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CEO compensation and corporate risk: Evidence from a natural experiment
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Metadata
- Authors
- Gormley, T. A., Matsa, D. A., & Milbourn, T.
- Venue
- Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2013-12
- Volume
- 56
- Issue
- 2-3
- Pages
- 79-101
- ISSN
- 0165-4101 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3124377963
- Cited by
- 378
- References
- 83
- FWCI
- 95.04
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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