What are the contents of representations in predictive processing?
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 43 of the 43 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
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“The ability of SOHMs to select aligned patterns may help explain how seemingly definite experiences could emerge from probabilistic world models (Wiese, 2017; Block, 2018; Clark, 2018; Gross, 2018), as opposed to generating a “Bayesian blur,” or superposition of possibilities.”
From An Integrated World Modeling Theory (IWMT) of Consciousness (2020) · cites this paper as Wiese, 2017
Citations
Cites
A New Approach to Linear Filtering and Prediction Problems
Kalman, R. E. (1960) · Journal of Basic Engineering · doi:10.1115/1.3662552 · Cited by 31,751
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Friston, K. (2010) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2787 · Cited by 8,120 · cited 7×
“Furthermore, under the assumption that the generative model is Gaussian, the recognition density can be coded by its mean and covariance (see, e.g., Friston 2009, 2010; Friston & Kiebel 2009).”
BackgroundInfluentialWhatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science
Clark, A. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12000477 · Cited by 5,924
Rao, R. P. N., & Ballard, D. H. (1999) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/4580 · Cited by 5,483 · cited 3×
“(Rao and Ballard 1999, pp. 85 f.) Applying Egan’s terminology, we can note the following about the quoted passage: 1.”
BackgroundInfluentialHohwy, J. (2013) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682737.001.0001 · Cited by 1,914 · cited 8×
“Here is how Hohwy puts the general idea of his PP account of delusions (for more details, see also Hohwy 2013a): As I have noted, expected precisions and the associated confidence estimates play a key role for the very general balance between bottom up sensory evidence and top down expectations:…”
BackgroundInfluentialThe free-energy principle: a rough guide to the brain?
Friston, K. (2009) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2009.04.005 · Cited by 1,831 · cited 2×
“There are PP models in which the main estimates that are computed are sample means and covariances (as mentioned above, this option is embraced in many models by Karl Friston and colleagues; see e.g. Friston 2009, 2010; Friston & Kiebel 2009).”
BackgroundPredictive coding under the free-energy principle
Friston, K., & Kiebel, S. (2009) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2008.0300 · Cited by 1,579 · cited 2×
“There are PP models in which the main estimates that are computed are sample means and covariances (as mentioned above, this option is embraced in many models by Karl Friston and colleagues; see e.g. Friston 2009, 2010; Friston & Kiebel 2009).”
BackgroundBayesian inference with probabilistic population codes
Ma, W. J., Beck, J. M., Latham, P. E., & Pouget, A. (2006) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn1790 · Cited by 1,457
The emulation theory of representation: Motor control, imagery, and perception
Grush, R. (2004) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x04000093 · Cited by 1,387 · cited 2×
“However, once the actual feedback is available, it is integrated with the previously computed estimate of the target system’s state (using a Kalman filter, cf. Grush 2004, p. 381).”
Attention, uncertainty, and free-energy
Feldman, H., & Friston, K. J. (2010) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2010.00215 · Cited by 1,365
Surfing Uncertainty: Prediction, Action, and the Embodied Mind
Clark, A. (2016) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190217013.001.0001 · Cited by 1,358
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Hierarchical Models in the Brain
Friston, K. (2008) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000211 · Cited by 952 · cited 1×
“This gives us the following equation (which is oversimplified, to convey only the essential idea; for a more sophisticated version, see, e.g., Friston 2008, p. 2): sensory signals = deterministic function of hidden causes + noise s = g(c) + ω .”
BackgroundPredictions not commands: Active inference in the motor system
Adams, R. A., Shipp, S., & Friston, K. J. (2013) · Brain Structure and Function · doi:10.1007/s00429-012-0475-5 · Cited by 765 · cited 1×
“For instance, according to the theory of active inference developed by Friston and colleagues, action is not brought about by motor commands, but by predictions of the (perceptual) changes that will be brought about by the respective actions (cf. Adams et al. 2013).”
BackgroundFriston, K. (2013) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2013.0475 · Cited by 754 · cited 2×
“This also comes with a circular causality brought about by many action-perception cycles (cf. Friston 2013, p. 8).”
Background(2009) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/8029.001.0001 · Cited by 743
A Hierarchy of Time-Scales and the Brain
Kiebel, S. J., Daunizeau, J., & Friston, K. J. (2008) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000209 · Cited by 694
Ramsey, W. M. (2007) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511597954 · Cited by 657
Computational psychiatry: the brain as a phantastic organ
Friston, K. J., Stephan, K. E., Montague, R., & Dolan, R. J. (2014) · The Lancet Psychiatry · doi:10.1016/s2215-0366(14)70275-5 · Cited by 531 · cited 1×
“(Friston et al. 2014, p. 148).”
Bayesian just-so stories in psychology and neuroscience.
Bowers, J. S., & Davis, C. J. (2012) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0026450 · Cited by 436 · cited 1×
“PP is only 2 Bowers and Davis (2012) draw a distinction between three types of Bayesian theorizing (extreme, methodological and theoretical), emphasizing that using Bayesian models in cognitive science does not entail a commitment to the assumption that the brain literally implements Bayesian…”
BackgroundAttention and conscious perception in the hypothesis testing brain
Hohwy, J. (2012) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00096 · Cited by 396 · cited 1×
“Apart from that, optimizing precision estimates is typically regarded (by proponents of PP) as the computational mechanism underpinning the allocation of attention (cf. Feldman & Friston 2010; Hohwy 2012).”
BackgroundThe Oxford handbook of the philosophy of perception
(2016) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.194275 · Cited by 391
Seeing the mean: Ensemble coding for sets of faces.
Haberman, J., & Whitney, D. (2009) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance · doi:10.1037/a0013899 · Cited by 361 · cited 1×
“Yet another example would be the perception of ensemble properties (cf. Haberman & Whitney 2009): When subjects are briefly exposed to an array of, for instance, faces displaying various expressions, subjects are able to report the average facial expression, without being sensitive to the…”
BackgroundNonparametric Statistics with Applications to Science and Engineering
Kvam, P. H., & Vidakovic, B. (2007) · Wiley Series in Probability and Statistics · doi:10.1002/9780470168707 · Cited by 306
How to think about mental content
Egan, F. (2014) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0172-0 · Cited by 225 · cited 9×
“These contents are mathematical contents in the sense of Egan (2014), as opposed to cognitive contents. I next explored to what extent these mathematical contents constrain ascriptions of cognitive contents. Here, Gładziejewski’s (2015) insightful treatment of the functional role fulfilled by representations in PP pro…”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialClark, A. (2015) · The Southern Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1111/sjp.12120 · Cited by 202 · cited 2×
“This figure captures the essential components of PP accounts (cf. Clark 2015): 1. estimates (first-order statistics), 2. predictions, 1 I am using the term “predictive processing” in the sense of Clark (2013b, p. 202/fn. 5).”
BackgroundMethodPredictive coding and representationalism
Gładziejewski, P. (2016) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0762-9 · Cited by 185 · cited 8×
“(Gładziejewski 2015, pp. 13 f.; bold emphasis added) So the three aspects that determine the structure of models in PP, as suggested by Gładziejewski, are: (1) likelihoods, (2) dynamic relations, and (3) prior probabilities.”
BackgroundInfluentialRepresentation in mind : new approaches to mental representation
Clapin, H., Staines, P. J., & Slezak, P. P. (2004) · Cited by 161
Notes Toward a Structuralist Theory of Mental Representation
O’Brien, G., & Opie, J. (2004) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-008044394-2/50004-x · Cited by 160
Are we predictive engines? Perils, prospects, and the puzzle of the porous perceiver
Clark, A. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12002440 · Cited by 158 · cited 4×
“The core idea of predictive processing (PP; see Clark 2013b, 2016; Hohwy 2013b) is that the brain does not process sensory signals in a purely bottom-up fashion, but that it also forms top-down predictions of sensory signals, based on estimates derived from a hierarchical model.”
BackgroundInfluentialDefending the structural concept of representation
BARTELS, A. (2006) · THEORIA · doi:10.1387/theoria.550 · Cited by 153 · cited 2×
“PP models are thus structural representations (in the sense of Bartels 2006; O’Brien 2015).”
BackgroundThe architecture of representation
Grush, R. (1997) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089708573201 · Cited by 144
How Many Arms Make a Pair? Perceptual Illusion of Having an Additional Limb
Ehrsson, H. H. (2009) · Perception · doi:10.1068/p6304 · Cited by 128 · cited 1×
“(Ehrsson 2009, p. 312; citation style adapted) The idea is that the brain is constantly comparing its estimate of the location of the right arm to perceptual input.”
BackgroundClark, A. (2013) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00270 · Cited by 108
Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?
Churchland, P. S. (1994) · Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association · doi:10.2307/3130741 · Cited by 94
Bridging the gap between theory and practice of approximate Bayesian inference
Kwisthout, J., & van Rooij, I. (2013) · Cognitive Systems Research · doi:10.1016/j.cogsys.2012.12.008 · Cited by 67
Bayesian Perceptual Psychology
Rescorla, M. (2013) · Oxford Handbooks Online · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199600472.013.010 · Cited by 59 · cited 1×
“Having computed the posterior, one can then settle on a single hypothesis (like the hypothesis that maximizes either the posterior or some utility function, cf. Rescorla 2015).”
MethodKvam, P. H., & Vidaković, B. (2007) · Wiley-Interscience eBooks · Cited by 40
Delusions, Illusions and Inference under Uncertainty
Hohwy, J. (2013) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/mila.12008 · Cited by 26
O’Brien, G. (2015) · Gutenberg Open Science · doi:10.15502/9783958570146 · Cited by 19
Parallels between Sensory and Motor Information Processing
Todorov, E. (2009) · The Cognitive Neurosciences · doi:10.7551/mitpress/8029.003.0054 · Cited by 13
Madary, M. (2012) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00419 · Cited by 10 · cited 1×
“(Madary 2012, p. 1) So representations of sample means may be an example of representations having a probabilistic format in Madary’s sense, and their mathematical content may have a direct bearing on phenomenological descriptions of our (visual) perception.”
Background
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- Eliasmith, C., & Anderson, C. H. (2003). Neural engineering: Computation, representation, and dynamics. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
- Grush, R. (1995). Emulation and cognition (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). San Diego: University of California.
Cited by
Ad Hoc Concepts, Polysemy and the Lexicon
Carston, R. (2019) · Relevance, Pragmatics and Interpretation · doi:10.1017/9781108290593.014 · Cited by 160
Safron, A. (2020) · Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.3389/frai.2020.00030 · Cited by 133
“…and Huang, 2017) The ability of SOHMs to select aligned patterns may help explain how seemingly definite experiences could emerge from probabilistic world models (Wiese, 2017; Block, 2018; Clark, 2018; Gross, 2018), as opposed to generating a “Bayesian blur,” or superposition of possibilities.”
BackgroundPredictive Processing and the Representation Wars
Williams, D. (2018) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1007/s11023-017-9441-6 · Cited by 134
Enactivism and predictive processing: a non-representational view
Kirchhoff, M. D., & Robertson, I. (2018) · Philosophical Explorations · doi:10.1080/13869795.2018.1477983 · Cited by 94
Beyond Desire? Agency, Choice, and the Predictive Mind
Clark, A. (2020) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048402.2019.1602661 · Cited by 78
Metadata
- Authors
- Wiese, W.
- Affiliations
- Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz (DE)
- Corresponding author
- Wiese, Wanja
- ORCID
- Wiese, Wanja
- Venue
- Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
- Published
- 2016-06-18
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 715-736
- ISSN
- 1568-7759 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8676
- OpenAlex
- W2433192715
- Cited by
- 66
- References
- 43
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 8 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 30 · 2018: 2 · 2017: 3
- FWCI
- 7.44
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Keywords
- predictive processing, representational content, mathematical content, cognitive content, attention, cognitive modeling
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