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Does Delaware law improve firm value?
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“While we kept both financial and nonfinancial firms in our data, running our regressions on a subset consisting only of nonfinancial firms [as done by Daines (2001)] yields similar results throughout.”
From What Matters in Corporate Governance? (2009) · cites this paper as Daines (2001)
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Metadata
- Authors
- Daines, R.
- Affiliations
- New York University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Daines, Robert
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2001-12
- Volume
- 62
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 525-558
- ISSN
- 0304-405X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3125217200
- Cited by
- 538
- References
- 77
- Citations by year
- 2026: 17 · 2025: 23 · 2024: 19 · 2023: 19 · 2022: 24 · 2021: 14 · 2020: 22 · 2019: 26 · 2018: 23 · 2017: 23 · 2016: 14 · 2015: 18 · 2014: 27 · 2013: 20 · 2012: 23
- FWCI
- 64.01
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Licence
- www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
- Locations
- Journal of Financial Economics (publishedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Corporate Governance and Law
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Financial Markets and Investment Strategies
- Keywords
- Delaware corporate law, firm value, state incorporation, Tobin's Q, mergers and acquisitions, takeover bids, corporate governance, public companies
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