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Chapter 56 Rural Financial Markets in Developing Countries

· 2007 · Handbook of Agricultural Economics
Cited by 133

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Metadata

Venue
Handbook of Agricultural Economics
Publisher
Elsevier
Published
2007
Pages
2857-2908
ISSN
1574-0072
Cited by
133
References
12
Language
en
Licence
  • www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
  • www.elsevier.com/legal/tdmrep-license (tdm)

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