The DOI matches its Crossref record; 44 of the 44 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Lay denial of knowledge for justified true beliefs
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Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Nagel, J., Juan, V. S., & Mar, R. A.
- Venue
- Cognition
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2013-12
- Volume
- 129
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 652-661
- ISSN
- 0010-0277 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2101406057
- Cited by
- 273
- References
- 44
- FWCI
- 136.20
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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