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Cited by 208Wikis in Education and CollaborationPolitical Theory and DemocracySocial Media and Politics

Laboratories of Oligarchy? How the Iron Law Extends to Peer Production

Shaw, Aaron, Hill, Benjamin M.·2014·Journal of Communication
DOI 10.1111/jcom.12082
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Abstract

Peer production projects like Wikipedia have inspired voluntary associations, collectives, social movements, and scholars to embrace open online collaboration as a model of democratic organization. However, many peer production projects exhibit entrenched leadership and deep inequalities, suggesting that they may not fulfill democratic ideals. Instead, peer production projects may conform to Robert Michels' “iron law of oligarchy,” which proposes that democratic membership organizations become increasingly oligarchic as they grow. Using exhaustive data of internal processes from a sample of 683 wikis, we construct empirical measures of participation and test for increases in oligarchy associated with growth in wikis' contributor bases. In contrast to previous studies, we find support for Michels' iron law and conclude that peer production entails oligarchic organizational forms.

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

This paper tests Michels’ “iron law of oligarchy” across peer production communities, using longitudinal data from 683 Wikia wikis. It finds that as wikis grow, administrators become more entrenched, more administratively active, and more likely to revert contributions by experienced editors, supporting oligarchic tendencies rather than robust democracy.

Key findings

  • H1 supported: a one log-unit increase in registered contributors is associated with odds of adding a new administrator that are only 0.81 times as high.
  • H2 supported: a 1% change in total accounts, controlling for total edits to administrative spaces, is associated with a 3% increase in administrative contributions by administrators.
  • H3 supported: a 1% increase in total accounts, controlling for total edits by experienced users that week, is associated with a 5% increase in administrator-reverted contributions by experienced editors.
  • The authors conclude that, on average, a small group present at the beginning monopolizes formal authority, accounts for more administrative activity, and uses authority to restrict experienced members’ contributions.

Methods

  • Empirical setting: 683 of the largest Wikia wikis, using every revision from registered and non-registered users from Wikia’s 2004 founding until data collection in April 2010.
  • Analysis focuses on wiki administrators in formal positions of authority.
  • Hierarchical linear models with random intercepts, described as a multilevel model for change, test three hypotheses corresponding to the “structural” and “goal transformation” components of Michels’ iron law.

Limitations

  • Stated: some wikis in the dataset appear more robustly democratic than others, and understanding why is identified as a promising area for future research.
  • Evident: the sample is restricted to 683 large Wikia wikis, so generalizability to other peer production projects or collective intelligence systems is not established.
  • Evident: the analysis centers on administrators and formal authority, and the text summarizes results from a working paper under review, noting that additional robustness checks are available there rather than in this text.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1111/jcom.12082

Cites

81 of 81 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Claims the paper makes

0 of 12 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged

  • Findingown data
    § 4. RESULTS · p. 2

    A 1% change in the total number of accounts on a wiki, controlling for the total edits made to administrative spaces of the wiki, is associated with a 3% increase in the number of administrative contributions made by administrators.

    “For H2, we estimate that a 1% change in the total number of accounts on a wiki, controlling for the total edits made to administrative spaces of the wikis, is associated with a 3% increase in the number of administrative contributions made by administrators.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Findingown data
    § 4. RESULTS · p. 2

    A 1% increase in the total number of accounts on a wiki, controlling for the total number of edits by experienced users in the wiki that week, is associated with a 5% increase in the number of administrator-reverted contributions made by experienced editors.

    “Our models also support H3, and at the margin, we estimate that a 1% increase in the total number of accounts on a wiki, controlling for the total number of edits by experienced users in the wiki that week, is associated with a 5% increase in the number of administrator-reverted contributions made by experienced editors.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Findingown data
    § 4. RESULTS · p. 2

    Ceteris paribus, one log-unit increase in the number of registered contributors on a wiki is associated with odds of adding a new administrator that are only 0.81 times as high.

    “With respect to H1, we find that, ceteris paribus , one log-unit increase in the number of registered contributors is associated with odds of adding a new administrator which are only 0.81 times as high.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Interpretationown data
    § 5. CONCLUSION · p. 3

    The widely observed hierarchies and inequalities within peer production projects and collective intelligence systems also bring enhanced oligarchic organizational structures and behavior among project leaders.

    “The widely observed hierarchies and inequalities within peer production projects and collective intelligence systems also bring enhanced oligarchic organizational structures and behavior among project leaders.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The 683 largest Wikia wikis are representative of peer production communities and collective intelligence systems generally, so that findings about them extend beyond Wikia.
  • Premisecitation
    § 1. INTRODUCTION · p. 1

    Many peer production projects exhibit entrenched leadership and deep inequalities.

    “However, many peer production projects exhibit entrenched leadership and deep inequalities [Healy and Schussman 2003; Ortega 2009; Vi´ egas et al. 2007]”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Healy and Schussman 2003
    • cites Ortega 2009

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites Viégas et al. 2007 source
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 5
  • May combine two claims. 3

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation
    § 2. BACKGROUND · p. 1

    Structurally, as voluntary organizations grow they become increasingly complex organizations with a small group of professional leaders who exercise a monopoly over the mechanisms of authority.

    “Michels proposes that two patterns drive increasing oligarchy within voluntary organizations as they grow: (1) structurally, the group becomes an increasingly complex organization with a small group of professional leaders who exercise a monopoly over the mechanisms of authority”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Jenkins 1977 source
    • cites Leach 2005 source
    • cites Voss and Sherman 2000 source

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation
    § 1. INTRODUCTION · p. 1

    Michels' iron law of oligarchy proposes that as membership organizations become large and complex, a small group of early members consolidate and exercise a monopoly of power within the organization as their interests diverge from those of the collective.

    “peer production projects may conform to Robert Michels' 'iron law of oligarchy' ([1915]), an influential sociological theory which proposes that as membership organizations become large and complex, a small group of early members consolidate and exercise a monopoly of power within the organization as their interests diverge from those of the collective.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Michels 1915

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationown data
    § 5. CONCLUSION · p. 3

    The results are consistent with Michels' iron law of oligarchy and contradict prevailing theoretical and empirical findings regarding organizational democracy in peer production.

    “These results are consistent with Michels' iron law of oligarchy and contradict prevailing theoretical and empirical findings regarding organizational democracy in peer production.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Michels 1915

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationown data
    § 5. CONCLUSION · p. 3

    On average, as wikis become larger, a small group present at the beginning monopolizes positions of formal authority in the community, accounts for more administrative activity, and uses its authority to restrict contributions from experienced community members.

    “We find strong evidence that, on average, as wikis become larger, a small group - present at the beginning - monopolizes positions of formal authority in the community and accounts for more administrative activity while also using their authority to restrict contributions from experienced community members.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Study design and conductnone given
    § 4. RESULTS · p. 2

    In addition to the three fitted models, additional robustness checks were performed.

    “The results of the three fitted models (as well as additional robustness checks) are available in the working paper, and we summarize them briefly here.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § 1:2 · A. Shaw and B. M. Hill · p. 2

    Organizational leaders develop independent interests in the preservation of the organization itself, resulting in the transformation of the organization's goals and activities in ways that diverge from the interests of members.

    “Oligarchic goal transformation occurs if organizational leaders and elites develop interests that diverge from those of other members and impose their interests on the rest of the organization.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Jenkins 1977 source
    • cites Leach 2005 source
    • cites Voss and Sherman 2000 source

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Study design and conductown data
    § 3. RESEARCH DESIGN · p. 2

    The analysis uses the full records of intra-organizational behavior within 683 of the largest Wikia wikis, including every revision from both registered and non-registered users from Wikia's founding in 2004 until data collection in April 2010.

    “We analyze the full records of intra-organizational behavior within 683 of the largest Wikia wikis. Our dataset includes every revision, from both registered and non-registered users, from the time of Wikia's founding in 2004 until the point of data collection in April, 2010.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
7 of 7

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The 683 largest Wikia wikis are representative of peer production communities and collective intelligence systems generally, so that findings about them extend beyond Wikia.

    “Our empirical setting is a large sample of peer production communities engaged in the collaborative creation of wikis hosted by the for-profit firm Wikia .”
1 of 1

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

1 of the 82 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. Kittur, 2007, Proceedings of Alt. CHI

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Related

Authors
Shaw, A., & Hill, B. M.
Affiliations
  • Northwestern University (US)
  • University of Washington (US)
ORCID
Venue
Journal of Communication
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published
2014-03-17
Volume
64
Issue
2
Pages
215-238
ISSN
0021-9916 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1111/jcom.12082
OpenAlex
W1934638552
Semantic Scholar
3482f90fb2a16d415df3f1203c715efa3da1cff4
Cited by
208
References
82
Citations by year
2026: 7 · 2025: 15 · 2024: 15 · 2023: 11 · 2022: 14 · 2021: 30 · 2020: 43 · 2019: 13 · 2018: 15 · 2017: 21 · 2016: 8 · 2015: 6 · 2014: 8
FWCI
42.50
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
doi.wiley.com/10.1002/tdm_license_1.1 (tdm, 533 d)
Locations
Journal of Communication (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Communication › Wikis in Education and Collaboration
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Theory and Democracy
  • Social Sciences › Communication › Social Media and Politics
Keywords
iron law of oligarchy, peer production, wikis, Wikipedia, Robert Michels, democratic organization, organizational growth, open collaboration

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