Generative midtended cognition and Artificial Intelligence: thinging with thinging things
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 59 of the 62 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 23 of the 35 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
This paper introduces the concept of “generative midtended cognition”, that explores the integration of generative AI technologies with human cognitive processes. The term “generative” reflects AI’s ability to iteratively produce structured outputs, while “midtended” captures the potential hybrid (human-AI) nature of the process. It stands between traditional conceptions of in tended creation, understood as steered or directed from with in, and ex tended processes that bring exo-biological processes into the creative process. We examine the working of current generative technologies (based on multimodal transformer architectures typical of large language models like ChatGPT) to explain how they can transform human cognitive agency beyond what the conceptual resources of standard theories of extended cognition can capture. We suggest that the type of cognitive activity typical of the coupling between a human and generative technologies is closer (but not equivalent) to social cognition than to classical extended cognitive paradigms. Yet, it deserves a specific treatment. We provide an explicit definition of generative midtended cognition in which we treat interventions by AI systems as constitutive of the agent’s intentional creative processes. Furthermore, we distinguish two dimensions of generative hybrid creativity: 1. Width: captures the sensitivity of the context of the generative process (from the single letter to the whole historical and surrounding data), 2. Depth: captures the granularity of iteration loops involved in the process. Generative midtended cognition stands in the middle depth between conversational forms of cognition in which complete utterances or creative units are exchanged, and micro-cognitive (e.g. neural) subpersonal processes. Finally, the paper discusses the potential risks and benefits of widespread generative AI adoption, including the challenges of authenticity, generative power asymmetry, and creative boost or atrophy.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
The paper proposes “generative midtended cognition” to describe hybrid human–AI creative/cognitive processes in which AI-generated interventions become constitutive of an agent’s intentional generation of a product while the agent retains some sense of agency or authorship. It argues this phenomenon is not fully captured by extended cognition or social cognition and maps it along dimensions of width (context sensitivity) and depth (granularity of iterative loops), while discussing risks such as authenticity, power asymmetry, and creative atrophy.
Key findings
- The paper defines generative midtension as follows: given a cognitive agent X, a generative system Y, and cognitive product Z, midtension takes place when generative interventions produced by Y become constitutive of the intentional generation of Z by X, whereby X keeps some sense of agency or authorship over Z.
- It distinguishes generative midtended cognition from standard extended cognition and from social cognition: generative AI systems have derived intentionality and produce purpose-structured outputs, but they are not autonomous agents, so interaction with them is closer to social cognition than classical extended cognition yet deserves separate treatment.
- It proposes two dimensions of generative hybrid creativity: Width, the sensitivity of the generative process to context (from a single letter to the whole historical and surrounding data), and Depth, the granularity of iteration loops (from final products and conversational/creative units down to perceptual-action tokens, sensorimotor dynamics, proprioceptive body, and neural scales). Midtended cognition is placed between conversational cognition and micro-cognitive subpersonal processes.
- It discusses risks and benefits including authenticity, generative power asymmetry, creative boost or atrophy, and an “intention economy” that could commodify human intentionality. It notes current problems with hallucinations, reasoning limitations, and deviant chained errors, and mentions that GPT-3 has 96 attentional/neural processing blocks and that Gemini can handle up to 2 million token contexts.
Methods
- Conceptual and philosophical analysis; the paper reports no empirical data, sample, or statistical analysis.
- It develops its argument through engagement with extended cognition, enactivism, predictive coding, Material Engagement Theory, social cognition/participatory sense-making, and postphenomenology, using examples such as drawing, writing, word suggestion, a smart racket, pottery, jazz improvisation, and AI-mediated social/political scenarios.
- It proposes a definition of generative midtension and a two-dimensional framework (width and depth) inspired by Heersmink’s dimensions of integration in extended cognition.
Limitations
- Stated: current generative technology suffers from hallucinations, reasoning limitations, and deviant chained errors, making midtended cognition “a relevant but narrowed phenomenon”; the width dimension assumes high precision and accuracy, which the authors call an idealisation; generative AI may be plateauing; and risks of authenticity, power asymmetry, creative atrophy, and intention commodification remain.
- Stated/evident: the analysis is conceptual and speculative; the authors describe deep generative midtension scenarios as “still relatively fictional” though increasingly foreseeable, and they do not empirically validate or operationalise the width and depth dimensions.
- Evident: the paper offers no data on actual cognitive effects, and its claims about future risks and benefits are projections rather than tested outcomes.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
18 Valid · 7 Not valid · 10 Not checked · 82 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“But the intuition that more transparency equals more integration (in this sense of clear authorship of behaviour) starts to break down when we consider AI-powered technologies [Clowes, 2020, Wheeler, 2019].”
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Clowes, 2020
An author–year citation the paper’s reference list doesn’t settle. We don’t search these by name.
- Supportedcites Wheeler, 2019 matched to “The reappearing tool: transparency, smart technology, and the extended mind” (2019) source
In §4, Wheeler argues that transparently integrated AI can guide behaviour through classifications that bypass the user's conscious awareness, raising questions about how to judge the resulting thoughts and actions. He therefore urges resistance to designing such technology for transparency. This supports the citing sentence's point that transparency no longer straightforwardly implies desirable integration or clear authorship of behaviour; the copy provides no page numbers. (LLM, conf=0.87)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on an assumption not shown here.
- Not matched
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“However, generative technologies do not qualify as autonomous agents [Barandiaran and Almendros, 2024, Gubelmann, 2024, Harvey, 2024].”
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Barandiaran and Almendros, 2024 matched to “Transforming Agency. On the mode of existence of Large Language Models” (2024) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Sections 3.4 and 4 argue that raw GPT and ChatGPT lack capacities required for genuine autonomous agency. The claim extends that conclusion from LLMs to generative technologies generally. Section 6.1 also qualifies the conclusion: extended LLMs might qualify as autonomous agents under a task-completion definition, though they currently fall short under the authors’ stronger definition. (LLM, conf=0.85)
- Partly supportedcites Gubelmann, 2024 matched to “Large Language Models, Agency, and Why Speech Acts are Beyond Them (For Now) – A Kantian-Cum-Pragmatist Case” (2024) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Introduction (§1) argues that transformer-based LLMs lack autonomy and are therefore not agents, supporting the claim for that class of generative technology. The paper does not establish the conclusion for generative technologies generally, as the citing sentence states. (LLM, conf=0.86)
- Supportedcites Harvey, 2024 matched to “Motivations for Artificial Intelligence, for Deep Learning, for ALife: Mortality and Existential Risk” (2024) source
In §5.1, Harvey states that current forms of deep learning “do not constitute agents” because they lack motivations of their own. The Conclusion (§9) applies this point to ChatGPT, describing chatbots as tools rather than systems with motivations in their own right. (LLM, conf=0.91)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Generative AI can also collapse when recursively trained and tuned to cannibalised content [Shumailov et al., 2024].”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Shumailov et al., 2024 matched to “AI models collapse when trained on recursively generated data” (2024) source
The Main section says that learning from data produced by earlier models causes model collapse. The “Model collapse in language models” section examines sequential fine-tuning on model-generated data, and the paper states that fine-tuned models remain vulnerable. (LLM, conf=0.94)
plainstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Generative AI, when considered from a sociotechnical perspective [see also Hipólito et al., 2023], moves beyond the cases of individual creativity we have explored so far; and can become an integral component of social and political cognition.”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Hipólito et al., 2023 matched to “Enactive artificial intelligence: subverting gender norms in human-robot interaction” (2023) source
The citation is attached to the sociotechnical perspective on AI. Section 2, “AI: cultural practice and practical culture” (page unavailable), explicitly describes AI as an inherently sociocultural practice whose design and meaning depend on social and cultural context. The sentence’s subsequent claim about social and political cognition is the citing authors’ extension, not the point specifically attributed to this source. (LLM, conf=0.90)
plainstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“First, by occupying positions traditionally held by human mediators in social coordination-e.g. as a family therapist mediating in a couple's conflict, a secretary organizing and scheduling meetings, or a lawyer mediating between a client and a public institution.”
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: unclear — It is unclear why the paper says it holds.
24 more claims
Create a free account to see all 117 claims and every source verdict.
- Probably not a substantial claim. 79
- It may state two separate claims as one. 28
Citations
Cites
Vaswani, A., Shazeer, N., Parmar, N., Uszkoreit, J., Jones, L., Gomez, A. N., Kaiser, L., & Polosukhin, I. (2017) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1706.03762 · Cited by 120,404
Language Models are Few-Shot Learners
Brown, T. B., Mann, B., Ryder, N., Subbiah, M., Kaplan, J., Dhariwal, P., Neelakantan, A., Shyam, P., Sastry, G., Askell, A., et al. (2020) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2005.14165 · Cited by 23,372
Hutchins, E. (1995) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/1881.001.0001 · Cited by 10,801 · cited 1×
“Notable examples include Haraway’s cyborgs and situated knowledge [Haraway, 1991], Stiegler’s Heideggerian account of technique [Stiegler, 1998] and Hutchins’ distributed cognition approach [Hutchins, 1995].”
Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/58.1.7 · Cited by 6,333 · cited 1×
“However, the extended mind hypothesis [Clark and Chalmers, 1998] marks the first significant attempt, within philosophy of mind, to strongly argue on the triviality of retaining the mind within the boundaries of the skull.”
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science
Clark, A. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12000477 · Cited by 5,924
The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience
Varela, F. J., Rosch, E., & Thompson, E. (1991) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/6730.001.0001 · Cited by 5,765 · cited 1×
“Contrary to the standard view, enactive and embodied contemporary approaches to cognition [Varela et al., 1991, Calvo and Gomila, 2008, Clark, 1998, Gallagher, 2023] stress the emergent nature of intentionality through sensory-motor interactions between agents and their environments.”
Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature.
Green, P. A., & Haraway, D. J. (1992) · Contemporary Sociology · doi:10.2307/2076334 · Cited by 5,455
Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition
Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M., Call, J., Behne, T., & Moll, H. (2005) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x05000129 · Cited by 4,882 · cited 2×
“8”
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind
Searle, J. R. (1983) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173452 · Cited by 4,575
Simians, cyborgs, and women: the reinvention of nature
(1991) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.28-6234 · Cited by 3,677
(2019) · Cited by 2,637
Being there: putting brain, body, and world together again
(1997) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.34-6204 · Cited by 2,631
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.
Velleman, J. D., & Bratman, M. E. (1991) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2185304 · Cited by 2,384
Age of Surveillance Capitalism – The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power.
Kendell, D. (2020) · Brock Education Journal · doi:10.26522/brocked.v29i2.849 · Cited by 2,135
Participatory sense-making: An enactive approach to social cognition
De Jaegher, H., & Di Paolo, E. (2007) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-007-9076-9 · Cited by 1,640 · cited 1×
“In the enactive approach, this would imply conceptualising generative cognition as a case of participatory sense-making [Cuffari et al., 2015, De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007].”
Technics and Time, 3: Cinematic Time and the Question of Malaise
Stiegler, B. (2020) · Stanford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9780804799362 · Cited by 1,511
AI models collapse when trained on recursively generated data
Shumailov, I., Shumaylov, Z., Zhao, Y., Papernot, N., Anderson, R., & Gal, Y. (2024) · Nature · doi:10.1038/s41586-024-07566-y · Cited by 793 · cited 1×
“Generative AI can also collapse when recursively trained and tuned to cannibalised content [Shumailov et al., 2024].”
Ricoeur, P., & Blamey, K. (1994) · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226844541.001.0001 · Cited by 696
How things shape the mind: a theory of material engagement
(2014) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.51-5103 · Cited by 684
Minds: extended or scaffolded?
Sterelny, K. (2010) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-010-9174-y · Cited by 619 · cited 17×
“Following Barandiaran and Almendros [2024], we differentiate between the purpose ful (or intentional) behaviour characteristic of human agents, and the merely purpose-structured and purpose-bounded behaviour that generative AI produces.”
InfluentialLinguistic Bodies: The Continuity between Life and Language
Di Paolo, E. A., Cuffari, E. C., & De Jaegher, H. (2018) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/11244.001.0001 · Cited by 510 · cited 1×
“…processes as true forms of social cognition would obscure the fact that generative AI technologies, while capable of producing generative outcomes, are not autonomous agents capable of participating in a true form of social interaction, with its constitutive tensions [see Di Paolo et al., 2018].”
Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word
Rivers, E. L., & Ong, W. J. (1984) · Comparative Literature · doi:10.2307/1770602 · Cited by 508
Defining Agency: Individuality, Normativity, Asymmetry, and Spatio-temporality in Action
Barandiaran, X. E., Di Paolo, E., & Rohde, M. (2009) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/1059712309343819 · Cited by 497 · cited 2×
“Enactive, autonomy-centred sensorimotor approaches, on the other hand, stress the importance of the agent-centred adaptive (i.e. norm-sensitive, purposeful) modulation of the sensorimotor coupling with the environment [Barandiaran, 2008, 2017, Barandiaran et al., 2009, Di Paolo et al., 2017].”
Self-citationDi Paolo, E., Buhrmann, T., & Barandiaran, X. (2017) · Oxford Scholarship Online · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198786849.001.0001 · Cited by 420
Self-citationExograms and Interdisciplinarity: History, the Extended Mind, and the Civilizing Process
Sutton, J. (2010) · The Extended Mind · doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262014038.003.0009 · Cited by 396 · cited 1×
“5 After a first wave focused on defending the possibility of extended minds, a second wave of theorists moved away from strict functionalism and the stringent parity principle [Sutton, 2010].”
Cyborg intentionality: Rethinking the phenomenology of human–technology relations
Verbeek, P.-P. (2008) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-008-9099-x · Cited by 315
Handbook of cognitive science : an embodied approach
Calvo, P., & Gomila, A. (2008) · Cited by 304
Stand out of our Light: Freedom and Resistance in the Attention Economy
Williams, J. (2018) · doi:10.1017/9781108453004 · Cited by 303 · cited 1×
“…economy is already showing its devastating effect on human autonomy and well-being [Bhargava and Velasquez, 2020, González de la Torre et al., 2024, Williams, 2018], it is hard to imagine the potential negative impact of an intention economy deployed through generative human cognitive steering.”
Ethics of the Attention Economy: The Problem of Social Media Addiction
Bhargava, V. R., & Velasquez, M. (2021) · Business Ethics Quarterly · doi:10.1017/beq.2020.32 · Cited by 292 · cited 1×
“If the attention economy is already showing its devastating effect on human autonomy and well-being [Bhargava and Velasquez, 2020, González de la Torre et al., 2024, Williams, 2018], it is hard to imagine the potential negative impact of an intention economy deployed through generative human…”
Dimensions of integration in embedded and extended cognitive systems
Heersmink, R. (2015) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-014-9355-1 · Cited by 191 · cited 1×
“Heersmink [2015] offers a taxonomy of these dimensions as presented in the literature, retaining some of the early intuitions of durability, reliability and trust, reformulating others such as phenomenological and informational transparency, and including newly proposed dimensions such as…”
Embodied and Enactive Approaches to Cognition
Gallagher, S. (2023) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009209793 · Cited by 190 · cited 2×
“Contrary to the standard view, enactive and embodied contemporary approaches to cognition [Varela et al., 1991, Calvo and Gomila, 2008, Clark, 1998, Gallagher, 2023] stress the emergent nature of intentionality through sensory-motor interactions between agents and their environments.”
Hurley, S. L. (2010) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262014038.003.0006 · Cited by 188
Malafouris, L. (2019) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-018-9606-7 · Cited by 181
From participatory sense-making to language: there and back again
Cuffari, E. C., Di Paolo, E., & De Jaegher, H. (2015) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-014-9404-9 · Cited by 159 · cited 1×
“In the enactive approach, this would imply conceptualising generative cognition as a case of participatory sense-making [Cuffari et al., 2015, De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007].”
Autonomy and Enactivism: Towards a Theory of Sensorimotor Autonomous Agency
Barandiaran, X. E. (2017) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-016-9365-4 · Cited by 128 · cited 1×
“However, the sort of intentionality instantiated by technology, in his account, is always directed towards the world, and not back to the agent.”
Self-citationThe Cognitive Ecology of the Internet
Smart, P. R., Heersmink, R., & Clowes, R. W. (2017) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-49115-8_13 · Cited by 124 · cited 2×
“Extended cognition theories, as part of the 4E paradigm in cognitive science, have proved to be rich frameworks to study contemporary digital technology [Smart et al., 2017].”
AI Extenders: The Ethical and Societal Implications of Humans Cognitively Extended by AI
Hernández-Orallo, J., & Vold, K. (2019) · Proceedings of the 2019 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society · doi:10.1145/3306618.3314238 · Cited by 99 · cited 1×
“Beyond this, even if we dodged those risks, one further line of worry that has already been brought up in the literature [Hernández-Orallo and Vold, 2019] is that of a sort of cognitive atrophy .”
The Rise of Generative Artificial Intelligence and Its Impact on Education: The Promises and Perils
Murugesan, S., & Cherukuri, A. K. (2023) · Computer · doi:10.1109/mc.2023.3253292 · Cited by 92 · cited 1×
“The term generative has, of course, also been chosen to name the generative AI technologies that have emerged recently [Akhtar, 2024, Jebara, 2012, Murugesan and Cherukuri, 2023].”
Akhtar, Z. B. (2024) · Journal of Electrical Systems and Information Technology · doi:10.1186/s43067-024-00145-1 · Cited by 85 · cited 1×
“The term generative has, of course, also been chosen to name the generative AI technologies that have emerged recently [Akhtar, 2024, Jebara, 2012, Murugesan and Cherukuri, 2023].”
Jebara, T. (2004) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-4419-9011-2 · Cited by 83
The reappearing tool: transparency, smart technology, and the extended mind
Wheeler, M. (2019) · AI & SOCIETY · doi:10.1007/s00146-018-0824-x · Cited by 67 · cited 1×
“But the intuition that more transparency equals more integration (in this sense of clear authorship of behaviour) starts to break down when we consider AI-powered technologies [Clowes, 2020, Wheeler, 2019].”
Berg, S., & Hofmann, J. (2021) · Internet Policy Review · doi:10.14763/2021.4.1612 · Cited by 64
Barandiaran, X. E., Calleja-López, A., Monterde, A., & Romero, C. (2024) · SpringerBriefs in Political Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-50784-7 · Cited by 44 · cited 1×
“11 Digital infrastructures are an essential part of contemporary political processes, and they are especially useful for accelerating and scaling participatory democracy [Barandiaran et al., 2024, Berg and Hofmann, 2021].”
Self-citationPersonality and Authenticity in Light of the Memory-Modifying Potential of Optogenetics
Zawadzki, P., & Adamczyk, A. K. (2021) · AJOB Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/21507740.2020.1866097 · Cited by 41 · cited 1×
“Finally, issues of authenticity [Zawadzki and Adamczyk, 2021], which are already at stake within current digital contexts [see Pérez-Verdugo and Barandiaran, 2023, for an exploration within an enactive framework], might also get amplified with generative midtension.”
Farina, M., & Lavazza, A. (2022) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-022-00508-4 · Cited by 40 · cited 2×
“AI-based AI-based technologies, however, pose particular challenges, and ethical debates have questioned the suitability of adopting extended cognition frameworks for these contemporary technologies [Cassinadri, 2022, Farina and Lavazza, 2022].”
Personal Autonomy and (Digital) Technology: An Enactive Sensorimotor Framework
Pérez-Verdugo, M., & Barandiaran, X. E. (2023) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-023-00683-y · Cited by 40 · cited 1×
“Finally, issues of authenticity [Zawadzki and Adamczyk, 2021], which are already at stake within current digital contexts [see Pérez-Verdugo and Barandiaran, 2023, for an exploration within an enactive framework], might also get amplified with generative midtension.”
Self-citationGubelmann, R. (2024) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-024-00696-1 · Cited by 36 · cited 1×
“However, generative technologies do not qualify as autonomous agents [Barandiaran and Almendros, 2024, Gubelmann, 2024, Harvey, 2024].”
Social Cognition and the Second Person in Human Interaction
Pérez, D. I., & Gomila, A. (2021) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781003133155 · Cited by 32 · cited 1×
“As the word-suggesting example in the opening of the paper illustrates, generative cognition might be better understood through the conceptual resources of social cognition [Pérez and Gomila, 2021] than those of extended cognition.”
Mental life. A naturalized approach to the autonomy of cognitive agents
Barandiaran, X. E., & Eugenio, X. (2008) · Euskomedia Digital Bilduma · Cited by 31
Self-citationEnactive artificial intelligence: subverting gender norms in human-robot interaction
Hipólito, I., Winkle, K., & Lie, M. (2023) · Frontiers in Neurorobotics · doi:10.3389/fnbot.2023.1149303 · Cited by 27 · cited 1×
“Generative AI, when considered from a sociotechnical perspective [see also Hipólito et al., 2023], moves beyond the cases of individual creativity we have explored so far; and can become an integral component of social and political cognition.”
de la Torre, P. G., Pérez-Verdugo, M., & Barandiaran, X. E. (2024) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2405.06478 · Cited by 19
Self-citationTransforming Agency. On the mode of existence of Large Language Models
Barandiaran, X. E., & Almendros, L. S. (2024) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2407.10735 · Cited by 18
Self-citationToward an Enactive Conception of Productive Practices: Beyond Material Agency
Di Paolo, E. A., Lawler, D., & Vaccari, A. P. (2023) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-023-00632-9 · Cited by 17 · cited 1×
“This does indeed underline the strong relation between agency, productive practices [see also Di Paolo et al., 2023] and technical interventions, and the enactive idea of coupling stresses the co-constitutive and constraining role of the environment in cognitive processes.”
Moral Reasons Not to Posit Extended Cognitive Systems: a Reply to Farina and Lavazza
Cassinadri, G. (2022) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-022-00560-0 · Cited by 14 · cited 1×
“AI-based AI-based technologies, however, pose particular challenges, and ethical debates have questioned the suitability of adopting extended cognition frameworks for these contemporary technologies [Cassinadri, 2022, Farina and Lavazza, 2022].”
(2017) · El Servicio de Difusión de la Creación Intelectual (National University of La Plata) · Cited by 8
Harvey, I. (2024) · Artificial Life · doi:10.1162/artl_a_00427 · Cited by 6 · cited 1×
“However, generative technologies do not qualify as autonomous agents [Barandiaran and Almendros, 2024, Gubelmann, 2024, Harvey, 2024].”
Bjarnason, R., Gambrell, D., & Lanthier-Welch, J. (2024) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2407.13960 · Cited by 4 · cited 1×
“…decision-making activities actively synthesizing collective inputs and (re)writing citizen proposals, that are further modified and selected by participants, to later bridge the gap between expert input and participatory engagement, and finally delivering public policies [Bjarnason et al., 2024].”
Artificial Democratic Life. Re-engineering the autonomy of the social, a research program
Barandiaran, X. E. (2019) · The 2019 Conference on Artificial Life · doi:10.1162/isal_a_00131 · Cited by 2 · cited 1×
“AI and Artificial Life systems can play an important role in empowering these infrastructures (avoiding the dangers of digital authoritarianism and centralism) towards models of democratic ecology augmented by (open and participatory) artificial systems of care and facilitation [Barandiaran, 2019].”
Self-citation(1991)
Research works printed but not linked: 3
- Davidson, D. (1980). Essays on actions and events (underlining). Oxford University Press.
- Pérez-Verdugo, M. (2022). Situating transparency: An extended cognition approach. Teorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofía,41(3), 7–24. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27185808
- Stiegler, B. (1998). Technics and time, 1: The fault of epimetheus. Stanford University Press. · DOI · Paper page
Cited by
Bibri, S. E., & Huang, J. (2025) · Sustainable Cities and Society · doi:10.1016/j.scs.2025.106826 · Cited by 57
Transforming agency: On the mode of existence of large language models
Barandiaran, X. E., & Almendros, L. S. (2025) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-025-10094-3 · Cited by 41
“For a detailed account of this concept of “midtended cognition” see Barandiaran and Pérez-Verdugo 2025.”
Self-citationCasacuberta, D., & Guersenzvaig, A. (2025) · Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.3389/frai.2025.1651354 · Cited by 11
AI-generated Literature, Distant Writing and the Reader: Reflections on Floridi and Calvino
Mollema, W. J. T. (2025) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-025-01008-x · Cited by 6
“4 Barandiaran & Pérez-Verdugo (2025) however exemplify critics of this kind of writing.”
InfluentialThe coalescent architecture of agency: normative directionality as the key to human–AI integration
Torres–Martínez, S. (2026) · AI & Society · doi:10.1007/s00146-026-02979-x · Cited by 4
“In aviation, Bainbridge (1983) identified the fundamental "ironies of automation": highly automated systems paradoxically require the highest levels of human operator skill because operators must monitor complex systems, detect subtle failures, and intervene decisively under time pressure—yet…”
Metadata
- Authors
- Barandiaran, X. E., & Pérez-Verdugo, M.
- Affiliations
- University of the Basque Country (ES)
- Corresponding author
- Barandiaran, Xabier E.
- Pérez-Verdugo, Marta
- Venue
- Synthese
- Published
- 2025-03-27
- Volume
- 205
- Issue
- 4
- ISSN
- 0039-7857 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0964
- OpenAlex
- W4408973818
- Cited by
- 19
- References
- 62
- Citations by year
- 2026: 11 · 2025: 8
- FWCI
- 10.76
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (vor)
- Locations
- Synthese (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (cc-by)
- Funders
- Universidad del País Vasco
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Cybernetics and Technology in Society
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- generative AI, extended cognition, creative cognition, social cognition, large language models, multimodal transformer, cognitive agency, authenticity, power imbalance
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
The claim verdicts this report counts are experimental: their accuracy is not yet measured.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-01, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-01 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).
Cited sources are checked with a language model’s help (gpt-6-sol).
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.