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Board of directors' responsiveness to shareholders: Evidence from shareholder proposals
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Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Ertimur, Y., Ferri, F., & Stubben, S. R.
- Venue
- Journal of Corporate Finance
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2010-02
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 53-72
- ISSN
- 0929-1199 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3123735113
- Cited by
- 351
- References
- 54
- FWCI
- 56.24
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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