Chapter 56 Rural Financial Markets in Developing Countries
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“and agricultural investment and consumption smoothing (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993; Conning and Udry, 2007; Giné and Yang, 2009).”
From The Effect of Rural Credit on Deforestation: Evidence from the Brazilian Amazon (2020) · cites this paper as Conning and Udry, 2007
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Townsend, R. M. (1979) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0 · Cited by 3,204 · cited 1×
“One approach has been to point to other constraints and trading frictions, for example problems of state verification (Townsend 1979), limited liability (Innes 1993) and/or contract renegotiation (Matthews 2001) place additional restrictions on the range 39 of feasible contracts and this might help…”
Morduch, J. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.4.1569 · Cited by 2,360
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Kandori, M. (1992) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297925 · Cited by 1,574
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Burgess, R., & Pande, R. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828054201242 · Cited by 1,480
Rosenzweig, M. R., & Wolpin, K. I. (1993) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261874 · Cited by 1,179
In Sickness and in Health: Risk Sharing within Households in Rural Ethiopia
Dercon, S., & Krishnan, P. (2000) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/316098 · Cited by 693 · cited 1×
“Duflo and Udry (2004), Goldstein (2004) and Dercon and Krishnan (2000) report furthermore that they can reject the hypothesis of efficient risk sharing even within the same households in rural Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Ethiopia, respectively.”
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The Effect of Rural Credit on Deforestation: Evidence from the Brazilian Amazon
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“While discussion of this was common in the South Asia literature in the 1970s/1980s, to our knowledge it has not been examined empirically in SSA.”
Metadata
- Venue
- Handbook of Agricultural Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier
- Published
- 2007
- Pages
- 2857-2908
- ISSN
- 1574-0072
- Cited by
- 133
- References
- 12
- Language
- en
- Licence
- www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
- www.elsevier.com/legal/tdmrep-license (tdm)
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