The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, With a New Preface and Appendix
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Abstract
Olson develops a theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations, examining the extent to which individuals who share a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the organizational effort.
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“This non-excludability creates free-rider incentives (Olson, 1965), where rational actors seek to benefit from commons resources (the profession-wide expert pool and its validation capacity) without contributing to commons maintenance through investments in developmental infrastructure.”
From The Tragedy of the Cognitive Commons: How AI Could Disrupt the Regeneration of Professional Expertise (2026) · cites this paper as Olson, 1965
In the citing paper
“As industries become more concentrated, the opportunities to exercise political power become amplified among the firms at the top, because it is easier for fewer large firms to act collectively to exert their political voice and to prevent free riders than would be the case with many small firms (Olson 1965).”
From Corporate concentration and power matter for agency in food systems (2025) · cites this paper as Olson 1965
In the citing paper
“Collective action dilemmas arise when the interests of individuals run counter to the common interests of a group of individuals (Olson, 1965;Poteete, Janssen, & Ostrom, 2010).”
From Collective action in a polycentric water governance system (2018) · cites this paper as Olson, 1965
In the citing paper
“organizations facilitate mobilization (Olson 1965), but are also prime targets for repression (Berman 2021; Davenport 2015; Sullivan 2016), cooptation (Collier and Collier 1979), and infiltration (Mattingly 2020) precisely because they are known loci for action.”
From Coordinated Dis-Coordination (2024) · cites this paper as Olson 1965
In the citing paper
“Collective action problems disincentive citizens from acting to protect democracy, and coordination problems undermine acting in concert.”
From How to study democratic backsliding (2024) · cites this paper as Olson, 1965
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Metadata
- Authors
- Olson, M.
- Corresponding author
- Olson, Mancur
- Venue
- Harvard University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Harvard University Press
- Published
- 1965-12-31
- OpenAlex
- W4391965190
- Cited by
- 14,191
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 526 · 2025: 489 · 2024: 428 · 2023: 473 · 2022: 428 · 2021: 504 · 2020: 681 · 2019: 643 · 2018: 531 · 2017: 528 · 2016: 464 · 2015: 440 · 2014: 430 · 2013: 420 · 2012: 410
- FWCI
- 28.30
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Harvard University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Keywords
- collective action, group behavior, organizational behavior, free-riding, cost sharing, common interests, individual versus group interests
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