Cited by 791Child and Animal Learning DevelopmentSocial Robot Interaction and HRIPhilosophy and Theoretical Science

Limits on theory of mind use in adults

Keysar, Boaz, Lin, Shuhong, Barr, Dale J·2003·Cognition

Abstract

By 6 years, children have a sophisticated adult-like theory of mind that enables them not only to understand the actions of social agents in terms of underlying mental states, but also to distinguish between their own mental states and those of others. Despite this, we argue that even adults do not reliably use this sophisticated ability for the very purpose for which it is designed, to interpret the actions of others. In Experiment 1, a person who played the role of "director" in a communication game instructed a participant to move certain objects around in a grid. Before receiving instructions, participants hid an object in a bag, such that they but not the director would know its identity. Occasionally, the descriptions that the director used to refer to a mutually-visible object more closely matched the identity of the object hidden in the bag. Although they clearly knew that the director did not know the identity of the hidden object, they often took it as the referent of the director's description, sometimes even attempting to comply with the instruction by actually moving the bag itself. In Experiment 2 this occurred even when the participants believed that the director had a false belief about the identity of the hidden object, i.e. that she thought that a different object was in the bag. These results show a stark dissociation between an ability to reflectively distinguish one's own beliefs from others', and the routine deployment of this ability in interpreting the actions of others. We propose that this dissociation indicates that important elements of the adult's theory of mind are not fully incorporated into the human comprehension system.

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Crossref · 10.1016/s0010-0277(03)00064-7

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Authors
Keysar, B., Lin, S., & Barr, D. J.
Affiliations
  • University of Chicago (US)
  • University of California, Riverside (US)
Corresponding author
Keysar, Boaz
Venue
Cognition
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2003-08
Volume
89
Issue
1
Pages
25-41
ISSN
0010-0277 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2119061043
Cited by
791
References
48
Citations by year
2026: 31 · 2025: 58 · 2024: 15 · 2023: 35 · 2022: 44 · 2021: 60 · 2020: 40 · 2019: 34 · 2018: 30 · 2017: 28 · 2016: 53 · 2015: 53 · 2014: 40 · 2013: 33 · 2012: 44
FWCI
32.88
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Cognition (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • ENLIGHTEN (Jurnal Bimbingan dan Konseling Islam) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • National Institutes of Health (5r01mh049685-10)
  • National Institute of Mental Health (R01 MH49685-06A1)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Social Robot Interaction and HRI
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Keywords
theory of mind, false belief, social cognition, referential description
MeSH terms
Awareness, Female, Humans, Male, Models, Psychological

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