The DOI matches its Crossref record; 60 of the 60 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
CEO turnover, firm performance, and enterprise reform in China: Evidence from micro data
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243
Corporate Ownership Around the World
La Porta, R., Lopez‐De‐Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00115 · Cited by 10,541
Investor protection and corporate governance
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2000) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00065-9 · Cited by 6,848
The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., & Lang, L. H. P. (2000) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00067-2 · Cited by 5,754
Outside directors and CEO turnover
Weisbach, M. S. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90053-0 · Cited by 4,234
The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations
Faccio, M., & Lang, L. H. P. (2002) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(02)00146-0 · Cited by 3,795
(2008) · Corporate Financial Strategy · doi:10.4324/9780080942841-11 · Cited by 2,390
Corporate governance, investor protection, and performance in emerging markets
Klapper, L. F., & Love, I. (2004) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/s0929-1199(03)00046-4 · Cited by 2,218
Johnson, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.2.22 · Cited by 2,211
Chapter 38 Executive compensation
Murphy, K. J. (1999) · Handbook of Labor Economics · doi:10.1016/s1573-4463(99)30024-9 · Cited by 1,567
The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism.
Nove, A., & Kornai, J. (1993) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2234722 · Cited by 1,352
China share issue privatization: the extent of its success
Sun, Q., & Tong, W. H. S. (2003) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(03)00145-4 · Cited by 959
Appointments of outsiders to Japanese boards: Determinants and implications for managers
Kaplan, S. N., & Minton, B. A. (1994) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(94)90025-6 · Cited by 957
Firm performance, corporate governance, and top executive turnover in Japan
Kang, J.-K., & Shivdasani, A. (1995) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(94)00807-d · Cited by 934
The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring, and the Decision to Go Public
Pagano, M., & Roell, A. (1998) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355398555568 · Cited by 900
Financial performance surrounding CEO turnover
Murphy, K. J., & Zimmerman, J. L. (1993) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(93)90014-7 · Cited by 896
Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the United States
Kaplan, S. N. (1994) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261944 · Cited by 860
Corporate Governance, Investor Protection and Performance in Emerging Markets
Klapper, L. F., & Love, I. (2002) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.303979 · Cited by 845
Growing Out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform 1978-1993.
Ho, S. P. S., & Naughton, B. (1996) · Pacific Affairs · doi:10.2307/2760884 · Cited by 815
Managerial succession and firm performance
Huson, M. R., Malatesta, P. H., & Parrino, R. (2004) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2003.08.002 · Cited by 806
Ownership structure and top executive turnover
Denis, D. J., Denis, D. K., & Sarin, A. (1997) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(97)00016-0 · Cited by 776
Board leadership structure and CEO turnover
Goyal, V. K., & Park, C. W. (2002) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/s0929-1199(01)00028-1 · Cited by 763
Corporate governance and market valuation in China
Bai, C.-E., Liu, Q., Lu, J., Song, F. M., & Zhang, J. (2004) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2004.07.002 · Cited by 742
China's Unfinished Economic Revolution
Zagoria, D., & Lardy, N. R. (1998) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20049106 · Cited by 714
Selling China: Foreign Direct Investment during the Reform Era
Pye, L. W., Huang, Y., & Wedeman, A. H. (2004) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20033878 · Cited by 675
The Cadbury Committee, Corporate Performance, and Top Management Turnover
Dahya, J., McConnell, J. J., & Travlos, N. G. (2002) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00428 · Cited by 552
Governance with poor investor protection: evidence from top executive turnover in Italy
Volpin, P. F. (2002) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(02)00071-5 · Cited by 537
Bebchuk, L. A., Kraakman, R. H., & Triantis, G. G. (2000) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 531
A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control
Bebchuk, L. A. (1999) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w7203 · Cited by 449
From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization
Megginson, W. L., & Netter, J. M. (2001) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.39.2.321 · Cited by 434
Bebchuk, L., Kraakman, R., & Triantis, G. (1999) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w6951 · Cited by 423
Investor Protection and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Worldwide CEO Turnover
DEFOND, M. L., & HUNG, M. (2004) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-679x.2004.00138.x · Cited by 406
China's Evolving Managerial Labor Market
Groves, T., Hong, Y., McMillan, J., & Naughton, B. J. (1995) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/262006 · Cited by 379
Separation of Ownership and Control
(2013) · Encyclopedia of Corporate Social Responsibility · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-28036-8_101331 · Cited by 363
A Multitask Theory of State Enterprise Reform
Bai, C.-E., Li, D. D., Tao, Z., & Wang, Y. (2000) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1006/jcec.2000.1681 · Cited by 362
The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism
Tesche, J., & Kornai, J. (1993) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1059965 · Cited by 347
Kato, T., & Long, C. (2006) · Economic Development and Cultural Change · doi:10.1086/503583 · Cited by 321
Self-citationIs Corporate Governance Ineffective in Emerging Markets?
Gibson, M. S. (2003) · The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.2307/4126771 · Cited by 318
The New Soviet Incentive Model
Weitzman, M. L. (1976) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003200 · Cited by 275
A study of the R&D efficiency and productivity of Chinese firms
Zhang, A., Zhang, Y., & Zhao, R. (2003) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/s0147-5967(03)00055-6 · Cited by 263
CEO pay, firm size, and corporate performance: evidence from Canada
Zhou, X. (2000) · Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique · doi:10.1111/0008-4085.00013 · Cited by 228
Agency Theory and Executive Compensation: The Case of Chinese State‐Owned Enterprises
Mengistae, T., & Colin Xu, L. (2004) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/383109 · Cited by 199
Incentives for CEOs with multitasks: Evidence from Chinese state-owned enterprises
Bai, C.-E., & Xu, L. C. (2005) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2005.03.013 · Cited by 198
CEO turnover in insider-dominated boards: The Italian case
Brunello, G., Graziano, C., & Parigi, B. M. (2003) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/s0378-4266(02)00244-3 · Cited by 195
Politician control, agency problems and ownership reform: Evidence from China*
Xu, L. C., Zhu, T., & Lin, Y. (2005) · Economics of Transition · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0351.2005.00205.x · Cited by 180
Transition as a process of large-scale institutional change
Dewatripont, M., & Roland, G. (2008) · Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications · doi:10.1017/ccol0521580129.007 · Cited by 158
CEO turnover, firm performance and corporate governance: empirical evidence on Danish firms
Lausten, M. (2002) · International Journal of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-7187(00)00083-7 · Cited by 153
Corporate governance in South Korea: the chaebol experience
Campbell, T. L., & Keys, P. Y. (2002) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/s0929-1199(01)00049-9 · Cited by 150
A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and ControlPreprint
Bebchuk, L. A. (1999) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.168990 · Cited by 148
Shareholder wealth effects of CEO departures: evidence from the UK
Dedman, E., & Lin, S. W. J. (2002) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/s0929-1199(01)00027-x · Cited by 137
Growing out of the plan: Chinese economic reform, 1978-1993
(1996) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.33-2855 · Cited by 134
Liu, G. S., & Sun, P. (2005) · Corporate Governance An International Review · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00402.x · Cited by 122
Legality and Market Reform in Soviet-Type Economies
Litwack, J. M. (1991) · The Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.5.4.77 · Cited by 115
Corporate governance of Japanese banks
Anderson, C. W., & Campbell, T. L. (2003) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/s0929-1199(03)00029-4 · Cited by 87
Managerial pay and executive turnover in the Czech and Slovak Republics*
Eriksson, T. (2005) · Economics of Transition · doi:10.1111/j.0967-0750.2005.00236.x · Cited by 55
Governance with Poor Investor Protection: Evidence from Top Executive TurnoverPreprint
Volpin, P. F. (2001) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.262789 · Cited by 44
Turnover of Senior Managers in Russian Privatised Firms
Muravyev, A. (2003) · Comparative Economic Studies · doi:10.1057/palgrave.ces.8100008 · Cited by 35
An Empirical Study on Corporate Governance and Market Valuation in China
Bai, C., Liu, Q., Lu, J. Z., Song, F. M., & Zhang, J. J. (2006) · Frontiers of Economics in China · doi:10.1007/s11459-005-0011-0 · Cited by 33
Liu, D., & Otsuka, K. (2004) · Economic Development and Cultural Change · doi:10.1086/420904 · Cited by 30
The Value of Private Benefits: Evidence from an Emerging Market for Corporate Control
Bai, C., Liu, Q., Song, F. M., Li, C., Liu, W., & Lu, J. (2003) · Cited by 10
Cited by
Corporate governance in China: A modern perspective
Jiang, F., & Kim, K. A. (2015) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.10.010 · Cited by 931
Executive compensation and corporate governance in China
Conyon, M. J., & He, L. (2011) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.04.006 · Cited by 592
Who Captures the Power of the Pen?
You, J., Zhang, B., & Zhang, L. (2018) · The Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhx055 · Cited by 310
Does the External Monitoring Effect of Financial Analysts Deter Corporate Fraud in China?
Chen, J., Cumming, D., Hou, W., & Lee, E. (2016) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-014-2393-3 · Cited by 309
Corporate ownership and managerial turnover in China and Eastern Europe: A comparative meta-analysis
Iwasaki, I., Ma, X., & Mizobata, S. (2020) · Journal of Economics and Business · doi:10.1016/j.jeconbus.2020.105928 · Cited by 51
Metadata
- Authors
- Kato, T., & Long, C.
- Venue
- Journal of Comparative Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2006-12
- Volume
- 34
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 796-817
- ISSN
- 0147-5967 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3123659852
- Cited by
- 293
- References
- 60
- FWCI
- 39.87
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.