CoChat
Sign Up
Cited by 28Climate Change Communication and PerceptionPhilosophy and History of ScienceEpistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

Public scientific testimony in the scientific image

Open access
Gerken, Mikkel·2020·Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A
DOI 10.1016/j.shpsa.2019.05.006
Open this paper in CoChat — free accountOpen PDF

Abstract

In this paper, I draw on philosophy of science to address a challenge for science communication. Empirical research indicates that some people who trust a meteorologist's report that they are in the path of a storm do not trust a climate scientist's report that we are on a path to global warming. Such selective skepticism about climate science exemplifies a more general challenge:A prominent response arising from the novel interdisciplinary science of science communication is a principle called Consensus Reporting. According to this principle, science reporters should, whenever feasible, report the scientific consensus or lack thereof for a reported scientific view. However, philosophy of science may offer a different perspective on the issue. This perspective is critical insofar as it indicates some inadequacies of Consensus Reporting. But it is also constructive insofar as it guides the development of an alternative principle, Justification Reporting, according to which science reporters should, whenever feasible, report aspects of the nature and strength of scientific justification or lack thereof for a reported scientific view. A central difference between these proposals is that Consensus Reporting appeals to the authority of the scientists whereas Justification Reporting appeals to the authority of scientific justification. As such, Justification Reporting reflects the image of science. The paper considers the philosophical and empirical motivation for Justification Reporting and its limitations. This includes prospects and problems for implementing it in a way that addresses The Challenge of Selective Uptake. From a methodological point of view, the paper illustrates how empirically informed philosophy of science may help address challenges for science communication.

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1016/j.shpsa.2019.05.006

Cites

74 of 74 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • The RM account can explain why confirmation bias is particularly strong in groups in which shared ideologies are at stake.

    “The account can also explain why confirmation bias is particularly strong in groups in which shared ideologies are at stake (Taber and Lodge 2006;Gerken 2019).”

    From What Is the Function of Confirmation Bias? (2022) · cites this paper as Gerken 2019

    The accepted manuscript (pp. 9–10) describes motivated cognition as favoring antecedent views and says identity-protective cognition may explain backfire effects in groups whose social identities are implicated. It does not establish that confirmation bias is generally *particularly strong* in such groups; on p. 19, it cautions against overestimating backfire effects. (LLM, conf=0.82)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • The PST generality constraint fits well with, and can supplement, other recent guidelines that aim to prevent ethical or epistemic harm from PST.

    “PST generality constraint also coheres well with, and can be added to, other recently defended guidelines for scientists and science reporters to avoid causing ethical and/or epistemic harm via PST (see, for example,Gerken [2018Gerken [ ], [2020]]).”

    From Science Communication and the Problematic Impact of Descriptive Norms (2023) · cites this paper as Gerken [2020]

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Popper, K.R., 1934 [2002], Logik der Forschung , Berlin: Akademie Verlag. English translation as The Logic of Scientific Discovery , London: Routledge.
  2. Shrader-Frechette, K. S. (2014). Tainted: How philosophy of science can expose bad science . Oxford University Press.

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Related

Authors
Gerken, M.
Affiliations
University of Southern Denmark (DK)
Corresponding author
Gerken, Mikkel
ORCID
Gerken, Mikkel
Venue
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2020-04
Volume
80
Pages
90-101
ISSN
0039-3681 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/j.shpsa.2019.05.006
OpenAlex
W2946687659
Cited by
28
References
74
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 3 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 16 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 1
FWCI
10.07
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • University of Southern Denmark Research Portal (University of Southern Denmark) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Climate Change Communication and Perception
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Keywords
science communication, scientific consensus, scientific justification, image of science, selective uptake, public trust in science, climate science, meteorology, scientific authority

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review