The DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
State Capacity, Conflict, and Development
Abstract
The absence of state capacities to raise revenue and to support markets is a key factor in explaining the persistence of weak states. This paper reports on an ongoing project to investigate the incentive to invest in such capacities. The paper sets out a simple analytical structure in which state capacities are modeled as forward looking investments by government. The approach highlights some determinants of state building including the risk of external or internal conflict, the degree of political instability, and dependence on natural resources. Throughout, we link these state capacity investments to patterns of development and growth.
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Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia
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What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse?
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The Value of Democracy: Evidence from Road Building in Kenya
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Ethnicity and Conflict: An Empirical Study
Esteban, J., Mayoral, L., & Ray, D. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.4.1310 · Cited by 533
The Logic of Political Violence
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Metadata
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- The Econometric Society
- Published
- 2010
- Volume
- 78
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-34
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3123278700
- Cited by
- 850
- References
- 35
- FWCI
- 93.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- doi.wiley.com/10.1002/tdm_license_1.1 (tdm, 2069 d)
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