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Cited by 53

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 138 of the 138 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Learning a commonsense moral theory

Kleiman-Weiner, Max, Saxe, Rebecca, Tenenbaum, Joshua B.·2017·Cognition
DOI 10.1016/j.cognition.2017.03.005
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Abstract

We introduce a computational framework for understanding the structure and dynamics of moral learning, with a focus on how people learn to trade off the interests and welfare of different individuals in their social groups and the larger society. We posit a minimal set of cognitive capacities that together can solve this learning problem: (1) an abstract and recursive utility calculus to quantitatively represent welfare trade-offs; (2) hierarchical Bayesian inference to understand the actions and judgments of others; and (3) meta-values for learning by value alignment both externally to the values of others and internally to make moral theories consistent with one's own attachments and feelings. Our model explains how children can build from sparse noisy observations of how a small set of individuals make moral decisions to a broad moral competence, able to support an infinite range of judgments and decisions that generalizes even to people they have never met and situations they have not been in or observed. It also provides insight into the causes and dynamics of moral change across time, including cases when moral change can be rapidly progressive, changing values significantly in just a few generations, and cases when it is likely to move more slowly.

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1016/j.cognition.2017.03.005

Cites

138 of 138 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

This paper’s full text isn’t openly available, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Claims other papers make about this one

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Citations

Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. Binmore, 1998, vol. 2
  2. Festinger, 1962, vol. 2
  3. Fudenberg, 1998, vol. 2

Cited by

See all 53

Metadata

Authors
Kleiman-Weiner, M., Saxe, R., & Tenenbaum, J. B.
Venue
Cognition
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2017-10
Volume
167
Pages
107-123
ISSN
0010-0277
DOI
10.1016/j.cognition.2017.03.005
Cited by
53
References
138
Language
en
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

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Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.