Climate policies and nationally determined contributions: reconciling the needed ambition with the political economy
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Countries have pledged to stabilize global warming at a 1.5–2°C increase. Either target requires reaching net zero emissions before the end of the century, which implies a major transformation of the economic system. This study reviews the literature on how policymakers can design climate policies and their nationally determined contributions to reach zero‐net emissions before the end of the century in a socially and politically acceptable manner. To get the ambition right, policymakers can use sectoral roadmaps with targets and indicators that track progress toward zero emissions (e.g., regarding renewable power or reforestation). Indeed, monitoring economy‐wide emissions‐reductions alone would not ensure that short‐term action contributes meaningfully to the long‐term decarbonization goal. To get the political economy right, climate policies can be designed so that they contribute to nonclimate objectives and create broad coalitions of supporters. For instance, carbon taxes revenues can fund social assistance and infrastructure investment, while reducing tax evasion and informality. To minimize social and economic disruptions and avoid stranded assets, policymakers can also start with a low carbon price level and use complementary policies. Designed at the sector level, complementary policies such as performance standards or feebates for cars, building norms, or moratoriums on new coal power plants can be negotiated in partnership with local stakeholders and trigger a transition to zero carbon that does not directly affect existing polluting capital.WIREs Energy Environ 2017, 6:e256. doi: 10.1002/wene.256 This article is categorized under:Energy and Climate > Economics and Policy Energy Policy and Planning > Economics and Policy
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The threat to climate change mitigation posed by the abundance of fossil fuels.
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“In terms of avoiding new fossil fuel projects, a moratorium could be placed on investments in fossil fuel assets, which would become stranded if a strict emission reduction policy were to be implemented (see Vogt-Schilb & Hallegatte, 2017).”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Vogt‐Schilb, A., & Hallegatte, S.
- Venue
- WIREs Energy and Environment
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2017-08-18
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- 6
- ISSN
- 2041-8396 (ISSN-L)
- 2041-840X
- OpenAlex
- W2737096442
- Cited by
- 112
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 18.56
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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