I Me Mine: on a Confusion Concerning the Subjective Character of Experience
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In recent debates on phenomenal consciousness, a distinction is sometimes made, after Levine (2001) and Kriegel (2009), between the "qualitative character" of an experience, i.e. the specific way it feels to the subject (e.g. blueish or sweetish or pleasant), and its "subjective character", i.e. the fact that there is anything at all that it feels like to her. I argue that much discussion of subjective character is affected by a conflation between three different notions. I start by disentangling the three notions in question, under the labels of "for-me-ness", "me-ness" and "mineness". Next, I argue that these notions are not equivalent; in particular, there is no conceptual implication from for-me-ness to me-ness or mineness. Empirical considerations based on clinical cases additionally suggest that the three notions may also correspond to different properties (although the claim of conceptual non-equivalence does not depend on this further point). The aim is clarificatory, cautionary but also critical: I examine four existing arguments from subjective character that are fuelled by an undifferentiated use of the three notions, and find them to be flawed for this reason.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Psychedelics, meditation, and self-consciousness
Millière, R., Carhart-Harris, R. L., Roseman, L., Trautwein, F.-M., & Berkovich-Ohana, A. (2018) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01475 · Cited by 390
“…bodily and spatial features of experience: “being presented with something necessarily involves being pre-reflectively and preconceptually aware of being the subject to whom something is presented” (Nida-Rümelin, 2017, p. 66; see also Strawson, 1999; Kriegel, 2009; Zahavi, 2014; Guillot, 2017).”
BackgroundMillière, R. (2017) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2017.00245 · Cited by 206
“However, the notion of subjective character is ambiguous (see Guillot, 2017): while it is sometimes defined as an ‘‘inner’’ or ‘‘peripheral’’ awareness of one’s own experience, it has also been equated with a kind of self-awareness (e.g., Zahavi, 2014).”
BackgroundThe Projective Consciousness Model and Phenomenal Selfhood
Williford, K., Bennequin, D., Friston, K., & Rudrauf, D. (2018) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02571 · Cited by 78
“…these elements and their relationships is, of course, immense, multidisciplinary, and spans centuries (see, e.g., Zahavi, 1999, 2008; Metzinger, 2000, 2003; Frank, 2007, 2016; Kriegel, 2009; Williford et al., 2012; Zahavi and Kriegel, 2016; Billon, 2017; Guillot, 2017; Howell and Thompson, 2017).”
Pain Asymbolia as Depersonalization for Pain Experience. An Interoceptive Active Inference Account
Gerrans, P. (2020) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.523710 · Cited by 43
Deane, G. (2021) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niab024 · Cited by 38
“Millière (2017, 2020) notes that the disagreements about the necessity claim and the typicality claim may hinge on terminological variation (Guillot 2017), due to the polysemy of ‘self-consciousness’ and ‘sense of self’.”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Guillot, M.
- Venue
- Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Published
- 2016-05-27
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 23-53
- ISSN
- 1878-5158 (ISSN-L)
- 1878-5166
- OpenAlex
- W2399821555
- Cited by
- 115
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 12.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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