1997) · Physical Review Letters · doi:10.1103/physrevlett.78.2690 · Cited by 5,293 · cited 1×
“The equality in (11) is a little abstract but has some clear homologues in stochastic thermodynamics (in the form of integral fluctuation theorems) [12,79].”
BackgroundThe precuneus: a review of its functional anatomy and behavioural correlates
Cavanna, A. E., & Trimble, M. R. (2006) · Brain · doi:10.1093/brain/awl004 · Cited by 5,128 · cited 1×
“Furthermore, the ‘paper trail’ from gauge theory to attention endorses pre-theoretical notions about their intimate relationship [142,143].”
BackgroundStochastic thermodynamics, fluctuation theorems and molecular machines
Seifert, U. (2012) · Reports on Progress in Physics · doi:10.1088/0034-4885/75/12/126001 · Cited by 3,300 · cited 4×
“So how far into the future? One can formalise a response to this question by turning to the path integral formulation of random dynamical systems [12,13,77,78].”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialMirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind-reading
Gallese, V (1998) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(98)01262-5 · Cited by 3,201
Cattaneo, L., & Rizzolatti, G. (2009) · Archives of Neurology · doi:10.1001/archneurol.2009.41 · Cited by 3,137
Between MDPs and semi-MDPs: A framework for temporal abstraction in reinforcement learning
Sutton, R. S., Precup, D., & Singh, S. (1999) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/s0004-3702(99)00052-1 · Cited by 3,119 · cited 1×
“, expected surprisal or uncertainty), we now have a plausible description of intentional behaviour that will, to all intents and purposes, look like uncertainty resolving, information seeking, epistemic foraging [81,83,84,26,85,86,87,88,89,90].”
BackgroundOptimal feedback control as a theory of motor coordination
Todorov, E., & Jordan, M. I. (2002) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn963 · Cited by 3,081 · cited 1×
“On this view, one can then spin-off an interpretation in terms of reinforcement learning [30], optimal control theory [31] and, in economics, expected utility theory [39].”
BackgroundNatural Gradient Works Efficiently in Learning
Amari, S.-I. (1998) · Neural Computation · doi:10.1162/089976698300017746 · Cited by 2,681 · cited 2×
“The important thing here is that any statistical manifold is necessarily equipped with a unique metric tensor, known as the Fisher information metric [23,59,62].”
BackgroundThe Bayesian brain: The role of uncertainty in neural coding and computation
Knill, D. C., & Pouget, A. (2004) · Trends in Neurosciences · doi:10.1016/j.tins.2004.10.007 · Cited by 2,588 · cited 1×
“In summary, the variational free energy is always implicitly or explicitly under the hood of any inference process, ranging from simple analyses of variance through to the Bayesian brain [57].”
BackgroundTowards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework
Dehaene, S. (2001) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00123-2 · Cited by 2,498 · cited 1×
“Furthermore, the ‘paper trail’ from gauge theory to attention endorses pre-theoretical notions about their intimate relationship [142,143].”
BackgroundSleep function and synaptic homeostasis
Tononi, G., & Cirelli, C. (2006) · Sleep Medicine Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.smrv.2005.05.002 · Cited by 2,151 · cited 2×
“This complexity minimisation itself has formal links with both machine learning [128] and universal computation [88,134,135]—and physiology in the form of synaptic homoeostasis [133,136].”
BackgroundAn information integration theory of consciousness
Tononi, G. (2004) · BMC Neuroscience · doi:10.1186/1471-2202-5-42 · Cited by 1,958
Hohwy, J. (2013) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682737.001.0001 · Cited by 1,914
‘What’ and ‘where’ in the human brain
Ungerleider, L. G., & Haxby, J. V. (1994) · Current Opinion in Neurobiology · doi:10.1016/0959-4388(94)90066-3 · Cited by 1,913 · cited 1×
“One celebrated example is the segregation of the brain into ventral (‘what’) and dorsal (‘where’) streams [74] that may reflect the statistical independence between ‘what’ and ‘where’.”
BackgroundInteroceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied self
Seth, A. K. (2013) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2013.09.007 · Cited by 1,816 · cited 2×
“, Bayesian brain) accounts of attentional selection and, a particularly important role in interoceptive inference [67,68,76,139,140].”
BackgroundIntegrated information theory: from consciousness to its physical substrate
Tononi, G., Boly, M., Massimini, M., & Koch, C. (2016) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn.2016.44 · Cited by 1,727 · cited 1×
“Another aspect of the axiom of integration is that “every part of the system has both causes and effects within the rest of the system” ([123], p.”
Background(2003) · Cited by 1,680
Constructing Free-Energy Approximations and Generalized Belief Propagation Algorithms
Yedidia, J. S., Freeman, W. T., & Weiss, Y. (2005) · IEEE Transactions on Information Theory · doi:10.1109/tit.2005.850085 · Cited by 1,617 · cited 1×
“Note that these beliefs are non-propositional, where ‘belief’ is used in the sense of ‘belief propagation’ and ‘Bayesian belief updating’ that can always be formulated as minimising variational free energy [51,52,58].”
BackgroundGoal-directed instrumental action: contingency and incentive learning and their cortical substrates
Balleine, B. W., & Dickinson, A. (1998) · Neuropharmacology · doi:10.1016/s0028-3908(98)00033-1 · Cited by 1,541 · cited 1×
“, politicians and pontiffs) may be characterised by deep generative models that see far into the future; enabling a move from homoeostasis to allostasis and, effectively, the capacity to select courses of action that consider long term consequences [80,81,82].”
BackgroundConsciousness as integrated information: a provisional manifesto
Tononi, G. (2008) · The Biological Bulletin · doi:10.2307/25470707 · Cited by 1,529 · cited 1×
“Perhaps the most notable is integrated information theory [118,119].”
BackgroundAllostasis: A New Paradigm to Explain Arousal Pathology
Sterling, P., & Eyer, J. (1988) · Zenodo · doi:10.5281/zenodo.13537700 · Cited by 1,450
Haken, H. (1983) · Springer Series in Synergetics · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-88338-5 · Cited by 1,431
(1988) · doi:10.1016/b978-0-08-051489-5.50008-4 · Cited by 1,429
A free energy principle for the brain
Friston, K., Kilner, J., & Harrison, L. (2006) · Journal of Physiology-Paris · doi:10.1016/j.jphysparis.2006.10.001 · Cited by 1,369 · cited 1×
“The minimisation of particular surprisal leads to a series of influential accounts of neuronal dynamics; including the principle of maximum mutual information [40,41], the principles of minimum redundancy and maximum efficiency [33] and—as we will see later—the free energy principle [42].”
BackgroundSelf-citationPossible Principles Underlying the Transformations of Sensory Messages
Barlow, H. B. (2012) · Sensory Communication · doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262518420.003.0013 · Cited by 1,269 · cited 2×
“From the perspective of information theory, surprisal corresponds to self-information, leading to notions such as the principle of minimum redundancy or maximum efficiency [33].”
BackgroundDayan, P., Hinton, G. E., Neal, R. M., & Zemel, R. S. (1995) · Neural Computation · doi:10.1162/neco.1995.7.5.889 · Cited by 1,207 · cited 1×
“This means that all the above formulations are internally consistent with things like the Bayesian brain hypothesis, evidence accumulation and predictive coding; most of which inherit from Helmholtz’s motion of unconscious inference [48], later unpacked in terms of perception as hypothesis testing in 20th century psyc…”
Background(1993) · Cited by 1,173
Predictive coding: an account of the mirror neuron system
Kilner, J. M., Friston, K. J., & Frith, C. D. (2007) · Cognitive Processing · doi:10.1007/s10339-007-0170-2 · Cited by 1,134
Self-citationThe "Wake-Sleep" Algorithm for Unsupervised Neural Networks
Hinton, G. E., Dayan, P., Frey, B. J., & Neal, R. M. (1995) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7761831 · Cited by 1,070 · cited 2×
“This complexity minimisation itself has formal links with both machine learning [128] and universal computation [88,134,135]—and physiology in the form of synaptic homoeostasis [133,136].”
BackgroundEvery good regulator of a system must be a model of that system †
CONANT, R. C., & ROSS ASHBY, W. (1970) · International Journal of Systems Science · doi:10.1080/00207727008920220 · Cited by 1,063
Attractors for random dynamical systems
Crauel, H., & Flandoli, F. (1994) · Probability Theory and Related Fields · doi:10.1007/bf01193705 · Cited by 985 · cited 2×
“So how far into the future? One can formalise a response to this question by turning to the path integral formulation of random dynamical systems [12,13,77,78].”
Background(2003) · Cited by 885
A Unifying Review of Linear Gaussian Models
Roweis, S., & Ghahramani, Z. (1999) · Neural Computation · doi:10.1162/089976699300016674 · Cited by 869
Gregory, R. L. (1980) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. B, Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.1980.0090 · Cited by 789 · cited 1×
“This means that all the above formulations are internally consistent with things like the Bayesian brain hypothesis, evidence accumulation and predictive coding; most of which inherit from Helmholtz’s motion of unconscious inference [48], later unpacked in terms of perception as hypothesis testing in 20th century psyc…”
BackgroundBeing No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity
Metzinger, T. (2003) · MIT Press · doi:10.7551/mitpress/1551.001.0001 · Cited by 789
Predictions not commands: Active inference in the motor system
Adams, R. A., Shipp, S., & Friston, K. J. (2013) · Brain Structure and Function · doi:10.1007/s00429-012-0475-5 · Cited by 765
Self-citationFriston, K. (2013) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2013.0475 · Cited by 754 · cited 2×
“In other words, we are ignoring the solenoidal coupling between internal and active states [9].”
BackgroundSelf-citationFormal theory of creativity, fun, and intrinsic motivation (1990–2010)
Schmidhuber, J. (2010) · IEEE Transactions on Autonomous Mental Development · doi:10.1109/tamd.2010.2056368 · Cited by 747 · cited 1×
“, expected surprisal or uncertainty), we now have a plausible description of intentional behaviour that will, to all intents and purposes, look like uncertainty resolving, information seeking, epistemic foraging [81,83,84,26,85,86,87,88,89,90].”
BackgroundEvery Good Regulator of a System Must Be a Model of That System
Conant, R. C., & Ashby, W. R. (1991) · Facets of Systems Science · doi:10.1007/978-1-4899-0718-9_37 · Cited by 712 · cited 2×
“This is exactly the good regulator theory that emerged in the formulations of self-organisation at the inception of cybernetics [45,70].”
BackgroundHochreiter, S., & Schmidhuber, J. (1997) · Neural Computation · doi:10.1162/neco.1997.9.1.1 · Cited by 676
Action understanding and active inference
Friston, K., Mattout, J., & Kilner, J. (2011) · Biological Cybernetics · doi:10.1007/s00422-011-0424-z · Cited by 665
Self-citationLangevin Equation and Thermodynamics
Sekimoto, K. (1998) · Progress of Theoretical Physics Supplement · doi:10.1143/ptps.130.17 · Cited by 655
Active Inference, homeostatic regulation and adaptive behavioural control
Pezzulo, G., Rigoli, F., & Friston, K. (2015) · Progress in Neurobiology · doi:10.1016/j.pneurobio.2015.09.001 · Cited by 650 · cited 1×
“, politicians and pontiffs) may be characterised by deep generative models that see far into the future; enabling a move from homoeostasis to allostasis and, effectively, the capacity to select courses of action that consider long term consequences [80,81,82].”
BackgroundSelf-citationPrinciples of the Self-Organizing Dynamic System
Ashby, W. R. (1947) · The Journal of General Psychology · doi:10.1080/00221309.1947.9918144 · Cited by 639 · cited 2×
“For example, predictive coding, homoeostasis and thermostats can all be articulated in terms of perceptual control [46,110,111] and a reflexive form of active inference using generative models based upon differential equations.”
BackgroundREM sleep and dreaming: towards a theory of protoconsciousness
Hobson, J. A. (2009) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2716 · Cited by 625 · cited 2×
“These prior beliefs underwrite protoconsciousness [127] and are necessary to generate virtual or fictive realities [132] in states such as dreaming [129,130,131].”
BackgroundSelf-citationFodor, J. A. (1981) · Scientific American · doi:10.1038/scientificamerican0181-114 · Cited by 590 · cited 1×
“20 Note that this treatment departs from the classical conception of computation, according to which there is “no computation without representation” [115].”
BackgroundBirkhoff, G. (1927) · Colloquium Publications · doi:10.1090/coll/009 · Cited by 590
Hohwy, J. (2016) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12062 · Cited by 578
Curious model-building control systems
Schmidhuber, J. (1991) · [Proceedings] 1991 IEEE International Joint Conference on Neural Networks · doi:10.1109/ijcnn.1991.170605 · Cited by 541 · cited 1×
“This complexity minimisation itself has formal links with both machine learning [128] and universal computation [88,90,134]—and physiology in the form of synaptic homoeostasis [133,135].”
BackgroundSelf-organization, free energy minimization, and optimal grip on a field of affordances
Bruineberg, J., & Rietveld, E. (2014) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2014.00599 · Cited by 538
Active inference, sensory attenuation and illusions
Brown, H., Adams, R. A., Parees, I., Edwards, M., & Friston, K. (2013) · Cognitive Processing · doi:10.1007/s10339-013-0571-3 · Cited by 488 · cited 1×
“, Bayesian brain) accounts of attentional selection and, a particularly important role in interoceptive inference [67,68,76,139,140].”
BackgroundSelf-citationProbabilistic inference for solving discrete and continuous state Markov Decision Processes
Toussaint, M., & Storkey, A. (2006) · Proceedings of the 23rd international conference on Machine learning - ICML '06 · doi:10.1145/1143844.1143963 · Cited by 482 · cited 1×
“, expected surprisal or uncertainty), we now have a plausible description of intentional behaviour that will, to all intents and purposes, look like uncertainty resolving, information seeking, epistemic foraging [81,83,84,26,85,86,87,88,89,90].”
BackgroundThe Markov blankets of life: autonomy, active inference and the free energy principle
Kirchhoff, M., Parr, T., Palacios, E., Friston, K., & Kiverstein, J. (2018) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2017.0792 · Cited by 473 · cited 1×
“We therefore conclude that phenomenally conscious systems for which a hard problem exists must possess a certain kind of statistical structure; namely, Markov blankets within Markov blankets [4].”
BackgroundSelf-citationPerceptions as Hypotheses: Saccades as Experiments
Friston, K., Adams, R. A., Perrinet, L., & Breakspear, M. (2012) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00151 · Cited by 462
Self-citationAllostatic Self-efficacy: A Metacognitive Theory of Dyshomeostasis-Induced Fatigue and Depression
Stephan, K. E., Manjaly, Z. M., Mathys, C. D., Weber, L. A. E., Paliwal, S., Gard, T., Tittgemeyer, M., Fleming, S. M., Haker, H., Seth, A. K., et al. (2016) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2016.00550 · Cited by 437 · cited 1×
“, expected surprisal or uncertainty), we now have a plausible description of intentional behaviour that will, to all intents and purposes, look like uncertainty resolving, information seeking, epistemic foraging [81,83,84,26,85,86,87,88,89,90].”
BackgroundTrue Believers:The Intentional Strategy and Why It Works
Dennett, D. C. (1997) · Mind Design II · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4626.003.0003 · Cited by 433
Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism
Chalmers, D. J. (2016) · Panpsychism · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199359943.003.0002 · Cited by 432 · cited 1×
“These special, non-structural properties are protophenomenal properties that are not identical to (micro-)physical properties (otherwise, even physicalism could be considered as a form of panprotopsychism, [100], p.”
BackgroundRichmond, B. J., Optican, L. M., Podell, M., & Spitzer, H. (1987) · Journal of Neurophysiology · doi:10.1152/jn.1987.57.1.132 · Cited by 428
Measuring Thermodynamic Length
Crooks, G. E. (2007) · Physical Review Letters · doi:10.1103/physrevlett.99.100602 · Cited by 424 · cited 4×
“exploited in characterising self-organisation in random, chaotic dynamical systems [23,62].”
BackgroundInfluentialNonlinear Fokker-Planck Equations
(2005) · Springer Series in Synergetics · doi:10.1007/b137680 · Cited by 400
Optican, L. M., & Richmond, B. J. (1987) · Journal of Neurophysiology · doi:10.1152/jn.1987.57.1.162 · Cited by 374 · cited 1×
“The minimisation of particular surprisal leads to a series of influential accounts of neuronal dynamics; including the principle of maximum mutual information [40,41], the principles of minimum redundancy and maximum efficiency [33] and—as we will see later—the free energy principle [42].”
BackgroundThe Meta-Problem of Consciousness
Chalmers, D. J. (2018) · Journal of Consciousness Studies · Cited by 361
Widespread Changes in Synaptic Markers as a Function of Sleep and Wakefulness in Drosophila
Gilestro, G. F., Tononi, G., & Cirelli, C. (2009) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1166673 · Cited by 360
Active Inference, Curiosity and Insight
Friston, K. J., Lin, M., Frith, C. D., Pezzulo, G., Hobson, J. A., & Ondobaka, S. (2017) · Neural Computation · doi:10.1162/neco_a_00999 · Cited by 351
Self-citationClarifying the roles of homeostasis and allostasis in physiological regulation.
Ramsay, D. S., & Woods, S. C. (2014) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/a0035942 · Cited by 320 · cited 1×
“, expected surprisal or uncertainty), we now have a plausible description of intentional behaviour that will, to all intents and purposes, look like uncertainty resolving, information seeking, epistemic foraging [81,83,84,26,85,86,87,88,89,90].”
BackgroundPath integrals and symmetry breaking for optimal control theory
Kappen, H. J. (2005) · Journal of Statistical Mechanics Theory and Experiment · doi:10.1088/1742-5468/2005/11/p11011 · Cited by 309 · cited 1×
“Specifically, we are interested in the probability of trajectories of autonomous states, often referred to as ‘policies’ in the optimal control literature [32].”
BackgroundBotvinick, M., & Toussaint, M. (2012) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2012.08.006 · Cited by 292 · cited 1×
“This is functionally equivalent to the temporal depth or extent of policies; namely, courses of action, and internally consistent with the notion of planning as inference [85,87,137].”
BackgroundWaking and dreaming consciousness: neurobiological and functional considerations.
Hobson, J. A., & Friston, K. J. (2012) · Progress in Neurobiology · doi:10.1016/j.pneurobio.2012.05.003 · Cited by 287 · cited 1×
“There are many fascinating issues here; for example, the complexity term of the free energy functional above provides a compelling metaphor for the housekeeping that we may enjoy during sleep [71,133].”
BackgroundSelf-citationQualia: The Geometry of Integrated Information
Balduzzi, D., & Tononi, G. (2009) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000462 · Cited by 269 · cited 1×
“In other words, IIT does not commit to an extrinsic information geometry (the “geometry of integrated information” is an intrinsic information geometry, see [120]).”
BackgroundStill, S., Sivak, D. A., Bell, A. J., & Crooks, G. E. (2012) · Physical Review Letters · doi:10.1103/physrevlett.109.120604 · Cited by 252 · cited 1×
“Indeed, this is common parlance in statistical physics [62,64,144].”
BackgroundPerceptual Neural Organization: Some Approaches Based on Network Models and Information Theory
Linsker, R. (1990) · Annual Review of Neuroscience · doi:10.1146/annurev.ne.13.030190.001353 · Cited by 248 · cited 1×
“The minimisation of particular surprisal leads to a series of influential accounts of neuronal dynamics; including the principle of maximum mutual information [40,41], the principles of minimum redundancy and maximum efficiency [33] and—as we will see later—the free energy principle [42].”
BackgroundWorking memory, attention, and salience in active inference
Parr, T., & Friston, K. J. (2017) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-017-15249-0 · Cited by 227 · cited 1×
“Alternatively, on a more (millennial) Gibsonian view, action selection responds to long-term epistemic affordances [91,92,93].”
BackgroundSelf-citationA free energy principle for a particular physics
Friston, K. (2019) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1906.10184 · Cited by 222 · cited 4×
“The formal basis of the arguments in this—more philosophical—treatment of sentience and physics can be found in [1].”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationUsing Markov Blankets for Causal Structure Learning
Pellet, J., & Elisseeff, A. (2008) · Journal of Machine Learning Research · doi:10.5555/1390681.1442776 · Cited by 206
Planning by Probabilistic Inference.
Attias, H. T. (2003) · Cited by 204
Planning and navigation as active inference
Kaplan, R., & Friston, K. J. (2018) · Biological Cybernetics · doi:10.1007/s00422-018-0753-2 · Cited by 203
Self-citationReduction, emergence and other recent options on the mind/body problem: A philosophic overview
Gulick, R. V. (2001) · Journal of Consciousness Studies · Cited by 197
Predictive coding and representationalism
Gładziejewski, P. (2016) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0762-9 · Cited by 185
The Functional Anatomy of Time: What and When in the Brain
Friston, K., & Buzsáki, G. (2016) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2016.05.001 · Cited by 183
Self-citationCephalopod Brains: An Overview of Current Knowledge to Facilitate Comparison With Vertebrates
Shigeno, S., Andrews, P. L. R., Ponte, G., & Fiorito, G. (2018) · Frontiers in Physiology · doi:10.3389/fphys.2018.00952 · Cited by 182 · cited 1×
“For example, if I looked at my brain, I would immediately guess that my embodied world had a bilateral symmetry, while if I looked at the brain of an octopus, I might guess that it’s embodied world had a rotational symmetry [75].”
BackgroundComputation without Representation
Piccinini, G. (2006) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-005-5385-4 · Cited by 174 · cited 1×
“Accordingly, physical systems can perform computations without representation (see [116].”
BackgroundOn Variational Message Passing on Factor Graphs
Dauwels, J. (2007) · 2007 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory · doi:10.1109/isit.2007.4557602 · Cited by 174 · cited 1×
“Note that these beliefs are non-propositional, where ‘belief’ is used in the sense of ‘belief propagation’ and ‘Bayesian belief updating’ that can always be formulated as minimising variational free energy [51,58,52].”
BackgroundMental Causation and Neural Mechanisms*
Woodward, J. (2008) · Being Reduced · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199211531.003.0013 · Cited by 161
(1979) · CERN Document Server (European Organization for Nuclear Research) · Cited by 157
Limanowski, J., & Friston, K. (2018) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00643 · Cited by 154 · cited 2×
“One could develop this story even further, in terms of the predictive processing of precision per se – and how this may underwrite mental action and a sense of agency [111,140].”
BackgroundSelf-citationTschacher, W., & Haken, H. (2007) · New Ideas in Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.newideapsych.2006.09.002 · Cited by 152 · cited 1×
“This means that anything that exists will—appear to—minimise the entropy of its particular states over time [29,34].”
Background(2018) · UCL Discovery (University College London) · Cited by 145
Self-citationEmerging of Stochastic Dynamical Equalities and Steady State Thermodynamics from Darwinian Dynamics
Ao, P. (2008) · Communications in Theoretical Physics · doi:10.1088/0253-6102/49/5/01 · Cited by 143
Markov blankets, information geometry and stochastic thermodynamics
Parr, T., Da Costa, L., & Friston, K. (2020) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A Mathematical Physical and Engineering Sciences · doi:10.1098/rsta.2019.0159 · Cited by 141
Self-citationFree Energy, Value, and Attractors
Friston, K., & Ao, P. (2012) · Computational and Mathematical Methods in Medicine · doi:10.1155/2012/937860 · Cited by 139
Self-citationPlanning to be surprised: optimal bayesian exploration in dynamic environments
Sun, Y., Gomez, F., & Schmidhuber, J. (2011) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-22887-2_5 · Cited by 134 · cited 1×
“, expected surprisal or uncertainty), we now have a plausible description of intentional behaviour that will, to all intents and purposes, look like uncertainty resolving, information seeking, epistemic foraging [81,83,84,26,85,86,87,88,89,90].”
BackgroundTowards a neuronal gauge theory
Sengupta, B., Tozzi, A., Cooray, G. K., Douglas, P. K., & Friston, K. J. (2016) · PLOS Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1002400 · Cited by 132 · cited 1×
“Our own work in this area [139] focused on gauge theories associated with information geometry and the Fisher information metric.”
BackgroundSelf-citationOn the axiomatic foundations of the integrated information theory of consciousness
Bayne, T. (2018) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niy007 · Cited by 132 · cited 1×
“the natural kind approach sketched in [126], p.”
BackgroundGenesis of the Marginal Utility Theory: From Aristotle to the End of the Eighteenth Century
Kauder, E. (1953) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2226451 · Cited by 120
On markov blankets and hierarchical self-organisation
Palacios, E. R., Razi, A., Parr, T., Kirchhoff, M., & Friston, K. (2020) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2019.110089 · Cited by 115
Self-citationWhere There is Life There is Mind: In Support of a Strong Life-Mind Continuity Thesis
Kirchhoff, M. D., & Froese, T. (2017) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e19040169 · Cited by 114
Risk-sensitive control and an optimal investment model II
Fleming, W. H., & Sheu, S. (2002) · The Annals of Applied Probability · doi:10.1214/aoap/1026915623 · Cited by 110
Entropy production in nonequilibrium systems described by a Fokker-Planck equation
Tomé, T. (2006) · Brazilian Journal of Physics · doi:10.1590/s0103-97332006000700029 · Cited by 108
Clark, A. (2013) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00270 · Cited by 108
Frank, T. D., Beek, P. J., & Friedrich, R. (2003) · Physical review. E, Statistical physics, plasmas, fluids, and related interdisciplinary topics · doi:10.1103/physreve.68.021912 · Cited by 107
Toward the neural implementation of structure learning
Tervo, D. G. R., Tenenbaum, J. B., & Gershman, S. J. (2016) · Current Opinion in Neurobiology · doi:10.1016/j.conb.2016.01.014 · Cited by 106 · cited 1×
“Indeed, from a statistical perspective, minimising variational free energy is synonymous with structure learning [59,121,122].”
BackgroundPalmer, C. J., Seth, A. K., & Hohwy, J. (2015) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2015.04.007 · Cited by 101
Information Geometry on Complexity and Stochastic Interaction
Ay, N. (2015) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e17042432 · Cited by 100 · cited 1×
“To license a description of this conditional density in terms of beliefs, we can now appeal to information geometry [23,59,60,61].”
BackgroundBayesing qualia: consciousness as inference, not raw datum
Clark, A., Friston, K. J., & Wilkinson, S. (2019) · Journal of Consciousness Studies · Cited by 86
Self-citationOn nodes and modes in resting state fMRI
Friston, K. J., Kahan, J., Razi, A., Stephan, K. E., & Sporns, O. (2014) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2014.05.056 · Cited by 85
Self-citationThe dialectics of consciousness and language
Zlatev, J. (2008) · Cited by 83
Mind that Abides: Panpsychism in the new millennium
(2009) · Advances in Consciousness Research · doi:10.1075/aicr.75 · Cited by 80
Free energy minimisation algorithmfor decoding and cryptanalysis
MacKay, D. J. C. (1995) · Electronics Letters · doi:10.1049/el:19950331 · Cited by 79 · cited 1×
“Finally, the probability of any particular states given a Markov blanket (m) is, on a statistical view, model evidence [18,47].”
Background(2014) · UCL Discovery (University College London) · Cited by 75
Self-citationIngthorsson, R., Lowe, E. J., & Gibb, S. C. (2013) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603770.001.0001 · Cited by 74
Echo-state conditional variational autoencoder for anomaly detection
Suh, S., Chae, D. H., Kang, H.-G., & Choi, S. (2016) · 2016 International Joint Conference on Neural Networks (IJCNN) · doi:10.1109/ijcnn.2016.7727309 · Cited by 74 · cited 1×
“For example, it is the (negative) evidence lower bound used in state of the art (variational autoencoder) deep learning [53,55].”
BackgroundHow to Knit Your Own Markov Blanket:
Clark, A. (2017) · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · doi:10.15502/9783958573031 · Cited by 72
Stochastic Reasoning, Free Energy, and Information Geometry
Ikeda, S., Tanaka, T., & Amari, S.-I. (2004) · Neural Computation · doi:10.1162/0899766041336477 · Cited by 68
Bossaerts, P., & Murawski, C. (2015) · Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.cobeha.2015.07.001 · Cited by 63 · cited 1×
“On this view, one can then spin-off an interpretation in terms of reinforcement learning [30], optimal control theory [31] and, in economics, expected utility theory [39].”
BackgroundInvestigating Information Geometry in Classical and Quantum Systems through Information Length
Kim, E.-J. (2018) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e20080574 · Cited by 63 · cited 2×
“exploited in characterising self-organisation in random, chaotic dynamical systems [23,62].”
BackgroundThe Russellian Monist's Problems with Mental Causation
Howell, R. (2015) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1093/pq/pqu058 · Cited by 50 · cited 1×
“The only causal interaction in question involves neutral entities (however, the problem of mental causation may reappear, in the sense that macro-level mental properties may still be causally irrelevant, see [102], pp.”
BackgroundSome Interesting Observations on the Free Energy Principle
Friston, K. J., Da Costa, L., & Parr, T. (2021) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e23081076 · Cited by 49 · cited 2×
“The interesting relationship between conditional independence and solenoidal coupling is pursued in a forthcoming submission to Entropy [38].”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationDreaming as Delirium: How the Brain Goes Out of Its Mind
Hobson, J. A. (1999) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/2497.001.0001 · Cited by 47
Self-citationMentalizing homeostasis: the social origins of interoceptive inference – replies to Commentaries
Fotopoulou, A., & Tsakiris, M. (2017) · Neuropsychoanalysis · doi:10.1080/15294145.2017.1307667 · Cited by 39 · cited 1×
“, Bayesian brain) accounts of attentional selection and, a particularly important role in interoceptive inference [67,68,140,76,141].”
BackgroundThe basics of information geometry
Caticha, A. (2015) · AIP conference proceedings · doi:10.1063/1.4905960 · Cited by 36 · cited 1×
“To license a description of this conditional density in terms of beliefs, we can now appeal to information geometry [23,59,60,61].”
BackgroundWiese, W. (2018) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262036993.001.0001 · Cited by 35 · cited 1×
“Specifying the constraints on generative models that underpin active inference of the sort that entails characteristic features of consciousness can lead to a unitary concept of consciousness ([124], as opposed to a bundle of feature descriptions; see [125]).”
BackgroundSelf-citationInference to the Best Prediction: A Reply to Wanja Wiese
Seth, A. K. (2015) · Theoretical Philosophy/MIND Group – JGU Mainz · doi:10.15502/9783958570986 · Cited by 34 · cited 2×
“For example, predictive coding, homoeostasis and thermostats can all be articulated in terms of perceptual control [46,110,111] and a reflexive form of active inference using generative models based upon differential equations.”
BackgroundBiological Self-organisation and Markov blankets
Palacios, E. R., Razi, A., Parr, T., Kirchhoff, M., & Friston, K. (2017) · bioRxiv (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory) · doi:10.1101/227181 · Cited by 34
Self-citationCoherent fluctuation relations: from the abstract to the concrete
Holmes, Z., Weidt, S., Jennings, D., Anders, J., & Mintert, F. (2019) · Quantum · doi:10.22331/q-2019-02-25-124 · Cited by 34 · cited 2×
“Indeed, this is common parlance in statistical physics [62,64,144].”
BackgroundControl of Perception Should be Operationalized as a Fundamental Property of the Nervous System
Mansell, W. (2011) · Topics in Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/j.1756-8765.2011.01140.x · Cited by 33 · cited 1×
“For example, predictive coding, homoeostasis and thermostats can all be articulated in terms of perceptual control [46,110,111] and a reflexive form of active inference using generative models based upon differential equations.”
BackgroundCausation is Macroscopic but Not Irreducible
Papineau, D. (2013) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603770.003.0006 · Cited by 32 · cited 1×
“This squares well with the idea that causation (including mental causation) is a macroscopic phenomenon [108,109].”
BackgroundArtificial General Intelligence
Schmidhuber, J., Looks, M., & Þórisson, K. R. (2011) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-22887-2 · Cited by 28
Toward a mature science of consciousness
Wiese, W. (2018) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00693 · Cited by 28 · cited 1×
“Specifying the constraints on generative models that underpin active inference of the sort that entails characteristic features of consciousness can lead to a unitary concept of consciousness ([124], as opposed to a bundle of feature descriptions; see [125]).”
BackgroundSelf-citationBenovsky, J. (2015) · Philosophical Investigations · doi:10.1111/phin.12122 · Cited by 27
Planning to Be Surprised: Optimal Bayesian Exploration in Dynamic EnvironmentsPreprint
Sun, Y., Gomez, F. J., & Schmidhuber, J. (2011) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1103.5708 · Cited by 25 · cited 1×
“, expected surprisal or uncertainty), we now have a plausible description of intentional behaviour that will, to all intents and purposes, look like uncertainty resolving, information seeking, epistemic foraging [81,83,84,26,85,86,87,88,89,90].”
BackgroundA Response to Our Theatre Critics
Hobson, J., & Friston, K. J. (2016) · Journal of Consciousness Studies · Cited by 24
Self-citationTriviality Arguments Reconsidered
Schweizer, P. (2019) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1007/s11023-019-09501-x · Cited by 24 · cited 1×
“In particular, one can make a threefold distinction between (i) systems that behave only ‘as if’ they implemented computations over probabilistic beliefs, (ii) systems for which the “computational stance” [114] provides added explanatory value, and (iii) systems that can usefully be described as not only computational…”
BackgroundGeneralized phase space version of Langevin equations and associated Fokker-Planck equations
Kerr, W. C., & Graham, A. J. (2000) · The European Physical Journal B · doi:10.1007/s100510051129 · Cited by 23
Perceptual-learning systems as conservative structures: Is economy an attractor?
van Leeuwen, C. (1990) · Psychological Research · doi:10.1007/bf00877522 · Cited by 18
A Path Integral Formalism for Non-equilibrium Hamiltonian Statistical Systems
Kleeman, R. D. (2014) · Journal of Statistical Physics · doi:10.1007/s10955-014-1149-x · Cited by 14
Wiese, W. (2018) · Project Muse (Johns Hopkins University) · Cited by 12
Self-citation(1977) · doi:10.4324/9781315740218-18
Research works printed but not linked: 5
- Yuan, R., Ma, Y., Yuan, B., and Ping, A. (2010). Bridging Engineering and Physics: Lyapunov Function as Potential Function. arXiv.
- Nicolis, G., and Prigogine, I. (1977). Self-Organization in Non-Equilibrium Systems, John Wiley.
- Clark, 2013, The many faces of precision, Front. Psychol., 4, 270
- Arnold, L. (2003). Random Dynamical Systems (Springer Monographs in Mathematics), Springer.
- Velmans, 2008, Reflexive Monism, J. Conscious. Stud., 15, 5
Cited by
In vitro neurons learn and exhibit sentience when embodied in a simulated game-world
Kagan, B. J., Kitchen, A. C., Tran, N. T., Habibollahi, F., Khajehnejad, M., Parker, B. J., Bhat, A., Rollo, B., Razi, A., & Friston, K. J. (2022) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2022.09.001 · Cited by 400
“It is proposed that these neural cultures wouldmeet the formal definition of sentience as being ‘‘responsive to sensory impressions’’ through adaptive internal processes (Friston et al., 2020).”
Self-citationIn the body's eye: the computational anatomy of interoceptive inference
Allen, M., Levy, A., Parr, T., & Friston, K. J. (2022) · PLOS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010490 · Cited by 185
Self-citationConsciousness and complexity: a consilience of evidence
Sarasso, S., Casali, A. G., Casarotto, S., Rosanova, M., Sinigaglia, C., & Massimini, M. (2021) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niab023 · Cited by 171
“…such as the Global Neuronal Workspace, the Kolmogorov Complexity Theory of Con-sciousness, and the Free Energy Principle, have more recently embraced, albeit starting from different premises, an explicit complexity-related framework (Dehaene et al. 2014; Ruffini 2017; Friston et al. 2020).”
Predictive processing as a systematic basis for identifying the neural correlates of consciousness
Hohwy, J., & Seth, A. (2020) · Philosophy and the Mind Sciences · doi:10.33735/phimisci.2020.ii.64 · Cited by 170
Entropy and the Brain: An Overview
Keshmiri, S. (2020) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e22090917 · Cited by 165
Metadata
- Authors
- Friston, K. J., Wiese, W., & Hobson, J. A.
- Affiliations
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging (GB)
- Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz (DE)
- Harvard University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Friston, Karl J.
- Wiese, Wanja
- Hobson, J. Allan
- Venue
- Entropy
- Publisher
- MDPI AG
- Published
- 2020-04-30
- Volume
- 22
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 516
- ISSN
- 1099-4300 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC7517007
- OpenAlex
- W3023671316
- Cited by
- 186
- References
- 143
- Citations by year
- 2026: 18 · 2025: 25 · 2024: 31 · 2023: 27 · 2022: 29 · 2021: 40 · 2020: 15
- FWCI
- 26.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- dx.doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Entropy (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Wellcome Trust (088130/Z/09/Z)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Keywords
- sentience, consciousness, Cartesian dualism, Markov blanket, information geometry, probability distributions, internal state, origin of consciousness, intentional systems
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.