Eye Movements in Risky Choice
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We asked participants to make simple risky choices while we recorded their eye movements. We built a complete statistical model of the eye movements and found very little systematic variation in eye movements over the time course of a choice or across the different choices. The only exceptions were finding more (of the same) eye movements when choice options were similar, and an emerging gaze bias in which people looked more at the gamble they ultimately chose. These findings are inconsistent with prospect theory, the priority heuristic, or decision field theory. However, the eye movements made during a choice have a large relationship with the final choice, and this is mostly independent from the contribution of the actual attribute values in the choice options. That is, eye movements tell us not just about the processing of attribute values but also are independently associated with choice. The pattern is simple—people choose the gamble they look at more often, independently of the actual numbers they see—and this pattern is simpler than predicted by decision field theory, decision by sampling, and the parallel constraint satisfaction model. © 2015 The Authors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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Citations
Cites
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
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Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty
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“The most notable is prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), but there are many significant models (e.g.,Birnbaum, 2008b; Birnbaum & Chavez, 1997; Edwards, 1962; Loomes & Sugden, 1982; Quiggin, 1993; Savage, 1954).”
BackgroundA spreading-activation theory of semantic processing.
Collins, A. M., & Loftus, E. F. (1975) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.82.6.407 · Cited by 8,141 · cited 1×
“The last class of model we consider are the parallel constraint satisfaction models (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008b; Glöckner & Herbold, 2011), examples of semantic networks (Collins & Loftus, 1975).”
BackgroundEye movements in reading and information processing: 20 years of research
Rayner, K. (1998) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.124.3.372 · Cited by 7,979
Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice Under Uncertainty
Loomes, G., & Sugden, R. (1982) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2232669 · Cited by 4,042 · cited 1×
“The most notable is prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), but there are many significant models (e.g.,Birnbaum, 2008b; Birnbaum & Chavez, 1997; Edwards, 1962; Loomes & Sugden, 1982; Quiggin, 1993; Savage, 1954).”
BackgroundGigerenzer, G., & Gaissmaier, W. (2011) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-120709-145346 · Cited by 4,037
The Neural Basis of Decision Making
Gold, J. I., & Shadlen, M. N. (2007) · Annual Review of Neuroscience · doi:10.1146/annurev.neuro.29.051605.113038 · Cited by 3,764 · cited 1×
“There is good neurophysiological evidence to support these accumulation models (see Gold & Shadlen, 2007, for a review).”
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The time course of perceptual choice: The leaky, competing accumulator model.
Usher, M., & McClelland, J. L. (2001) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.108.3.550 · Cited by 2,152 · cited 1×
“…reviews, see Huang, Sen, & Szidarovszky, 2012; Teodorescu & Usher, 2013), particularly in decision making and perceptual choice (e.g., Krajbich, Armel, & Rangel, 2010; Laming, 1968; Loomes, Navarro-Martinez, Isoni, & Butler, 2012; Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998; Usher & McClelland, 2001; Vickers, 1970).”
Cited by
Triple dissociation of attention and decision computations across prefrontal cortex
Hunt, L. T., Malalasekera, W. M. N., de Berker, A. O., Miranda, B., Farmer, S. F., Behrens, T. E. J., & Kennerley, S. W. (2018) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/s41593-018-0239-5 · Cited by 222
Accounting for attention in sequential sampling models of decision making
Krajbich, I. (2019) · Current Opinion in Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2018.10.008 · Cited by 165
Medial Frontal Cortex Activity Predicts Information Sampling in Economic Choice
Kaanders, P., Nili, H., O'Reilly, J. X., & Hunt, L. (2021) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.0392-21.2021 · Cited by 27
Metadata
- Authors
- Stewart, N., Hermens, F., & Matthews, W. J.
- Venue
- Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2015-01-26
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 2-3
- Pages
- 116-136
- ISSN
- 0894-3257 (ISSN-L)
- 1099-0771
- OpenAlex
- W1902196158
- Cited by
- 145
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 5.83
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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