The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Causal deviance and the attribution of moral responsibility
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Citations
Cites
The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.
Haidt, J. (2001) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814 · Cited by 8,048
Implicit social cognition: Attitudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes
Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (1995) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.102.1.4 · Cited by 6,682
Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and controlled components
Devine, P. G. (1989) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.56.1.5 · Cited by 5,673
Integration of the cognitive and the psychodynamic unconscious
Epstein, S. (1994) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.49.8.709 · Cited by 2,883 · cited 5×
“…when arriving at judgments of moral responsibility (and perhaps when making moral judgments in other domains as well [Haidt, 2001; Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993; Shweder & Haidt, 1994]), a more deliberative mindset can ‘‘undo’’ the effects of moral intuitions (Epstein, 1994; Epstein et al., 1992).”
BackgroundInfluentialWilson, T. D., Lindsey, S., & Schooler, T. Y. (2000) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.107.1.101 · Cited by 2,112
Cited by
Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment
Greene, J. D., Morelli, S. A., Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2008) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2007.11.004 · Cited by 1,231
The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgment: Testing Three Principles of Harm
Cushman, F., Young, L., & Hauser, M. (2006) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01834.x · Cited by 1,013
Crime and punishment: Distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment
Cushman, F. (2008) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2008.03.006 · Cited by 990
Malle, B. F., Guglielmo, S., & Monroe, A. E. (2014) · Psychological Inquiry · doi:10.1080/1047840x.2014.877340 · Cited by 632
Justice and personality: Using integrative theories to derive moderators of justice effects
Colquitt, J. A., Scott, B. A., Judge, T. A., & Shaw, J. C. (2006) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2005.09.001 · Cited by 454
Metadata
- Authors
- Pizarro, D. A., Uhlmann, E., & Bloom, P.
- Venue
- Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2003-11
- Volume
- 39
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 653-660
- ISSN
- 0022-1031 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1967111801
- Cited by
- 175
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 0.97
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Causal deviance and the attribution of moral responsibility. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/s0022-1031(03)00041-6
- The paper
- Pizarro, D. A., Uhlmann, E., & Bloom, P. (2003). Causal deviance and the attribution of moral responsibility. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-1031(03)00041-6
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.