The myth of the Bayesian brain
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 199 of the 204 references it cites were found in a registry or an index, and 4 are not checked yet; 62 of the 183 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
The Bayesian brain hypothesis-the idea that neural systems implement or approximate Bayesian inference-has become a dominant framework in cognitive neuroscience over the past two decades. While mathematically elegant and conceptually unifying, this paper argues that the hypothesis occupies an ambiguous territory between useful metaphor and testable, biologically plausible mechanistic explanation. We critically examine the key claims of the Bayesian brain hypothesis, highlighting issues of unfalsifiability, biological implausibility, and inconsistent empirical support. The framework's remarkable flexibility in accommodating diverse findings raises concerns about its explanatory power, as models can often be adjusted post hoc to fit virtually any data pattern. We contrast the Bayesian approach with alternative frameworks, including dynamic systems theory, ecological psychology, and embodied cognition, which conceptualize prediction and adaptive behavior without recourse to probabilistic inference. Despite its limitations, the Bayesian brain hypothesis persists-driven less by empirical grounding than by its mathematical elegance, metaphorical power, and institutional momentum.
Verified 2026-11-22 · 4 references not checked yet
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TL;DR
This paper argues that the “Bayesian brain” is better understood as a powerful metaphor than as a biologically grounded mechanistic theory: it is flexible, hard to falsify, and often unsupported by neural implementation evidence. The author contrasts it with dynamic systems, ecological, and embodied approaches, and calls for post-Bayesian neuroscience grounded in biological constraints and explicit, risky predictions.
Key findings
- The paper claims the Bayesian brain framework is ambiguous between metaphor and mechanism, and that this slippage weakens its scientific status; the framework is described as “self-sealing” and potentially “unfalsifiable.”
- It argues that Bayesian models can be fit post hoc to “virtually any observed data pattern” by adjusting priors, likelihoods, noise, or hierarchy, making the theory too flexible to strongly constrain outcomes.
- The paper says empirical support is mixed: some findings are presented as Bayesian “successes” (e.g., multisensory integration, visual illusions, motor control), but these are often consistent with other explanations and frequently rely on retrofitted priors or unclear neural implementation.
- The paper identifies biological implausibilities, including the difficulty of encoding full probability distributions, the computational burden of real-time Bayesian updating, and mismatches with non-Gaussian, multistable, state-dependent neural dynamics.
Methods
- Conceptual and critical review of the Bayesian brain hypothesis, predictive coding, and the Free Energy Principle; the paper also contrasts them with dynamic systems theory, ecological psychology, and embodied/enactive cognition.
- Uses qualitative argumentation and literature-based critique rather than new experiments or original data; it discusses examples from perception, action, learning, and psychiatry, and proposes a hypothetical “crucial experiment.”
- Main analysis focuses on conceptual drift (metaphor vs. mechanism), falsifiability criteria, empirical mismatches, and neurobiological feasibility.
Limitations
- The paper itself notes that a full comparative evaluation of alternative frameworks is beyond its scope.
- It also says the proposed critical experiment and falsifiability criteria are conceptual, not a completed empirical test.
- Evident from the text: the argument is a narrative/literature-based critique without new data or systematic meta-analysis, so its conclusions depend on interpretation of prior studies rather than direct experimental adjudication.
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Claims the paper makes
42 Valid · 3 Not valid · 66 Not checked · 135 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“when behavioral data fail to conform to the predictions of Bayesian optimality, researchers frequently appeal to auxiliary assumptions—such as “suboptimal” priors, cognitive capacity limitations, or the use of approximation algorithms—to account for these deviations (Rahnev and Denison 2018; Sanborn and Chater 2016).”
§ The myth of the Bayesian brain > Unfalsifiability and flexibility
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Rahnev and Denison 2018 matched to “Suboptimality in perceptual decision making” (2018) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 5.1 says new findings are often modeled with flexibly chosen Bayesian components, and Section 3.8 describes priors invoked to explain perceptual biases. Section 4.2 also discusses computational capacities as a limit on optimality. The passages do not establish that researchers frequently invoke approximation algorithms specifically to explain deviations. (LLM, conf=0.84)
- Partly supportedcites Sanborn and Chater 2016 matched to “Bayesian Brains without Probabilities” (2016) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
In “Bayesian Brains without Probabilities” and “Unavoidable Limitations of Sampling” (page unavailable), the paper explains departures from ideal probability judgments through finite sampling and computational limits. It does not say that researchers frequently invoke auxiliary assumptions in general, or identify suboptimal priors as one of those explanations. (LLM, conf=0.83)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Partly supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“If top-down predictions and bottom-up errors do not interact as predicted—e.g., if perturbations to higher-order areas do not affect lower-level error responses—this violates core architectural assumptions (Clark 2013).”
§ The myth of the Bayesian brain > Metaphor, mechanism, or myth: The conceptual drift of the Bayesian brain > Falsifiability criteria for the Bayesian brain hypothesis
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Clark 2013 matched to “Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science” (2013) source
Section 1.2 (p. 3) describes higher-level predictions as suppressing lower-level prediction errors, with errors then propagating upward. Section 3.1 (p. 12) likewise says backward signals from higher areas should reshape lower-area responses. The cited architecture therefore predicts the interaction described in the claim, although the paper does not discuss the specific perturbation example. (LLM, conf=0.88)
hedgedstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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The cited sources that could be checked couldn’t confirm or dispute this claim.
In the paper
“If Bayesian-based explanations of psychiatric disorders (e.g., schizophrenia as altered precision weighting) fail to predict symptom patterns, treatment outcomes, or neural correlates in out-of-sample datasets, the theory’s applied value diminishes (Fletcher and Frith 2009).”
§ The myth of the Bayesian brain > Metaphor, mechanism, or myth: The conceptual drift of the Bayesian brain > Falsifiability criteria for the Bayesian brain hypothesis
What the sources say
- Could not verifycites Fletcher and Frith 2009 matched to “Perceiving is believing: a Bayesian approach to explaining the positive symptoms of schizophrenia” (2009) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The ‘Prediction error, learning and dopamine’ section says that future work must link experimental learning abnormalities to clinical delusions, and the Conclusions identify further questions for the model. Neither passage addresses whether failure to predict symptoms, treatment outcomes, or neural correlates in out-of-sample datasets diminishes the theory’s applied value; searches for those validation criteria found no such passage. (LLM, conf=0.70)
hedgedstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Could not verify
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Perhaps most problematically, the Bayesian framing has difficulty accounting for the context-sensitivity and task-dependence of neural responses. The same neural circuits may perform different functions depending on behavioral context, attentional state, or motivational factors—a flexibility that sits uncomfortably with strict Bayesian formulations (Gilbert and Li 2013).”
§ The myth of the Bayesian brain > Empirical and biological Shortcomings > Empirical mismatches
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Gilbert and Li 2013 matched to “Top-down influences on visual processing” (2013) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The “Perceptual task” section (page unavailable) says that neuronal tuning changes with the task even when the stimulus is identical, and that neurons can serve different functions in different behavioral contexts. The cited passages do not say that Bayesian formulations have difficulty accounting for this flexibility; the paper contrasts it with classical feedforward accounts instead. (LLM, conf=0.86)
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“In tightly controlled tasks where prior probabilities and likelihoods are explicitly defined, persistent deviations from Bayesian-optimal behavior—unexplainable by noise, heuristics, or approximation—would falsify normative claims (Rahnev and Denison 2018).”
§ The myth of the Bayesian brain > Metaphor, mechanism, or myth: The conceptual drift of the Bayesian brain > Falsifiability criteria for the Bayesian brain hypothesis
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Rahnev and Denison 2018 matched to “Suboptimality in perceptual decision making” (2018) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 5.3 says the many findings of suboptimality make the assumption that the brain is built for optimal decisions suspect. Section 4.2 says deviations can challenge components of a specified model, but it does not say they would falsify normative Bayesian claims generally. Section 2.2 also distinguishes experimentally defined priors from likelihood functions derived under assumptions, so the claim overstates how fully the tasks define both. (LLM, conf=0.86)
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
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“The same neural circuits may perform different functions depending on behavioral context, attentional state, or motivational factors—a flexibility that sits uncomfortably with strict Bayesian formulations (Gilbert and Li 2013).”
The neocortical circuit: themes and variations
Harris, K. D., & Shepherd, G. M. G. (2015) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn.3917 · Cited by 1,215 · cited 1×
“…anatomical specialization with distinct cell types, circuit motifs, and processing principles across regions—from the unique neuronal types of the cerebellum to the columnar organization of sensory cortices to the distinct micro-circuits of the basal ganglia (Harris and Shepherd 2015; Nelken 2004).”
Emergent complex neural dynamics
Chialvo, D. R. (2010) · Nature Physics · doi:10.1038/nphys1803 · Cited by 1,165 · cited 1×
“Heavy-tailed distributions: Neural fluctuations frequently follow heavy-tailed distributions, including power-law, log-normal, and Lévy-stable distributions rather than Gaussian profiles (Beggs and Plenz 2003; Chialvo 2010; Freyer et al. 2009; Metzler and Klafter 2000; Touboul and Destexhe 2010).”
Models and Analogies in Science
HESSE, M. B. (1965) · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · Cited by 1,156
Active inference: a process theory
Friston, K., FitzGerald, T., Rigoli, F., Schwartenbeck, P., & Pezzulo, G. (2017) · Neural Computation · doi:10.1162/neco_a_00912 · Cited by 1,156 · cited 1×
“Active inference extends these ideas to account for decision-making and planning, suggesting that agents select actions that minimize expected free energy or maximize expected information gain (Friston et al. 2011, 2017; Parr et al. 2020).”
Long-Range Temporal Correlations and Scaling Behavior in Human Brain Oscillations
Linkenkaer-Hansen, K., Nikouline, V. V., Palva, J. M., & Ilmoniemi, R. J. (2001) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.21-04-01370.2001 · Cited by 1,149 · cited 1×
“Scale-free dynamics: The power spectra of neural signals typically follow a power-law form ( 1 ∕ f 𝛽 ), indicating temporal correlations that persist across multiple time-scales (He et al. 2010; Miller et al. 2009; Linkenkaer-Hansen et al. 2001; Touboul and Destexhe 2010).”
London, M., & Häusser, M. (2005) · Annual Review of Neuroscience · doi:10.1146/annurev.neuro.28.061604.135703 · Cited by 1,149 · cited 1×
“Dendrites contain voltage-gated ion channels that create complex integration zones with supralinear and sublinear summation depending on the spatiotemporal pattern of inputs (Branco and Häusser 2010; London and Häusser 2005; Polsky et al. 2004).”
Radical embodiment: neural dynamics and consciousness
Thompson, E., & Varela, F. J. (2001) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(00)01750-2 · Cited by 1,144 · cited 1×
“Related enactive approaches view cognition as constituted by the dynamic coupling between organism and environment, rather than as computation occurring within the brain (Di Paolo et al. 2017; Thompson and Varela 2001).”
The Asynchronous State in Cortical Circuits
Renart, A., de la Rocha, J., Bartho, P., Hollender, L., Parga, N., Reyes, A., & Harris, K. D. (2010) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1179850 · Cited by 1,106
Motion illusions as optimal percepts
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“These case studies are frequently cited as successes that validate the framework and demonstrate its predictive and explanatory power (Ernst and Banks 2002; Körding and Wolpert 2004; Weiss et al. 2002).”
The Intellectual and Social Organization Of the Sciences
Whitley, R. (2000) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199240531.001.0001 · Cited by 1,076
The Spike-Timing Dependence of Plasticity
Feldman, D. E. (2012) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2012.08.001 · Cited by 1,071
Learning multiple layers of representation
Hinton, G. E. (2007) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2007.09.004 · Cited by 1,011 · cited 1×
“Generative models: Perhaps most fundamentally, it assumes the brain maintains internal generative models of the world that can simulate expected sensory inputs (Hinton 2007; Clark 2013).”
The Temporal Structures and Functional Significance of Scale-free Brain Activity
He, B. J., Zempel, J. M., Snyder, A. Z., & Raichle, M. E. (2010) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2010.04.020 · Cited by 990 · cited 1×
“Scale-free dynamics: The power spectra of neural signals typically follow a power-law form ( 1 ∕ f 𝛽 ), indicating temporal correlations that persist across multiple time-scales (He et al. 2010; Miller et al. 2009; Linkenkaer-Hansen et al. 2001; Touboul and Destexhe 2010).”
Craver, C. F. (2007) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199299317.001.0001 · Cited by 985 · cited 2×
“Yet metaphors in science carry an implicit contract—they must eventually be translated into mechanistic explanations that are biologically plausible and empirically testable (Craver 2007).”
Oscillatory coupling of hippocampal pyramidal cells and interneurons in the behaving rat
Csicsvari, J., Hirase, H., Czurkó, A., Mamiya, A., & Buzsáki, G. (1999) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.19-01-00274.1999 · Cited by 966
The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science.
Hull, D. L., & Dupre, J. (1994) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2186103 · Cited by 947
The Predictive Coding Account of Psychosis
Sterzer, P., Adams, R. A., Fletcher, P., Frith, C., Lawrie, S. M., Muckli, L., Petrovic, P., Uhlhaas, P., Voss, M., & Corlett, P. R. (2018) · Biological Psychiatry · doi:10.1016/j.biopsych.2018.05.015 · Cited by 941 · cited 1×
“The models typically explain observed symptoms by adjusting the relative weight of priors or sensory inputs, but rarely predict which patients will exhibit which symptoms under specific conditions (Sterzer et al. 2018).”
Affordances and Prospective Control: An Outline of the Ontology
Turvey, M. T. (1992) · Ecological Psychology · doi:10.1207/s15326969eco0403_3 · Cited by 933 · cited 1×
“Instead, it proposes that organisms directly perceive affordances—possibilities for action—by detecting invariant structures in ambient sensory arrays (Chemero 2009; Turvey 1992).”
Gallagher, S. (2017) · Oxford Scholarship Online · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198794325.001.0001 · Cited by 887
Theory-based Bayesian models of inductive learning and reasoning
Tenenbaum, J. B., Griffiths, T. L., & Kemp, C. (2006) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.05.009 · Cited by 880 · cited 1×
“This updating is presumed to follow Bayes’ rule, which combines prior beliefs with likelihood functions to generate posterior beliefs (Behrens et al. 2007; Mathys et al. 2011; Tenenbaum et al. 2006).”
The natural selection of bad science
Smaldino, P. E., & McElreath, R. (2016) · Royal Society Open Science · doi:10.1098/rsos.160384 · Cited by 860 · cited 4×
“Young researchers face strong pressures to publish in high-impact journals and secure competitive grants—goals more easily achieved by working within established frameworks than by challenging them (Smaldino and McElreath 2016).”
InfluentialThe Computational Anatomy of Psychosis
Adams, R. A., Stephan, K. E., Brown, H. R., Frith, C. D., & Friston, K. J. (2013) · Frontiers in Psychiatry · doi:10.3389/fpsyt.2013.00047 · Cited by 850 · cited 3×
“For example, in the clinical domain, Bayesian models of schizophrenia posit that positive symptoms emerge from the altered precision weighting of prediction errors (Adams et al. 2013; Fletcher and Frith 2009; Friston et al. 2014).”
Optimal dynamical range of excitable networks at criticality
Kinouchi, O., & Copelli, M. (2006) · Nature Physics · doi:10.1038/nphys289 · Cited by 831 · cited 1×
“Bistability and multistability: Neural activity often exhibits multimodal distributions, reflecting transitions between distinct dynamical states rather than continuous fluctuations around a single equilibrium (Deco et al. 2011; Freyer et al. 2009; Kinouchi and Copelli 2006).”
Inferring mental states from neuroimaging data: from reverse inference to large-scale decoding
Poldrack, R. A. (2011) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2011.11.001 · Cited by 821 · cited 1×
“These interpretations frequently rest on correlational evidence (O’Reilly et al. 2012; Poldrack 2011).”
Computational subunits in thin dendrites of pyramidal cells
Polsky, A., Mel, B. W., & Schiller, J. (2004) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn1253 · Cited by 817 · cited 1×
“Dendrites contain voltage-gated ion channels that create complex integration zones with supralinear and sublinear summation depending on the spatiotemporal pattern of inputs (Branco and Häusser 2010; London and Häusser 2005; Polsky et al. 2004).”
Gregory, R. L. (1980) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. B, Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.1980.0090 · Cited by 789 · cited 1×
“This view constitutes a radical departure from traditional stimulus–response models by positioning the brain as an active, hypothesis-testing organ rather than a passive receiver of sensory information (Clark 2015; Friston 2010; Gregory 1980).”
An embodied cognitive science?
Clark, A. (1999) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(99)01361-3 · Cited by 781 · cited 1×
“Embodied cognition emphasizes how cognitive processes are shaped by the physical body and its sensorimotor interactions with the world (Clark 1999; Shapiro 2019; Varela et al. 1991).”
Predictions not commands: Active inference in the motor system
Adams, R. A., Shipp, S., & Friston, K. J. (2013) · Brain Structure and Function · doi:10.1007/s00429-012-0475-5 · Cited by 765
Neural synchrony in cortical networks: history, concept and current status
Uhlhaas, P. (2009) · Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/neuro.07.017.2009 · Cited by 758
Power-Law Scaling in the Brain Surface Electric Potential
Miller, K. J., Sorensen, L. B., Ojemann, J. G., & den Nijs, M. (2009) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000609 · Cited by 742 · cited 1×
“Scale-free dynamics: The power spectra of neural signals typically follow a power-law form ( 1 ∕ f 𝛽 ), indicating temporal correlations that persist across multiple time-scales (He et al. 2010; Miller et al. 2009; Linkenkaer-Hansen et al. 2001; Touboul and Destexhe 2010).”
Self-organization of cognitive performance.
Van Orden, G. C., Holden, J. G., & Turvey, M. T. (2003) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/0096-3445.132.3.331 · Cited by 718 · cited 1×
“Dynamic systems theory considers cognition emerging from complex, nonlinear interactions among neural, bodily, and environmental components (Kelso 1995; Thelen and Smith 1994; Van Orden et al. 2003).”
Friston, K., FitzGerald, T., Rigoli, F., Schwartenbeck, P., ODoherty, J., & Pezzulo, G. (2016) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2016.06.022 · Cited by 674
Statistically optimal perception and learning: from behavior to neural representations
Fiser, J., Berkes, P., Orbán, G., & Lengyel, M. (2010) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2010.01.003 · Cited by 672 · cited 2×
“However, these proposals remain largely speculative and face substantial implementation challenges (Fiser et al. 2010; Pouget et al. 2013).”
Action understanding and active inference
Friston, K., Mattout, J., & Kilner, J. (2011) · Biological Cybernetics · doi:10.1007/s00422-011-0424-z · Cited by 665 · cited 1×
“Active inference extends these ideas to account for decision-making and planning, suggesting that agents select actions that minimize expected free energy or maximize expected information gain (Friston et al. 2011, 2017; Parr et al. 2020).”
Ramsey, W. M. (2007) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511597954 · Cited by 657
A Bayesian foundation for individual learning under uncertainty
Mathys, C. (2011) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2011.00039 · Cited by 655
Optimal Predictions in Everyday Cognition
Griffiths, T. L., & Tenenbaum, J. B. (2006) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01780.x · Cited by 639 · cited 2×
“For instance, if current neural activity does not appear explicitly Bayesian, it may be reinterpreted as approximating Bayesian solutions that emerged through evolutionary or developmental processes (Griffiths and Tenenbaum 2006; Perfors et al. 2011).”
Dynamical approaches to cognitive science
Beer, R. D. (2000) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(99)01440-0 · Cited by 639 · cited 1×
“Rather than focusing on information processing or probabilistic inference, this approach emphasizes how cognitive functions self-organize through the continuous coordination of processes unfolding across multiple timescales (Beer 2000; Sporns and Edelman 1993).”
Activity-dependent regulation of dendritic growth and patterning
Wong, R. O. L., & Ghosh, A. (2002) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn941 · Cited by 635
Probabilistic brains: knowns and unknowns
Pouget, A., Beck, J. M., Ma, W. J., & Latham, P. E. (2013) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn.3495 · Cited by 615 · cited 4×
“However, these proposals remain largely speculative and face substantial implementation challenges (Fiser et al. 2010; Pouget et al. 2013).”
InfluentialSpivey, M. (2006) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195170788.001.0001 · Cited by 599
Compartmentalized dendritic plasticity and input feature storage in neurons
Losonczy, A., Makara, J. K., & Magee, J. C. (2008) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature06725 · Cited by 598 · cited 1×
“Moreover, single neurons often exhibit branch-specific plasticity rather than global weighting adjustments (Losonczy et al. 2008), contra-dicting the assumption that synaptic weights represent statistical parameters in a coherent probabilistic model.”
The Development of Embodied Cognition: Six Lessons from Babies
Smith, L., & Gasser, M. (2005) · Artificial Life · doi:10.1162/1064546053278973 · Cited by 597
Probabilistic models of cognition: exploring representations and inductive biases
Griffiths, T. L., Chater, N., Kemp, C., Perfors, A., & Tenenbaum, J. B. (2010) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2010.05.004 · Cited by 568 · cited 1×
“The Bayesian approach offers researchers powerful mathematical formalisms, computational models, and a common vocabulary that facilitates collaboration across disciplines (Clark 2013; Griffiths et al. 2010; Hohwy 2013).”
Nelson, L. D., Simmons, J., & Simonsohn, U. (2018) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-122216-011836 · Cited by 548 · cited 2×
“Career incentives reward those working within influential paradigms, and funding agencies often prioritize research that builds on established frameworks rather than those that challenge them fundamentally (Nelson et al. 2018; Romero 2017; Smaldino and McElreath 2016).”
Cognitive computational neuroscience
Kriegeskorte, N., & Douglas, P. K. (2018) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/s41593-018-0210-5 · Cited by 535 · cited 1×
“The mathematical formalism of Bayesian approaches has particular appeal in an era when neuroscience increasingly values computational sophistication (Kriegeskorte and Douglas 2018).”
Hallucinations and strong priors
Corlett, P. R., Horga, G., Fletcher, P. C., Alderson-Day, B., Schmack, K., & Powers, A. R. (2019) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2018.12.001 · Cited by 534 · cited 1×
“Predictive coding accounts propose that symptoms such as hallucinations and delusions arise from aberrant precision-weighting of prediction errors—either attributing too much weight to low-level sensory signals or too little to top-down priors (Adams et al. 2013; Corlett et al. 2019; Friston 2016).”
Jones, M., & Love, B. C. (2011) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x10003134 · Cited by 533
Computational psychiatry: the brain as a phantastic organ
Friston, K. J., Stephan, K. E., Montague, R., & Dolan, R. J. (2014) · The Lancet Psychiatry · doi:10.1016/s2215-0366(14)70275-5 · Cited by 531 · cited 1×
“For example, in the clinical domain, Bayesian models of schizophrenia posit that positive symptoms emerge from the altered precision weighting of prediction errors (Adams et al. 2013; Fletcher and Frith 2009; Friston et al. 2014).”
Integrating psychology and neuroscience: functional analyses as mechanism sketches
Piccinini, G., & Craver, C. (2011) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-011-9898-4 · Cited by 508 · cited 1×
“The Bayesian brain hypothesis emerged during a period of increasing mathematization in neuroscience and psychology, when computational approaches gained prestige and institutional support (Dupré 1993; Piccinini and Craver 2011).”
Beyond the connectome: how neuromodulators shape neural circuits
Bargmann, C. I. (2012) · BioEssays · doi:10.1002/bies.201100185 · Cited by 505
After Phrenology: Neural Reuse and the Interactive Brain
Anderson, M. L. (2014) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/10111.001.0001 · Cited by 501
Shapiro, L. (2019) · doi:10.4324/9781315180380 · Cited by 492 · cited 1×
“Embodied cognition emphasizes how cognitive processes are shaped by the physical body and its sensorimotor interactions with the world (Clark 1999; Shapiro 2019; Varela et al. 1991).”
Active inference, sensory attenuation and illusions
Brown, H., Adams, R. A., Parees, I., Edwards, M., & Friston, K. (2013) · Cognitive Processing · doi:10.1007/s10339-013-0571-3 · Cited by 488 · cited 1×
“Under this framework, motor actions are seen as attempts to minimize prediction errors by altering sensory inputs to align with predictions, rather than adjusting predictions to match inputs as in perception (Adams et al. 2013; Brown et al. 2013; Friston 2011).”
The Ecological Approach to the Visual Perception of Pictures
Gibson, J. J. (1978) · Leonardo · doi:10.2307/1574154 · Cited by 456
Bayesian just-so stories in psychology and neuroscience.
Bowers, J. S., & Davis, C. J. (2012) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0026450 · Cited by 436 · cited 8×
“…free parameters—such as priors, likelihood functions, noise distributions, or assumed processing levels—Bayesian models—particularly in their loosely specified, post hoc applications—an often be tailored to fit virtually any observed data pattern (Bowers and Davis 2012; Jones and Love 2011).”
InfluentialDynamics of Interpersonal Coordination
Schmidt, R. C., & Richardson, M. J. (2007) · Understanding Complex Systems · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-74479-5_14 · Cited by 415 · cited 1×
“…this framework, is not the outcome of internal model selection but a natural consequence of temporally structured dynamics—where the system’s history and current state constrain its future evolution, without requiring explicit Bayesian updating (Schmidt and Richardson 2008; Richardson et al. 2014).”
Ignorance: how it drives science
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“A full understanding of its place in contemporary neuroscience requires attention to both its intellectual content and its sociological context (Firestein 2012; Longino 2020).”
Surfing uncertainty: prediction, action and the embodied mind
Bruineberg, J., & Froese, T. (2016) · International Journal of Performance Arts and Digital Media · doi:10.1080/14794713.2016.1257478 · Cited by 400
Griffiths, T. L., Lieder, F., & Goodman, N. D. (2015) · Topics in Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/tops.12142 · Cited by 397 · cited 1×
“…inference, Monte Carlo sampling, etc.)—and have been proposed as biologically plausible strategies, these still require sophisticated computations that strain biological plausibility, especially for real-time decision-making under pressure (Griffiths et al. 2015; Sanborn and Chater 2016).”
Attention and conscious perception in the hypothesis testing brain
Hohwy, J. (2012) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00096 · Cited by 396 · cited 1×
“The model assumes neural systems can dynamically adjust the “precision” (inverse variance) of prediction errors based on contextual factors and uncertainty (Feldman and Friston 2010; Hohwy 2012).”
From cognitivism to autopoiesis: towards a computational framework for the embodied mind
Allen, M., & Friston, K. J. (2018) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1288-5 · Cited by 386 · cited 2×
“The Bayesian perspective has also transformed how we understand the relationship between brain, body, and environment (Allen and Friston 2018; Clark 2015; Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019).”
The free energy principle for action and perception: A mathematical review
Buckley, C. L., Kim, C. S., McGregor, S., & Seth, A. K. (2017) · Journal of Mathematical Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jmp.2017.09.004 · Cited by 363
The single dendritic branch as a fundamental functional unit in the nervous system
Branco, T., & Häusser, M. (2010) · Current Opinion in Neurobiology · doi:10.1016/j.conb.2010.07.009 · Cited by 355 · cited 1×
“Dendrites contain voltage-gated ion channels that create complex integration zones with supralinear and sublinear summation depending on the spatiotemporal pattern of inputs (Branco and Häusser 2010; London and Häusser 2005; Polsky et al. 2004).”
Seth, A. K. (2014) · Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/17588928.2013.877880 · Cited by 346 · cited 1×
“By framing perception as inference and action as a means of testing perceptual hypotheses, it challenges traditional boundaries between sensing and doing (Clark 2013; Hohwy 2013; Seth 2014).”
Suboptimality in perceptual decision making
Rahnev, D., & Denison, R. N. (2018) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x18000936 · Cited by 342
Evaluating the neurophysiological evidence for predictive processing as a model of perception
Walsh, K. S., McGovern, D. P., Clark, A., & O'Connell, R. G. (2020) · Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1111/nyas.14321 · Cited by 333 · cited 1×
“Rather than interpreting this as a challenge to the theory, they argued that Bayesian processes might operate at different spatial or temporal scales, or that such effects only emerge under specific task conditions (Walsh et al. 2020).”
What is optimal about motor control?
Friston, K. (2011) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2011.10.018 · Cited by 332 · cited 2×
“Under this framework, motor actions are seen as attempts to minimize prediction errors by altering sensory inputs to align with predictions, rather than adjusting predictions to match inputs as in perception (Adams et al. 2013; Brown et al. 2013; Friston 2011).”
Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge
Popper, K. (2014) · doi:10.4324/9780203538074 · Cited by 327 · cited 2×
“Without this clarity, the hypothesis risks becoming what philosopher Karl Popper would call a “metaphysical research program” (Popper 2014)—influential but ultimately unfalsifiable.”
The Probability Heuristics Model of Syllogistic Reasoning
Chater, N., & Oaksford, M. (1999) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1006/cogp.1998.0696 · Cited by 324 · cited 1×
“Moreover, the Bayesian framework connects to a venerable tradition of understanding cognition as rational or optimal within constraints (Anderson 2013; Chater and Oaksford 1999).”
Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes
LAKATOS, I. (2014) · Philosophy, Science, and History · doi:10.4324/9780203802458-7 · Cited by 318
Not Noisy, Just Wrong: The Role of Suboptimal Inference in Behavioral Variability
Beck, J. M., Ma, W. J., Pitkow, X., Latham, P. E., & Pouget, A. (2012) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2012.03.016 · Cited by 316
Evaluating the Operations Underlying Multisensory Integration in the Cat Superior Colliculus
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“Moreover, deviations from optimal integration have been observed in tasks with time constraints or novel stimuli (Arnold et al. 2019; Stanford et al. 2005), suggesting that the Bayesian fit may reflect task-specific tuning rather than a general cognitive strategy.”
Bayesian Brains without Probabilities
Sanborn, A. N., & Chater, N. (2016) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2016.10.003 · Cited by 307 · cited 3×
“…inference, Monte Carlo sampling, etc.)—and have been proposed as biologically plausible strategies, these still require sophisticated computations that strain biological plausibility, especially for real-time decision-making under pressure (Griffiths et al. 2015; Sanborn and Chater 2016).”
A tutorial introduction to Bayesian models of cognitive development
Perfors, A., Tenenbaum, J. B., Griffiths, T. L., & Xu, F. (2011) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2010.11.015 · Cited by 304 · cited 1×
“For instance, if current neural activity does not appear explicitly Bayesian, it may be reinterpreted as approximating Bayesian solutions that emerged through evolutionary or developmental processes (Griffiths and Tenenbaum 2006; Perfors et al. 2011).”
Philosophy and Predictive Processing
Thomas, M., & Wiese, W. (2017) · Cited by 292
Richardson, M. J., Shockley, K., Fajen, B. R., Riley, M. A., & Turvey, M. T. (2008) · Handbook of Cognitive Science · doi:10.1016/b978-0-08-046616-3.00009-8 · Cited by 286
The glutamate hypothesis of schizophrenia: evidence from human brain tissue studies
Hu, W., MacDonald, M. L., Elswick, D. E., & Sweet, R. A. (2015) · Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1111/nyas.12547 · Cited by 286 · cited 1×
“Moreover, non-Bayesian alternatives—such as models based on disordered neuromodulation (Hu et al. 2015), disrupted synaptic pruning (Sekar et al. 2016), or abnormal cortical dynamics (Uhlhaas et al. 2009)—can also account for similar symptom profiles without invoking probabilistic inference.”
A tutorial on the free-energy framework for modelling perception and learning
Bogacz, R. (2017) · Journal of Mathematical Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jmp.2015.11.003 · Cited by 283 · cited 1×
“…processing is fundamentally concerned with minimizing prediction errors through probabilistic inference—essen-tially implementing something akin to Bayes’ theorem at various levels of neural organization, from individual cells to large-scale networks (Bogacz 2017; Friston 2010; Ma et al. 2006).”
Roberts, J. A., Gollo, L. L., Abeysuriya, R. G., Roberts, G., Mitchell, P. B., Woolrich, M. W., & Breakspear, M. (2019) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-019-08999-0 · Cited by 264 · cited 1×
“Multiplicative noise processes: Evidence suggests that neural fluctuations involve multiplicative rather than merely additive noise components, where the variance of the noise depends on the system’s state (Buice et al. 2010; Roberts et al. 2019).”
Marder, E., O'Leary, T., & Shruti, S. (2014) · Annual Review of Neuroscience · doi:10.1146/annurev-neuro-071013-013958 · Cited by 262 · cited 1×
“However, neuromodulators like dopamine, acetylcholine, and norepinephrine fundamentally reconfigure circuit properties—not merely adjusting weights but qualitatively changing input–output functions, intrinsic excitability, and even the direction of plasticity (Dayan 2012; Marder et al. 2014).”
Generalised free energy and active inference
Parr, T., & Friston, K. J. (2019) · Biological Cybernetics · doi:10.1007/s00422-019-00805-w · Cited by 236 · cited 1×
“The Free Energy Principle (FEP) attempts to unify perception, action, and learning under a single imperative: minimizing variational free energy, which is claimed to approximate prediction error or surprise over time (Friston et al. 2006; Friston 2010; Parr and Friston 2019).”
Mechanism and Biological Explanation
Bechtel, W. (2011) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/661513 · Cited by 230 · cited 1×
“It is the standard by which claims about brain function must ultimately be judged (Bechtel 2011; Craver 2007; Machamer et al. 2000).”
Processing of complex stimuli and natural scenes in the auditory cortex
Nelken, I. (2004) · Current Opinion in Neurobiology · doi:10.1016/j.conb.2004.06.005 · Cited by 223 · cited 1×
“…anatomical specialization with distinct cell types, circuit motifs, and processing principles across regions—from the unique neuronal types of the cerebellum to the columnar organization of sensory cortices to the distinct micro-circuits of the basal ganglia (Harris and Shepherd 2015; Nelken 2004).”
Active inference, enactivism and the hermeneutics of social cognition
Gallagher, S., & Allen, M. (2018) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1269-8 · Cited by 214 · cited 1×
“…profound implications for how we conceptualize embodied cognition and the extended mind—suggesting that the brain’s primary purpose is not to represent the world accurately but to facilitate successful interaction with it through prediction (Clark 2015; Gallagher and Allen 2018; Kirchhoff 2018).”
The Self-Organization of Human Interaction
Dale, R., Fusaroli, R., Duran, N. D., & Richardson, D. C. (2013) · Psychology of Learning and Motivation · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-407187-2.00002-2 · Cited by 206 · cited 1×
“This pluralistic approach reminds us that mathematical descriptions, however elegant or internally consistent, represent only one possible way of carving nature at its joints—and that the joints themselves may not always lie where the equations suggest (Dale et al. 2013; Richardson et al. 2008).”
Cognitive niches: An ecological model of strategy selection.
Marewski, J. N., & Schooler, L. J. (2011) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/a0024143 · Cited by 206
The evolution of mental metaphors in psychology: A 90-year retrospective.
Gentner, D., & Grudin, J. (1985) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.40.2.181 · Cited by 196 · cited 1×
“Cognitive scientists have long recognized the importance of metaphors in scientific theorizing—from computer models of mind to neural networks to dynamical systems (Gentner and Grudin 1985; Lakoff and Johnson 1980).”
Gigerenzer, G. (1998) · Theory & Psychology · doi:10.1177/0959354398082006 · Cited by 196 · cited 1×
“The risk here is the unchecked proliferation of “just-so stories”—post hoc narratives crafted to explain observed phenomena without generating risky, testable predictions that could potentially disconfirm the theory (Gigerenzer 1998; Marcus and Davis 2013).”
How Robust Are Probabilistic Models of Higher-Level Cognition?
Marcus, G. F., & Davis, E. (2013) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797613495418 · Cited by 195 · cited 2×
“The risk here is the unchecked proliferation of “just-so stories”—post hoc narratives crafted to explain observed phenomena without generating risky, testable predictions that could potentially disconfirm the theory (Gigerenzer 1998; Marcus and Davis 2013).”
(2002) · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · Cited by 193
Twenty-Five Lessons from Computational Neuromodulation
Dayan, P. (2012) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2012.09.027 · Cited by 190 · cited 1×
“However, neuromodulators like dopamine, acetylcholine, and norepinephrine fundamentally reconfigure circuit properties—not merely adjusting weights but qualitatively changing input–output functions, intrinsic excitability, and even the direction of plasticity (Dayan 2012; Marder et al. 2014).”
Can Power-Law Scaling and Neuronal Avalanches Arise from Stochastic Dynamics?
Touboul, J., & Destexhe, A. (2010) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008982 · Cited by 190
Is coding a relevant metaphor for the brain?
Brette, R. (2019) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x19000049 · Cited by 190
Bistability and Non-Gaussian Fluctuations in Spontaneous Cortical Activity
Freyer, F., Aquino, K., Robinson, P. A., Ritter, P., & Breakspear, M. (2009) · Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.0754-09.2009 · Cited by 189 · cited 2×
“Heavy-tailed distributions: Neural fluctuations frequently follow heavy-tailed distributions, including power-law, log-normal, and Lévy-stable distributions rather than Gaussian profiles (Beggs and Plenz 2003; Chialvo 2010; Freyer et al. 2009; Metzler and Klafter 2000; Touboul and Destexhe 2010).”
Systematic Fluctuation Expansion for Neural Network Activity Equations
Buice, M. A., Cowan, J. D., & Chow, C. C. (2010) · Neural Computation · doi:10.1162/neco.2009.02-09-960 · Cited by 164 · cited 1×
“Multiplicative noise processes: Evidence suggests that neural fluctuations involve multiplicative rather than merely additive noise components, where the variance of the noise depends on the system’s state (Buice et al. 2010; Roberts et al. 2019).”
Bayes in the Brain—On Bayesian Modelling in Neuroscience
Colombo, M., & Seriès, P. (2012) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axr043 · Cited by 164 · cited 4×
“Alternatively, the Bayesian framework may be invoked at a more abstract, computational level, where its validity does not depend on direct neural implementation (Colombo and Seriès 2012; Kiefer and Hohwy 2018).”
InfluentialScience as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry
LONGINO, H. E. (2020) · doi:10.2307/j.ctvx5wbfz · Cited by 161 · cited 4×
“Scientific practices are shaped by evidence and social and institutional factors that influence research funding, publication, and recognition (Latour 1987; Longino 2020).”
InfluentialForms of prediction in the nervous system
Teufel, C., & Fletcher, P. C. (2020) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/s41583-020-0275-5 · Cited by 155 · cited 2×
“Experiments designed to isolate prior influence (e.g., cue-based probabilistic expectations) that show no such modulation undermine Bayesian assumptions (Teufel and Fletcher 2020).”
Reconceiving representation-hungry cognition: an ecological-enactive proposal
Kiverstein, J. D., & Rietveld, E. (2018) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/1059712318772778 · Cited by 150 · cited 1×
“They also suggest that the temporal dynamics of neural activity may reflect ongoing engagement with the environment rather than sequential updating of internal models (Kiverstein and Rietveld 2018; Raja 2019).”
Content and misrepresentation in hierarchical generative models
Kiefer, A. B., & Hohwy, J. (2017) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1435-7 · Cited by 147 · cited 1×
“Alternatively, the Bayesian framework may be invoked at a more abstract, computational level, where its validity does not depend on direct neural implementation (Colombo and Seriès 2012; Kiefer and Hohwy 2018).”
Do humans make good decisions?
Summerfield, C., & Tsetsos, K. (2015) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2014.11.005 · Cited by 143 · cited 1×
“…narrowly defined or experimentally controlled conditions, they fall short as a comprehensive or generalizable account of how the brain actually operates across the full spectrum of contexts, environments, and real-world challenges (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011; Summerfield and Tsetsos 2015).”
Solving Bernstein's problem: a proposal for the development of coordinated movement by selection.
Sporns, O., & Edelman, G. M. (1993) · PubMed · Cited by 137
Predictive Processing and the Representation Wars
Williams, D. (2018) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1007/s11023-017-9441-6 · Cited by 134 · cited 2×
“The Bayesian explanation, while mathematically elegant, risks functioning more as a narrative scaffold than a mechanistic theory of pathophysiology (Williams 2018).”
Neural Network Mechanisms Underlying Stimulus Driven Variability Reduction
Deco, G., & Hugues, E. (2012) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002395 · Cited by 132 · cited 1×
“• Recurrent connectivity patterns and attractor dynamics: Cortical and subcortical circuits exhibit dense recurrent connectivity that generates attractor dynamics, oscil-2658 latory patterns, and metastable states (Brinkman et al. 2022; Deco and Hugues 2012).”
Extended Consciousness and Predictive Processing: A Third-Wave View
Kirchhoff, M. D., & Kiverstein, J. (2019) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781315150420 · Cited by 122 · cited 1×
“The Bayesian perspective has also transformed how we understand the relationship between brain, body, and environment (Allen and Friston 2018; Clark 2015; Kirchhoff and Kiverstein 2019).”
On Bayesian mechanics: a physics of and by beliefs
Ramstead, M. J. D., Sakthivadivel, D. A. R., Heins, C., Koudahl, M., Millidge, B., Da Costa, L., Klein, B., & Friston, K. J. (2023) · Interface Focus · doi:10.1098/rsfs.2022.0029 · Cited by 120
Understanding vision in wholly empirical terms
Purves, D., Wojtach, W. T., & Lotto, R. B. (2011) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1012178108 · Cited by 106 · cited 1×
“In many cases, non-Bayesian accounts based on ecological constraints or perceptual heuristics offer equally plausible, and often more parsimonious, explanations (Purves et al. 2011).”
Complex Dynamical Systems in Social and Personality Psychology: Theory, Modeling, and Analysis
Richardson, M. J., Dale, R., & Marsh, K. L. (2014) · Handbook of Research Methods in Social and Personality Psychology · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511996481.015 · Cited by 104
First principles in the life sciences: the free-energy principle, organicism, and mechanism
Colombo, M., & Wright, C. (2021) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-018-01932-w · Cited by 101 · cited 2×
“…the difficulty of empirically constraining priors and loss functions in perceptual models (Colombo 2018), and the problematic metaphysical overreach of the Free Energy Principle in its attempts to explain life, cognition, and action through a single variational formalism (Colombo and Wright 2021).”
The brain timewise: how timing shapes and supports brain function
Hari, R., & Parkkonen, L. (2015) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2014.0170 · Cited by 98
Unifying the Mind: Cognitive Representations as Graphical Models
Danks, D. (2014) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/9540.001.0001 · Cited by 96 · cited 1×
“The Bayesian brain hypothesis frequently operates in an “as-if” mode of explanation: the brain acts as if it were performing Bayesian inference, without claiming that actual Bayesian computations are implemented in neural tissue (Colombo and Seriès 2012; Danks 2014).”
How can a Bayesian approach inform neuroscience?
O’Reilly, J. X., Jbabdi, S., & Behrens, T. E. J. (2012) · European Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1111/j.1460-9568.2012.08010.x · Cited by 88 · cited 1×
“These interpretations frequently rest on correlational evidence (O’Reilly et al. 2012; Poldrack 2011).”
Unification by Fiat: Arrested Development of Predictive Processing
Litwin, P., & Miłkowski, M. (2020) · Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/cogs.12867 · Cited by 86 · cited 1×
“This linguistic slippage becomes particularly acute in expressions like “the brain minimizes prediction error” or “neurons encode precision weights”—phrases implying mechanistic claims while remaining shielded from falsification by their metaphorical status (Litwin and Miłkowski 2020).”
An Introduction to Predictive Processing Models of Perception and Decision‐Making
Sprevak, M. D., & Smith, R. S. (2023) · Topics in Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/tops.12704 · Cited by 85 · cited 1×
“Second, the very mathematics of Bayesian inference requires computation over explicit probability distributions, yet proponents often claim that the brain need not explicitly represent these distributions (Sprevak and Smith 2023).”
The Adaptive Character of Thought
Anderson, J. R. (2013) · doi:10.4324/9780203771730 · Cited by 84
Kirchhoff, M. D. (2017) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-017-0891-8 · Cited by 79 · cited 2×
“Proponents frequently underscore this potential, suggesting that predictive processing can reconcile conflicting paradigms and move the field beyond dichotomous thinking, resolving longstanding debates rather than merely choosing sides in them (Kirchhoff 2018).”
Hipólito, I., Ramstead, M. J. D., Convertino, L., Bhat, A., Friston, K., & Parr, T. (2021) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2021.02.003 · Cited by 79
Information Is Where You Find It: Perception as an Ecologically Well-Posed Problem
Warren, W. H. (2021) · i-Perception · doi:10.1177/20416695211000366 · Cited by 76 · cited 1×
“It is fundamentally action-oriented, relational, and environ-ment-coupled, grounded in real-time interaction rather than mediated by internal representations or probabilistic inference (Michaels and Carello 1981; Warren 2021).”
Kaliukhovich, D. A., & Vogels, R. (2014) · Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.2154-14.2014 · Cited by 69 · cited 1×
“Particularly telling is how predictive coding advocates responded when single-unit recordings in macaque IT cortex by Kaliukhovich and Vogels (2014) failed to show the expected repetition suppression effects.”
From symbols to icons: the return of resemblance in the cognitive neuroscience revolution
Williams, D., & Colling, L. (2018) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1578-6 · Cited by 69 · cited 1×
“…of biological plausibility stand in tension with the framework’s mathematical elegance, creating a gap between theoretical aspiration and mechanistic reality that remains inadequately addressed in much of the literature (Bowers and Davis 2012; Nelson et al. 2018; Williams and Colling 2018).”
Di Paolo, E. A., Buhrmann, T., & Barandiaran, X. E. (2017) · Oxford Scholarship Online · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198786849.003.0006 · Cited by 69
Metastable dynamics of neural circuits and networks
Brinkman, B. A. W., Yan, H., Maffei, A., Park, I. M., Fontanini, A., Wang, J., & La Camera, G. (2022) · Applied Physics Reviews · doi:10.1063/5.0062603 · Cited by 64 · cited 1×
“• Recurrent connectivity patterns and attractor dynamics: Cortical and subcortical circuits exhibit dense recurrent connectivity that generates attractor dynamics, oscil-2658 latory patterns, and metastable states (Brinkman et al. 2022; Deco and Hugues 2012).”
Williams, D. (2020) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-018-1768-x · Cited by 63 · cited 3×
“The Bayesian explanation, while mathematically elegant, risks functioning more as a narrative scaffold than a mechanistic theory of pathophysiology (Williams 2018).”
Novelty versus Replicability: Virtues and Vices in the Reward System of Science
Romero, F. (2017) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/694005 · Cited by 61 · cited 2×
“Furthermore, the publishing landscape in contemporary science rewards novel, positive findings over replications or negative results (Ioannidis 2005; Romero 2017).”
Persistence of false paradigms in low-power sciences
Akerlof, G. A., & Michaillat, P. (2018) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1816454115 · Cited by 54 · cited 1×
“The safer career path involves extending or applying the Bayesian framework rather than developing alternatives or exposing its limitations, thereby creating a selection pressure in the academic ecosystem that favors theoretical conformity over innovation or critique (Akerlof and Michaillat 2018).”
Bayesian reverse-engineering considered as a research strategy for cognitive science
Zednik, C., & Jäkel, F. (2016) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1180-3 · Cited by 50 · cited 1×
“To move beyond this impasse requires abandoning the comfort of “as-if” terminology and specifying exactly what neural operations would constitute—not merely simulate or approximate—Bayesian inference (Zednik and Jäkel 2016).”
Prefrontal Computation as Active Inference
Parr, T., Rikhye, R. V., Halassa, M. M., & Friston, K. J. (2020) · Cerebral Cortex · doi:10.1093/cercor/bhz118 · Cited by 48 · cited 1×
“Active inference extends these ideas to account for decision-making and planning, suggesting that agents select actions that minimize expected free energy or maximize expected information gain (Friston et al. 2011, 2017; Parr et al. 2020).”
Gigerenzer, G. (2020) · Topics in Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/tops.12480 · Cited by 48 · cited 1×
“This “mathematization” of neuroscience reflects broader trends across the sciences, where quantitative approaches tend to displace qualitative ones, regardless of their explanatory adequacy (Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009; Gigerenzer 2020).”
Solving Bernstein's Problem: A Proposal for the Development of Coordinated Movement by Selection
Sporns, O., & Edelman, G. M. (1993) · Child Development · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.1993.tb04182.x · Cited by 38 · cited 1×
“Rather than focusing on information processing or probabilistic inference, this approach emphasizes how cognitive functions self-organize through the continuous coordination of processes unfolding across multiple timescales (Beer 2000; Sporns and Edelman 1993).”
Grounding predictive coding models in empirical neuroscience research
Egner, T., & Summerfield, C. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x1200218x · Cited by 36 · cited 1×
“Absence of prediction error signatures: Neural populations hypothesized to encode prediction errors (e.g., mismatch responses in sensory cortices) should systematically differ under conditions of violated expectations (Egner and Summerfield 2013).”
Keysers, C., Silani, G., & Gazzola, V. (2024) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2024.105877 · Cited by 35
From metaphor to theory: the role of resonance in perceptual learning
Raja, V. (2019) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/1059712319854350 · Cited by 34 · cited 1×
“They also suggest that the temporal dynamics of neural activity may reflect ongoing engagement with the environment rather than sequential updating of internal models (Kiverstein and Rietveld 2018; Raja 2019).”
A model of conceptual bootstrapping in human cognition
Zhao, B., Lucas, C. G., & Bramley, N. R. (2023) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-023-01719-1 · Cited by 30
The role of priors in Bayesian models of perception
Teufel, C., Subramaniam, N., & Fletcher, P. C. (2013) · Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fncom.2013.00025 · Cited by 26 · cited 1×
“In perceptual neuroscience, auditory mismatch negativity (MMN) is frequently interpreted within a predictive coding framework (Garrido et al. 2009; Teufel et al. 2013; Teufel and Fletcher 2020).”
God, the devil, and the details: Fleshing out the predictive processing framework
Rasmussen, D., & Eliasmith, C. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12002154 · Cited by 23 · cited 1×
“What appears to support the hypothesis may instead reflect the descriptive flexibility of the models rather than evidence of mechanistic reality (Marcus and Davis 2013; Rasmussen and Eliasmith 2013).”
Suboptimal human multisensory cue combination
Arnold, D. H., Petrie, K., Murray, C., & Johnston, A. (2019) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-018-37888-7 · Cited by 23 · cited 1×
“Moreover, deviations from optimal integration have been observed in tasks with time constraints or novel stimuli (Arnold et al. 2019; Stanford et al. 2005), suggesting that the Bayesian fit may reflect task-specific tuning rather than a general cognitive strategy.”
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Cited by
The illusion of internal models in biological movement
Mangalam, M. (2025) · European Journal of Applied Physiology · doi:10.1007/s00421-025-05963-3 · Cited by 13
“In a recent deconstruction of the Bayesian brain hypothesis (Mangalam 2025), I argue that Bayesian logic, despite its formal elegance, often functions as a rhetorical backdoor for representational commitments.”
Self-citationThe equilibrium point hypothesis revisited: why threshold control does not explain human movement
Mangalam, M., & Stergiou, N. (2026) · Experimental Brain Research · doi:10.1007/s00221-026-07242-9 · Cited by 7
“Opti - mization-based theories and related computational frameworks that assume explicit prediction or model-based control carry their own computational and implementational challenges (Loeb 2012; Mangalam 2025a, b, c), and we do not advocate for their wholesale adoption.”
Self-citationPathophysiology of functional neurological disorder for the general neurologist
Phillips, W. E. (2025) · BMJ Neurology Open · doi:10.1136/bmjno-2025-001309 · Cited by 6
“15 However, the theory itself is not without critics 16 and it is difficult to provide direct proof for any mechanism.”
Minimization of prediction errors during cerebral embryogenesis and the emergence of agency
Wright, J. J., & Bourke, P. D. (2025) · Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnsys.2025.1683448 · Cited by 1
“Recent criticisms (Kwisthout and van Rooij, 2020; Mangalam, 2025) assert that the principle is metaphoric and not testable; that the computation of Bayesian priors and posteriors could not be achieved within hierarchical architectures; that intermediate values of these measures could not be stored;…”
Mangalam, M. (2026) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2026.106724 · Cited by 2
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Mangalam, M.
- Affiliations
- University of Nebraska at Omaha (US)
- Corresponding author
- Mangalam, Madhur
- ORCID
- Mangalam, Madhur
- Venue
- European Journal of Applied Physiology
- Published
- 2025-06-26
- Volume
- 125
- Issue
- 10
- Pages
- 2643-2677
- ISSN
- 0020-9376 (ISSN-L)
- 1439-6319
- 1439-6327
- PMC
- PMC12479598
- OpenAlex
- W4411669101
- Cited by
- 14
- References
- 204
- Citations by year
- 2026: 10 · 2025: 4
- FWCI
- 2.33
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (vor)
- Locations
- European Journal of Applied Physiology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- DigitalCommons@UNO (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Cognitive Science and Education Research
- Keywords
- Bayesian brain hypothesis, Bayesian inference, unfalsifiability, biological plausibility, prediction, dynamical systems theory, ecological psychology, embodied cognition, probabilistic inference, explanatory power
- MeSH terms
- Animals, Bayes Theorem, Brain, Cognition, Humans, Models, Neurological
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.