Donald Trump and the Lie
Open accessAbstract
The legitimacy of democratically elected governments rests in part on widespread acceptance of the outcome of elections, especially among those who lost. This “losers’ consent” allows the winners to govern, and when the incumbent is the losing party, it allows for a peaceful transition of power. What happens in a democratic system when one side not only refuses to concede but also actively perpetuates lies about the outcome? This article studies the evolution of public opinion about Donald Trump’s “big lie” using a rolling cross-sectional daily tracking survey, yielding 40 days of polls and more than 20,000 responses from US voters from October 27, 2020, through January 29, 2021. We find that the lie is pervasive and sticky: the number of Republicans and independents saying that they believe the election was fraudulent is substantial, and this proportion did not change appreciably over time or shift after important political developments. Belief in the lie may have buoyed some of Trump supporters’ self-esteem. In reaction to the lie and the threat it brought to the transition of power, there was a significant rise in support for violent political activism among Democrats, which only waned after efforts to overturn the election clearly failed. Even if these findings merely reflect partisan cheerleading, we nonetheless find significant and potentially long-term consequences of the lie. A conjoint experiment shows that Republican voters reward politicians who perpetuate the lie, giving Republican candidates an incentive to continue to do so in the next electoral cycle. These findings raise concerns about the fragility of American democracy.
AI snapshot
Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
This article uses a 40-day rolling cross-sectional survey of US voters to show that belief in Donald Trump’s “big lie” about the 2020 election was pervasive, sticky, and electorally consequential. It finds that the lie did not shift after major political events, was rewarded by Republican voters in a conjoint experiment, and coincided with rising Democratic support for radical anti-state action before waning after the transition of power.
Key findings
- Belief in the lie was widespread and stable: roughly one in four Americans did not believe the election result was legitimate or identify Biden as the winner, while Republican proportions hovered around 50%; only three out of four registered voters believed Biden legitimately won. Perceptions barely moved after the Electoral College vote, the Capitol insurrection, or Biden’s inauguration.
- Among voters who denied the outcome, 28.7% said they would believe Biden won if Republican leaders like Mitch McConnell said so, 31.0% if the Electoral College awarded him a majority, 42.9% if the Supreme Court decided so, and 45.2% if Trump conceded; about 33% named no event that would change their mind.
- A conjoint experiment found that Republican respondents favored a candidate who said Trump won by 5.7 percentage points over one who said Trump lost. Among Republicans who said the election was legitimate, a candidate admitting Trump lost was favored by 17.9 points; among those who said it was not legitimate, a candidate insisting Trump won was favored by 25.3 points.
- Support for radical and violent political action against the state rose among Democrats after the election, peaked before the Electoral College met on December 14, and waned after efforts to overturn the election failed, though it remained higher than the preelection baseline. Republicans showed net increases in self-esteem over the election period, and mean Trump identification among Republicans remained 3.62 out of 5 at the end.
Methods
- The Election Legitimacy Tracking Survey (ELTS) was an online rolling cross-sectional survey administered by Qualtrics to US citizens registered to vote from October 27, 2020, through January 29, 2021. It collected 500 new respondents daily from October 27 to November 20, then samples on Tuesdays and Fridays, yielding 20,000 responses over 40 daily samples.
- Daily poststratification weights were calculated using entropy balancing on gender, age, race, partisanship, education, and region. The questionnaire measured election legitimacy perceptions, hypothetical events that might change beliefs, the Radicalism Intention Scale, Rosenberg self-esteem, Trump identification, and support for democratic norms.
- A paired conjoint experiment beginning January 12 asked Republican and Independent respondents to choose between two hypothetical Republican congressional primary candidates across three pairs, with randomly assigned attributes including profession, age, ethnicity, gender, and position on the big lie. Analysis used descriptive time trends, linear probability models, and average marginal component effects from the conjoint with standard errors clustered at the respondent level.
Limitations
- The paper states that the conjoint design was “a bit heavy-handed” because the candidate’s stance on the election was the only policy stance, possibly priming respondents, and that it could have included a third option where a candidate declines to say who won. It also notes that results may reflect “expressive responding” rather than sincere belief, and that the sample skews younger and more educated than the registered-voter population, with Black voters slightly overrepresented, though weighted and findings are not sensitive to weighting.
- The paper states that low political interest could explain the lack of updating, though the authors favor motivated reasoning, selective exposure, and expressive responding as explanations.
- Evident from the text: the design is observational and cannot establish causal effects of the lie or political events on beliefs, violence support, or self-esteem; it relies on self-reported attitudes and does not directly measure private beliefs.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
0 of 93 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged
- Findingown data
Republicans were much more likely to say that they believed the lie that Donald Trump won the election.
“First, and least surprisingly, we corroborate other research teams and news reports in finding that Republicans were much more likely to say that they believed the lie that Donald Trump won the election.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Americans' perceptions of the election outcome were largely fixed by mid-November.
“Americans' perceptions of the election outcome were largely fixed by mid-November.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Nine days after Joe Biden was sworn in as president, roughly 25% of unaffiliated voters did not view the election as legitimate.
“Nine days after Joe Biden was sworn in as president, roughly 25% of unaffiliated voters did not view the election as legitimate.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Voters who are older, less educated, and categorize themselves as having lower social status are less likely to perceive the Biden win as legitimate.
“Voters who are older, less educated, and categorize themselves as having lower social status are less likely to perceive the Biden win as legitimate.”
- Also stated in: § Who Is Most Likely to Believe the Big Lie? · plain
“We observe that voters who are older, less educated, and categorize themselves as having lower social status are less likely to perceive the Biden win as legitimate.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § Who Is Most Likely to Believe the Big Lie? · plain
- Findingnone given
Even the most salient events like Biden's inauguration did not increase acceptance of the outcome.
“But even the most salient events like Biden's inauguration did not increase acceptance of the outcome.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
- Findingown data
Our data show a sharp partisan divergence in perceptions of the election.
“Consistent with contemporaneous survey research (Bright Line Watch, 2020;Drutman, 2021;Pennycook and Rand, 2021), our data show a sharp partisan divergence in perceptions of the election.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
A conjoint experiment shows that Republican voters will reward politicians who perpetuate the lie.
“Fifth, a conjoint experiment shows that Republican voters will reward politicians who perpetuate the lie, giving Republican candidates an incentive to do so.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
In the one-month period from November 16 to December 15, we surveyed 1,558 Republican voters, 941 (60.4%) of whom refused to identify Biden as the election winner.
“In the one-month period from November 16 to December 15, we surveyed 1,558 Republican voters, 941 (60.4%) of whom refused to identify Biden as the election winner.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Of the voters who denied the outcome, 28.7% said they would believe Biden won if Republican leaders like Mitch McConnell were to say that Biden had won more votes.
“Of the voters who denied the outcome, 28.7% said they would believe Biden won if Republican leaders like Mitch McConnell were to say that Biden had won more votes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
As these events unfolded, we did not observe equivalent increases in acceptance of the outcome.
“Nonetheless, as these events unfolded, we did not observe equivalent increases in acceptance of the outcome.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
About 42.9% would believe Biden won if there were a Supreme Court decision to that effect.
“About 31.0%would believe Biden won if the Electoral College were to award him a majority of votes, and 42.9% would believe Biden won if there were a Supreme Court decision to that effect.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
This proportion rose to close to 100% after the election results were called by most media outlets on November 7.
“This proportion rose to close to 100% after the election results were called by most media outlets on November 7.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
About 31.0% would believe Biden won if the Electoral College were to award him a majority of votes.
“About 31.0%would believe Biden won if the Electoral College were to award him a majority of votes, and 42.9% would believe Biden won if there were a Supreme Court decision to that effect.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
About 33% of respondents who did not view the Biden win as legitimate did not identify any event that would make them think he actually won.
“About 33% of respondents who did not view the Biden win as legitimate did not identify any event that would make them think he actually won.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
About 45.2% of people who identified Trump as the winner would believe Biden won if Trump were to concede.
“About 45.2% of people who identified Trump as the winner would believe Biden won if Trump were to concede.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The data indicate a general reluctance to shift perceptions of the outcome, even with new political developments.
“The data indicate a general reluctance to shift perceptions of the outcome, even with new political developments.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Half of Republican voters consistently said they did not view Biden as the legitimate winner.
“Likewise, half of Republican voters consistently said they did not view Biden as the legitimate winner.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
These proportions stayed relatively fixed over the three months following the election.
“These proportions stayed relatively fixed over the three months following the election.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The actual proportion continued to hover around 40%.
“The actual proportion continued to hover around 40%, which suggests a certain stickiness to the lie.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Only three out of four registered American voters believe Joe Biden legitimately won the election.
“Only three out of four registered American voters believe Joe Biden legitimately won the election.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingreasoning
This Democratic support peaked just before the Electoral College met on December 14.
“This Democratic support peaked just before the Electoral College met on December 14, perhaps in response to Trump's public efforts to pressure local officials and legislators to dismiss votes from key states.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
This mindset changed substantially after the election result was secured by the Electoral College vote, the events of January 6, and Democrats regained control of the White House and the Senate.
“As table 2 shows, this mindset changed substantially after the election result was secured by the Electoral College vote, the events of January 6, and Democrats regained control of the White House and the Senate; yet support for violence among Democrats remained significantly higher than preelection levels even after Biden was inaugurated.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
For voters who accepted that Trump lost, identification with Trump went down by 0.566 points after the race was called relative to the preelection baseline.
“For voters who accepted that he lost, identification went down after the race was called relative to the preelection baseline (-0.566 points).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
There was a strong upward trend in the self-esteem score among Republicans in the weeks following the Capitol insurrection and Biden's inauguration.
“There is a strong upward trend in the self-esteem score among Republicans”
- Also stated in: § Psychological Motivations for Believing the Big Lie · plain
“in the weeks following the Capitol insurrection and Biden's inauguration.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § Psychological Motivations for Believing the Big Lie · plain
- Findingown data
There is an asymmetry in the conjoint data after subsetting by Republican voters who believe the election is legitimate and those who do not.
“Further, we find an asymmetry in the data after subsetting the analysis by Republican voters who believe the election is legitimate (figure 7; panel 2) and those who do not (panel 3).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
For Republican voters who say the election is not legitimate, a candidate who insists Trump won is favored by about 25.3 percentage points.
“For those who say the election is not legitimate, a candidate who insists Trump won is favored by about 25.3 percentage points.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Among Republicans as a group, self-esteem increased sizably over the course of the election.
“Curiously, we observe sizable increases in self-esteem among Republicans as a group over the course of the election, as shown in the bottom panel of figure 7.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Among Republicans over the course of the election, identification with Trump decreased by 0.17 points on a 5-point scale, about one-fifth of a standard deviation.
“We see some degree of deidentification with Trump among Republicans over the course of the election, but the effect size is relatively modest, only -0.17 points on a 5-point scale (about onefifth of a standard deviation).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
For Republican voters who say the election is legitimate, a candidate who admits Trump lost is favored by about 17.9 percentage points.
“For those who say the election is legitimate, a candidate who admits Trump lost is favored by about 17.9 percentage points.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The relationships that emerge are the same for Democrats, Republicans, and unaffiliated voters.
“The relationships that emerge are the same for Democrats, Republicans, and unaffiliated voters.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
From the data it appears that more than half of Republican voters are choosing the second path, accepting the big lie and denying the election loss.
“From the data it appears that more than half of Republican voters are choosing that second path”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Joe Biden legitimately won the 2020 presidential election.
- Findingown data
Support for violence among Democrats remained significantly higher than preelection levels even after Biden was inaugurated.
“As table 2 shows, this mindset changed substantially after the election result was secured by the Electoral College vote, the events of January 6, and Democrats regained control of the White House and the Senate; yet support for violence among Democrats remained significantly higher than preelection levels even after Biden was inaugurated.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Voters who are younger, male, more educated, and of higher social status are more likely to say that radical action and violence are justified to defend one's group.
“We observe that voters who are younger, male, more educated, and of higher social status are more likely to say that radical action and violence are justified to defend one's group.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
For Republican respondents in the conjoint experiment, all else equal, a candidate who said Trump won is favored by 5.7 percentage points relative to a candidate who said Trump lost.
“For Republican respondents in the experiment, all else equal, a candidate who said Trump won is favored by 5.7 percentage points relative to a candidate who said Trump lost.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
By the end of the election, the mean level of the Trump identification index among Republican voters remained 3.62 out of 5.
“But by the end of the election, the mean level of the index among Republican voters remained 3.62 out of 5.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Independent voters are also much more likely to accept the election outcome.
“Independent voters are also much more likely to accept the election outcome.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingnone given
For Republican voters who deny that Biden won the election, identification with Trump increased by 0.155 points after the election was called.
“Indeed, for Republican voters who deny that Biden won the election, identification with Trump actually increased (0.155 points) after the election was called.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The willingness of incumbent politicians to accept defeat is a crucial test for democratic stability.
“Consequently, the willingness of incumbent politicians to accept defeat is a crucial test for democratic stability.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
In authoritarian systems, citizens are obligated to live "within the lie" and behave "as if" they believe obvious falsehoods propagated by their governments.
“In these systems, citizens are obligated to live “within the lie” and behave “as if” they believe obvious falsehoods propagated by their governments (Havel 2018;Wedeen 2015).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Havel 2018
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- cites Wedeen 2015
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- Premisecitation
The legitimacy of democratically elected governments rests in part on widespread acceptance of the outcome of elections, especially among those who lost.
“The legitimacy of democratically elected governments rests in part on widespread acceptance of the outcome of elections, especially among those who lost.”
- Also stated in: § B · plain
“The legitimacy of democratically elected governments rests in part on widespread acceptance of the outcome of elections, especially among those who lost (Anderson et al. 2005).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Anderson et al. 2005
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- Also stated in: § B · plain
- Premisecitation
Lies about politics are more likely to spread than the truth.
“Social media allow “fake news” to spread rapidly through partisan networks and “echo chambers” (Del Vicario et al. 2016;Guess and Lyons 2020), and lies about politics are more likely to spread than the truth (Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral 2018).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral 2018
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- Premisecitation
In countries with weak commitments to democracy, incumbents commonly make dubious charges of fraud when they do not win.
“In countries with weak commitments to democracy, incumbents commonly make dubious charges of fraud when they do not win (Schedler 2001), and their supporters often believe them (Cantu and Garcıa-Ponce 2015).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Schedler 2001
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- Premisecitation
The presence of robust political competition and a free press works to limit the ability of politicians to manipulate public opinion.
“On the one hand, the presence of robust political competition and a free press works to limit the ability of politicians to manipulate public opinion (Chong and Druckman 2007;Zaller 1992).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Chong and Druckman 2007
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- cites Zaller 1992
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- Premisecitation
In countries with weak commitments to democracy, supporters often believe incumbents' dubious charges of fraud.
“In countries with weak commitments to democracy, incumbents commonly make dubious charges of fraud when they do not win (Schedler 2001), and their supporters often believe them (Cantu and Garcıa-Ponce 2015).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Cantu and Garcıa-Ponce 2015
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- Premisecitation
In authoritarian systems, it is difficult to discern who really believes what.
“Many come to internalize regime narratives, and it is difficult to discern who really believes what (Kuran 1991;Shen and Truex 2021).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Kuran 1991
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- cites Shen and Truex 2021
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- Premisecitation
As partisan polarization transmogrifies into partisan sectarianism in the United States, it provides fertile ground for lies pedaled by politicians to take root and go unchecked by their partisans.
“On the other hand, as partisan polarization transmogrifies into partisan sectarianism in the United States, it provides fertile ground for lies pedaled by politicians to take root and go unchecked by their partisans (Finkel et al. 2020;Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013;Van Bavel and Pereira 2018).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Finkel et al. 2020
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- cites Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013
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- cites Van Bavel and Pereira 2018
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- Premisecitation
Many people in authoritarian systems come to internalize regime narratives.
“Many come to internalize regime narratives, and it is difficult to discern who really believes what (Kuran 1991;Shen and Truex 2021).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Kuran 1991
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- cites Shen and Truex 2021
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- Premisecitation
Dictators create an atmosphere in which they are continually portrayed as powerful, infallible, and the only viable option.
“Dictators create an atmosphere in which they are continually portrayed as powerful, infallible, and the only viable option (Huang 2015;Magaloni 2006;Wedeen 2015).”
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- cites Magaloni 2006
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- cites Wedeen 2015
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- Premisecitation
In authoritarian systems, lies, along with propaganda and political indoctrination, demonstrate the dominance of the regime.
“In authoritarian systems, lies, along with propaganda and political indoctrination, demonstrate the dominance of the regime (Havel 2018;Huang 2015;Magaloni 2006;Wedeen 2015).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Havel 2018
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- cites Huang 2015
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- cites Magaloni 2006
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- Premisecitation
Political systems built on lies and domination may foster preference falsification and inflate the observed public support for the regime as a result.
“Political systems built on lies and domination may foster preference falsification-a disconnect between what people say they believe and what they privately believeand inflate the observed public support for the regime as a result (Kuran 1991;Shen and Truex 2021).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Kuran 1991
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- cites Shen and Truex 2021
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- Interpretationcitation
Believing the lie helped "cut off reflected failure" for some Trump supporters.
“Third, Republican voters largely continued to link their identity to Trump as the loss became apparent and displayed net increases in self-esteem, suggesting that believing the lie helped “cut off reflected failure” (Hirt et al. 1992; see also Boen et al. 2002).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Hirt et al. 1992
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- cites Boen et al. 2002
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- Interpretationreasoning
Big lies told by elites can engender millions of smaller lies at the individual level, as citizens are forced to present themselves a certain way out of fear.
“Big lies told by elites can thus engender millions of smaller lies at the individual level, as citizens are forced to present themselves a certain way out of fear.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
A key feature of democratic backsliding transitions is that they were enabled by other elites and supported by partisans willing to trade off democracy for ideological aims.
“A key feature of those transitions is that they were enabled by other elites and supported by partisans willing to trade off democracy for ideological aims (Carey et al. 2019;2020;Gandhi 2019;Graham and Svolik, 2020;Svolik 2019).”
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- cites Graham and Svolik, 2020
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- Premisecitation
Lies are more likely to spread "farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than truth."
“Consequently, lies are more likely to spread “farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than truth” (Vosoughi, Roy, andAral 2018, 1147).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Vosoughi, Roy, andAral 2018
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- Premisecitation
Exposure to regime messaging does not necessarily increase support of the regime.
“As Huang (2015) shows, exposure to this sort of messaging does not necessarily increase support of the regime, but it does dissuade dissent and send a strong signal that the government can maintain order.”
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- Premisecitation
People are more likely to believe and spread lies and rumors that paint outgroups as dangerous.
“Moreover, people are especially susceptible to accept misinformation that highlights threats (Blaine and Boyer 2017) and are more likely to believe and spread lies and rumors that paint outgroups as dangerous (Horowitz 2001).”
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- Interpretationown data
Republican candidates have an incentive to continue to perpetuate the lie in the next electoral cycle.
“Fifth, a conjoint experiment shows that Republican voters will reward politicians who perpetuate the lie, giving Republican candidates an incentive to do so.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
There is a certain stickiness to the lie.
“The actual proportion continued to hover around 40%, which suggests a certain stickiness to the lie.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
People are especially susceptible to accept misinformation that highlights threats.
“Moreover, people are especially susceptible to accept misinformation that highlights threats (Blaine and Boyer 2017) and are more likely to believe and spread lies and rumors that paint outgroups as dangerous (Horowitz 2001).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Blaine and Boyer 2017
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- Interpretationown data
These findings offer additional support for the position that culture alone cannot sustain democratic norms.
“These findings offer additional support for the position that culture alone cannot sustain democratic norms (Dahl 1989;Przeworski 2005).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Dahl 1989
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- cites Przeworski 2005
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- Premisecitation
People can readily accept mistruths when they are consistent with their preferences.
“Research on disinformation shows us that people can readily accept mistruths when they are consistent with their preferences (Douglas, Sutton, and Cichocka 2017;Duran, Nicholson, and Dale 2017;Kim and Kim 2019;Murphy et al. 2019;Nyhan and Reifler 2010;Van Prooijen and Jostmann 2013).”
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- cites Duran, Nicholson, and Dale 2017
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- Premisecitation
In settings of authoritarian lies, although people publicly acquiesce to a lie, no one really knows who believes what.
“In such settings, a central feature of political life is that, although people publicly acquiesce to a lie, no one really knows who believes what (Havel 2018;Wedeen 2015).”
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- Interpretationcitation
By repeating the big lie about a stolen election, Donald Trump undermined the legitimacy of Biden's presidency among a substantial portion of Americans.
“These findings are consistent with preelection research showing that exposure to Trump's rigged election rhetoric lowered Republicans' confidence in the election (Clayton et al. 2021) and support the notion that, by repeating the big lie about a stolen election, Donald Trump undermined the legitimacy of Biden's presidency among a substantial portion of Americans”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Clayton et al. 2021
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- Study design and conductnone given
Our key substantive findings are not sensitive to the weighting decision.
“Our key substantive findings are not sensitive to this weighting decision.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
Partisans are willing to spread congenial misinformation to disparage opposing partisans.
“Whether partisans believe congenial misinformation, they are willing to spread it to disparage opposing partisans (Osmundsen et al. 2021).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Osmundsen et al. 2021
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- Interpretationown data
Voters who bought into Trump's stolen election narrative do not appear to readily update their perceptions of events.
“Voters who bought into Trump's stolen election narrative do not appear to readily update their perceptions of events.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Study design and conductcitation
The data quality and representativeness of Qualtrics samples have been independently verified by scholars to be in line with probability samples like the General Social Survey and the American National Election Studies.
“Importantly, the data quality and representativeness of Qualtrics samples have been independently verified by scholars to be in line with probability samples like the General Social Survey and the American National Election Studies (Boas, Christenson, and Glick, 2020).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Boas, Christenson, and Glick, 2020
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- Interpretationcitation
The big lie opened up two alternative paths to self-concept preservation among Republicans, given the identity threat posed by the election loss.
“Our interpretation of these patterns is that the big lie opened up two alternative paths to self-concept preservation among Republicans, given the identity threat posed by the election loss (Nyhan and Reifler 2019).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Nyhan and Reifler 2019
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- Rests on an assumption: Joe Biden legitimately won the 2020 presidential election.
- Premisecitation
Partisan ties in American politics operate through identity-based mechanisms similar to those in other social identities.
“Partisan ties in American politics operate through similar identity-based mechanisms (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002;Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012;Lyons et al. 2021)”
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- cites Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012
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- cites Lyons et al. 2021
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- Interpretationown data
The results from the conjoint experiment illustrate that whether Republicans really believe that the election was not stolen from Trump, many will reward Republican candidates who claim that it was.
“The results from the conjoint experiment illustrate that whether Republicans really believe that the election was not stolen from Trump, many will reward Republican candidates who claim that it was.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Joe Biden legitimately won the 2020 presidential election.
- Interpretationreasoning
The big lie around the 2020 election has allowed Trump to dominate other Republican elites, in a fashion not dissimilar from how leaders in authoritarian systems force their citizens to perpetuate lies.
“The big lie around the 2020 election has allowed Trump to dominate other Republican elites, in a fashion not dissimilar from how leaders in authoritarian systems force their citizens to perpetuate lies (Wedeen 2015).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Wedeen 2015
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- Rests on an assumption: Joe Biden legitimately won the 2020 presidential election.
- Interpretationcitation
Likely aided by increasingly sectarian partisan polarization and psychological needs to maintain a positive self-image, a sizable portion of Trump's electoral base behaved as if they believed clear falsehoods.
“Likely aided by the increasingly sectarian nature of partisan polarization (Finkel et al. 2020), as well as psychological needs to maintain a positive self-image, a sizable portion of his electoral base behaved as if they believed clear falsehoods.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Finkel et al. 2020
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- Rests on an assumption: Joe Biden legitimately won the 2020 presidential election.
- Premisecitation
The 2020 election may have caused many Republicans to justify using violence to prevent Joe Biden from being elected.
“Partisan political violence is tightly woven into US history from the American Revolution through the Civil War and Jim Crow eras (Kalmoe 2020), and the 2020 election may have caused many Republicans to justify using violence to prevent Joe Biden from being elected (Bright Line Watch 2020;Mason and Kalmoe 2021;Pennycook and Rand 2021).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Bright Line Watch 2020
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Mason and Kalmoe 2021
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Pennycook and Rand 2021
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Even if every survey respondent who said the election was stolen knew Biden was the legitimate winner, the claim still has the power to create the impression that 'this is what people believe.'
“Even if every single survey respondent who said that the election was stolen from Donald Trump knew that Joe Biden was the legitimate winner of the election, it still has the power to create the impression that”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Joe Biden legitimately won the 2020 presidential election.
- Premisecitation
People dissociate themselves with perceived losers to manage their own identities and self-concepts.
“People dissociate themselves with perceived losers to manage their own identities and self-concepts (Boen et al. 2002;Hirt et al. 1992).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Boen et al. 2002
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Hirt et al. 1992
Not checked in the free run.
- Study design and conductcitation
Because the conjoint attributes were randomly assigned, the average marginal component effect (AMCE) of the attribute on selection for political office can be recovered using a simple linear regression, clustering standard errors at the respondent level.
“Because these attributes were randomly assigned, we can recover the average marginal component effect (AMCE) of the attribute on selection for political office using a simple linear regression, clustering the standard errors at the respondent level (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Voters could de-identify with Trump, rendering him less central to their identities, as a way of cutting off his reflected failure.
“Voters could de-identify with Trump,”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
As polarization increases in the United States, so does acceptance of political violence.
“As polarization increases in the United States, so does acceptance of political violence (Kalmoe and Mason 2021).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Kalmoe and Mason 2021
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Trump's perpetuation of the lie, coupled with his attempts to overturn the election result, may have pushed Democratic voters into a more radical mindset.
“Trump's perpetuation of the lie, coupled with his attempts to overturn the election result, may have pushed Democratic voters into a more radical mindset.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Under the two-turnover test definition, the United States was a consolidated democracy before the 2020 election.
“Under this definition, the United States was a consolidated democracy before the 2020 election.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Moehler and Lindberg 2009
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Democracy often dies with the consent of the people it empowers.
“Democracy often dies with the consent of the people it empowers (Moehler and Lindberg 2009).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Moehler and Lindberg 2009
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
The handful of Republican leaders who have pushed forcefully against the lie have been punished, such as Liz Cheney who was stripped of her leadership position in the Republican Party.
“The handful of Republican leaders who have pushed forcefully against the lie have been punished, such as Liz Cheney who was stripped of her leadership position in the Republican Party (Sotomayor and Alemany 2021).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Sotomayor and Alemany 2021
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
The dynamics surrounding the big lie give Republican lawmakers pressure to cater to antidemocratic forces within the party.
“and the dynamics surrounding the big lie give Republican lawmakers pressure to cater to antidemocratic forces within the party.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Joe Biden legitimately won the 2020 presidential election.
- Premisecitation
Executive takeovers and other forms of democratic breakdown are often enabled and abetted by opportunistic elites.
“Finally, we know that executive takeovers and other forms of democratic breakdown are often enabled and abetted by opportunistic elites (Gandhi 2019;Graham and Svolik 2020;Svolik 2019)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Gandhi 2019
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Graham and Svolik 2020
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- cites Svolik 2019
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- Interpretationcitation
If voters do not hold their own party's politicians accountable or egg them on to undo democratic processes to achieve partisan ends, it threatens the stability of the American democratic system.
“If voters do not hold their own party's politicians accountable or, worse, egg them on to undo democratic processes to achieve partisan ends (Carey et al. 2020;Svolik 2019), it threatens the stability of the American democratic system.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Carey et al. 2020
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Svolik 2019
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisereasoning
In past contested presidential elections, once the winner of the election was resolved, the losing candidate(s) conceded.
“Yet in each of those instances, once the winner of the election was resolved, the losing candidate(s) conceded.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
- May combine two claims. 35
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 18
May combine two claims.
Findingnone givenThis willingness abated after Trump's attempts to overturn the election failed, but support for radical political action remained higher among all voters than the preelection baseline.
“This willingness abated after Trump's attempts to overturn the election failed, but support for radical political action remained higher among all voters than the preelection baseline.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataEven though many respondents said they would update their opinion in the direction of the truth if particular events happened, belief in the lie did not shift at the aggregate level when these events occurred.
“Second, even though many respondents said they would update their opinion in the direction of the truth if particular events happened (e.g., Biden is inaugurated), belief in the lie did not shift at the aggregate level when these events occurred.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataRepublican voters increasingly identified Biden as the winner as the results came in, but this proportion plateaued at around 40% and remained relatively stable thereafter.
“Republican voters increasingly identified Biden as the winner as the results came in, but this proportion plateaued at around 40% and remained relatively stable thereafter.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
FindingcitationRepublican voters largely continued to link their identity to Trump as the loss became apparent and displayed net increases in self-esteem.
“Third, Republican voters largely continued to link their identity to Trump as the loss became apparent and displayed net increases in self-esteem, suggesting that believing the lie helped “cut off reflected failure” (Hirt et al. 1992; see also Boen et al. 2002).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataShortly after the initial election results came in on the evening of November 3, most Democrats identified Joe Biden as the winner and perceived the outcome as legitimate.
“Shortly after the initial election results came in on the evening of November 3, most Democrats identified Joe Biden as the winner and perceived the outcome as legitimate.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataFor Republicans, the proportions saying they do not believe the election result was legitimate or identify Biden as the winner hover around 50%.
“For Republicans, these proportions hover around 50%.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Findingnone givenAs President Trump's attempts to overturn the election became more aggressive in early December, more Democrats expressed a willingness to engage in radical violent action aimed at the state.
“Fourth, as President Trump's attempts to overturn the election became more aggressive in early December, more Democrats expressed a willingness to engage in radical violent action aimed at the state.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingnone givenFewer voters in the aftermath of the 2020 election saw the outcome as legitimate compared to the 2000 election, even though Joe Biden defeated Donald Trump by a comfortable margin in both the Electoral College and the popular vote.
“In contrast, fewer voters in the aftermath of the 2020 election saw the outcome as legitimate, even though Joe Biden defeated Donald Trump by a comfortable margin in both the Electoral College and the popular vote.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataVoters who identify as independent or members of other parties increasingly accepted the legitimacy of a Biden win as the results came in from different states, but again, this proportion plateaued.
“Voters who identify as independent or members of other parties increasingly accepted the legitimacy of a Biden win as the results came in from different states, but again, this proportion plateaued.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataRoughly one in four Americans say that they do not believe the election result was legitimate or identify Joe Biden as the winner.
“Roughly one in four Americans say that they do not believe the election result was legitimate or identify Joe Biden as the winner.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Findingnone givenWhen it was unclear whether attempts to overturn the results of the election would work, many of those who did not support Trump expressed support for radical violence aimed at attacking the state apparatus.
“In turn, when it was unclear whether attempts to overturn the results of the election would work, many of those who did not support Trump expressed support for radical violence aimed at attacking the state apparatus.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataIdentification with Trump dropped by 0.28 points just after the Capitol insurrection and then rebounded shortly thereafter.
“This obscures some important temporal variation, including the noticeable drop in identification (-0.28 points) with Trump just after the Capitol insurrection and then a rebound in identification with him shortly thereafter.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
FindingcitationThe 5.7 percentage point effect is in line with and smaller than a similar conjoint experiment independently implemented by Bright Light Watch (2021) a week after ours was completed as well as one conducted by Noble and Carlson (N.d.) a year after the election.
“This effect is in line with and is smaller than a similar conjoint experiment independently implemented by Bright Light Watch (2021) a week after ours was completed as well as one conducted by Noble and Carlson (N.d.) a year after the election.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Bright Light Watch (2021)
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Noble and Carlson (N.d.)
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataOur study systematically documents that roughly one-fourth of the country and half of the Republican Party rank and file say that they buy into the idea that the election was stolen from President Trump.
“Our study systematically documents a new feature of American political life: roughly one-fourth of the country and half of the Republican Party rank and file say that they buy into the idea that the election was stolen from President Trump.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Joe Biden legitimately won the 2020 presidential election.
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataWe observe higher levels of support for radical action among partisans and a noticeable increase in support for radical action against the state among Democrats in the immediate aftermath of the election.
“We observe higher levels of support for radical action among partisans and a noticeable increase in support for radical action against the state among Democrats in the immediate aftermath of the election.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThese relationships hold for both Republican and Independent voters, although they are more pronounced among Republican respondents.
“These relationships hold for both Republican and Independent voters, although they are more pronounced among Republican respondents.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe two measures have a phi coefficient of .663, indicating a positive association of moderate strength.
“The two measures have a phi coefficient of .663,indicating a positive association of moderate strength.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationSocial media allow "fake news" to spread rapidly through partisan networks and "echo chambers."
“Social media allow “fake news” to spread rapidly through partisan networks and “echo chambers” (Del Vicario et al. 2016;Guess and Lyons 2020), and lies about politics are more likely to spread than the truth (Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral 2018).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Del Vicario et al. 2016
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Guess and Lyons 2020
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationA cornerstone assumption in American free speech jurisprudence is that in a "marketplace of ideas," truth wins out over falsehood.
“A cornerstone assumption in American free speech jurisprudence is that in a “marketplace of ideas,” truth wins out over falsehood (Brazeal 2011).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Brazeal 2011
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationSuch claims are uncommon in consolidated democracies, making Donald Trump's blatant lies all the more noteworthy and abnormal.
“Such claims are uncommon in consolidated democracies, making Donald Trump's blatant lies all the more noteworthy and abnormal (Anderson et al. 2005).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Anderson et al. 2005
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningEven established democracies are fragile, and the strategic decisions made by elites have potentially dire consequences.
“Even established democracies are fragile, and the strategic decisions made by elites have potentially dire consequences.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningBased on this estimate, as well as the data from the hypothetical scenarios shown in table 1, we would have expected about 585 of those voters to have come around by Inauguration Day, yielding an overall acceptance rate of the Biden win among Republican voters at around 76%.
“Based on this estimate, as well as the data from the hypothetical scenarios shown in table 1, we would have expected about 585 of those voters to have come around by Inauguration Day, yielding an overall acceptance rate of the Biden win among Republican voters at around 76%.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningThese findings raise concerns about the fragility of American democracy.
“These findings raise concerns about the fragility of American democracy.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductown dataBlack voters are slightly overrepresented in the sample.
“Black voters are slightly overrepresented.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationExposure to regime messaging dissuades dissent and sends a strong signal that the government can maintain order.
“As Huang (2015) shows, exposure to this sort of messaging does not necessarily increase support of the regime, but it does dissuade dissent and send a strong signal that the government can maintain order.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Huang 2015
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationMany democracies are experiencing an increase in polarization and the loosening of the universal commitment to democratic norms.
“Many democracies are experiencing an increase in polarization and the loosening of the universal commitment to democratic norms (Przeworski 2019), stimulating studies of the conditions that foster “democratic backsliding” (Bermeo 2016;Carey et al. 2019;Gandhi 2019;Graham and Svolik 2020;Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018;Svolik 2019;Waldner and Lust 2018).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Przeworski 2019
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningWe observe many of these dynamics in the contemporary Republican Party, both at the elite and mass levels, and show how a big lie can be used strategically by a charismatic leader to capture a party and push it in an authoritarian direction.
“We observe many of these dynamics in the contemporary Republican Party, both at the elite and mass levels, and show how a big lie can be used strategically by a charismatic leader to capture a party and push it in an authoritarian direction.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Study design and conductown dataThe sample matches the population of registered voters with respect to turnout, gender, and partisanship, but it skews younger and more educated than the population.
“The sample matches the population of registered voters with respect to turnout, gender, and partisanship, but it skews younger and more educated than the population.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningGiven that the RIS taps a willingness to engage in state-targeted violent action, it makes sense that younger men would be more likely to contemplate such behavior.
“Given that the RIS taps a willingness to engage in state-targeted violent action, it makes sense that younger men would be more likely to contemplate such behavior.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationPeople are behaving 'as if' they believe and choosing to 'live within the lie.'
“To borrow from the authoritarian politics literature, people are behaving”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Havel 2018
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Wedeen 2015
Not checked in the free run.
- Rests on an assumption: Joe Biden legitimately won the 2020 presidential election.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Study design and conductcitationThe Radicalism Intention Scale (RIS) assesses a respondent's readiness to participate in violent or illegal political action against the legal authorities to achieve their political goals.
“The ELTS core questionnaire included the Radicalism Intention Scale (RIS), which assesses a respondent's readiness to participate in violent or illegal political action against the legal authorities to achieve their political goals (Moskalenko and McCauley 2009).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Moskalenko and McCauley 2009
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Study design and conductreasoningThe conjoint experiment's design is heavy-handed because the text about the candidate's stance on the election is the only policy stance, which may prime respondents to think about that dimension more than they otherwise would.
“First, the design is a bit heavy-handed in that the text about the candidate's stance on the election is the only policy stance.It stands out from the demographic and professional attributes on the survey and perhaps primes respondents to think about that dimension more than they otherwise would.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationVoters could accept the big lie and deny the election loss altogether, rejecting the failure and preserving their self-concept.
“Alternatively, they could accept the big lie and simply deny the election loss altogether, rejecting the failure and preserving their self-concept (Boen et al. 2002;Hirt et al. 1992;Lyons et al. 2021).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Boen et al. 2002
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Hirt et al. 1992
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Lyons et al. 2021
Not checked in the free run.
- Rests on an assumption: Joe Biden legitimately won the 2020 presidential election.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataAcross the 40 days of our study, acceptance of the big lie was pervasive, sticky, and consequential.
“Across the 40 days of our study, acceptance of this big lie was pervasive, sticky, and consequential.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Joe Biden legitimately won the 2020 presidential election.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThese findings show how the big lie could be a polarizing issue among Republican voters and how potential candidates must navigate substantial uncertainty, because they might not know the distribution of the two types in their districts.
“These findings show how the big lie could be a polarizing issue among Republican voters and how potential candidates must navigate substantial uncertainty, because they might not know the distribution of the two types in their districts (Broockman and Skovron 2018).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Broockman and Skovron 2018
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductnone givenThe conjoint experiment did not include a third option whereby the candidate declines to say who won the election at all.
“Second, our conjoint experiment could have included a third option, whereby the candidate declines to say who won the election at all.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationPartisan political violence is tightly woven into US history from the American Revolution through the Civil War and Jim Crow eras.
“Partisan political violence is tightly woven into US history from the American Revolution through the Civil War and Jim Crow eras (Kalmoe 2020), and the 2020 election may have caused many Republicans to justify using violence to prevent Joe Biden from being elected (Bright Line Watch 2020;Mason and Kalmoe 2021;Pennycook and Rand 2021).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Kalmoe 2020
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationAfter observing their team win, fans have higher levels of self-esteem and enhanced performance on certain cognitive tasks.
“In a related set of experiments, Hirt et al. (1992) show that, after observing their team win, fans have higher levels of self-esteem and enhanced performance on certain cognitive tasks.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Hirt et al. (1992)
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PremisecitationMany Republican lawmakers at the federal and state levels have embraced the big lie, while most stay silent about what they believe.
“Many Republican lawmakers at the federal and state levels have embraced the big lie (Rutenberg, Corasaniti, and Feuer, 2021), while most stay silent about what they believe (”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Rutenberg, Corasaniti, and Feuer, 2021
Not checked in the free run.
- cites "Where Republicans in Congress" 2020
Not checked in the free run.
- Rests on an assumption: Joe Biden legitimately won the 2020 presidential election.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationcitationAvoiding the issue of the big lie is a form of self-censorship.
“This is a form of self-censorship (Shen and Truex 2021).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Shen and Truex 2021
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisereasoningThe RIS is related to, but distinct from, measures of partisan violence.
“The RIS is related to, but distinct from, measures of partisan violence, such as Kalmoe and Mason's (2021) measure.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Kalmoe and Mason's (2021)
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationDisputes over election legitimacy in consolidating democracies sometimes lead partisans of the losing side to attempt to overthrow the government through violent means.
“Disputes over election legitimacy in consolidating democracies sometimes lead partisans of the losing side to attempt to overthrow the government through violent means (Przeworski 1991;2005), and we included the RIS on the survey because it focuses on one's willingness to target state agents.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Przeworski 1991;2005
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May combine two claims.
PremisecitationIn the Three (Football) Field Study, students had a greater tendency to wear their school's apparel after a football team victory than a defeat and were more likely to use the word 'we' when describing a win than a loss.
“In the”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Cialdini et al. (1976)
Not checked in the free run.
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InterpretationreasoningAs a result, it is difficult for Republican leaders to take a stand against the big lie and requires them to at least pretend that the foundation of American democracy-its electoral apparatus-is corrupt and broken.
“As a result, it makes it difficult for Republican leaders to take a stand against the big lie and requires them to at least pretend that the foundation of American democracy-its electoral apparatus-is corrupt and broken.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Joe Biden legitimately won the 2020 presidential election.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Study design and conductcitationThe ELTS questionnaire included the 10-question battery for the Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem Scale.
“The ELTS questionnaire included the 10-question battery for the Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem Scale.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Rosenberg (1965)
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductnone givenTo ensure some balance in the data, quotas on gender and partisanship were instituted in the collection process.
“To ensure some balance in the data, we instituted quotas on gender and partisanship in the collection process.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationIf claims of fraud become a regular feature of American elections in the future, they could stoke violence and undermine support for the democratic system.
“Fourth, if claims of fraud become a regular feature of American elections in the future, they could stoke violence and undermine support for the democratic system (Albertson and Guiler 2020;Kingzette et al. 2021).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Albertson and Guiler 2020
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Kingzette et al. 2021
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationThere is no widespread agreement on when a democratic system becomes 'consolidated.'
“Although there is no widespread agreement on when a democratic system becomes”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Schedler 2001
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Study design and conductcitationThe Trump identification index was adapted from Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe's (2015) measure of expressive partisan identity and was constructed by taking the mean agreement score on a 5-point scale on two questions.
“This index was adapted from Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe's (2015) measure of expressive partisan identity and was constructed by taking the mean agreement score on a 5-point scale on two questions:”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe's (2015)
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
PremisecitationThe 'two-turnover test' presumes democracy to be established after two uncontroversial alternations in power among political parties.
“The”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Moehler and Lindberg 2009
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationThe big lie provides a rationale for limiting voting rights and for enacting 'reforms' that would make it easier to jettison ballots, in turn accelerating democratic backsliding in states controlled by Republican leaders who either believe or feel pressure to behave as if they believe the big lie.
“Second, it provides a rationale for limiting voting rights and for enacting”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Grumbach 2021
Not checked in the free run.
- Rests on an assumption: Joe Biden legitimately won the 2020 presidential election.
The paper relies on this without support.
Joe Biden legitimately won the 2020 presidential election.
“Candidates who bucked the lie stated that they would have voted to certify the election for Joe Biden”
“the big lie”
The paper relies on this without support.
Authoritarian regimes typically feature a charismatic leader who creates blatant falsehoods to justify his hold on power and requires everyone to behave as if those lies are true.
“This echoes a dynamic typically observed in authoritarian regimes, in which a charismatic leader creates blatant falsehoods to justify his hold on power and requires everyone to behave as if those lies are true.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Donald Trump did not step aside and pledge support to his opponent once the results were no longer in doubt to any reasonable observer.
“Donald Trump eschewed the long democratic tradition of stepping aside and pledging support to his opponent once the results were no longer in doubt to any reasonable observer.”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Trump supporters reward politicians who perpetuated misinformation about election fraud.
“Such supporters also reward politicians who perpetuated misinformation about election fraud (Arceneaux & Truex, 2023).”
From How to study democratic backsliding (2024) · cites this paper as Arceneaux & Truex, 2023
If MS effects using essay primes are only effective in these samples under those conditions, the explanatory power of this method may be more limited than is often presented.
“Although this slice of the population can disproportionately inflict harm when faced with perceived threat [112–115], if MS effects using essay primes are only effective in these samples under those conditions, the explanatory power of this method may be more limited than is often presented.”
From Not so terrifying after all? A set of failed replications of the mortality salience effects of Terror Management Theory (2023) · cites this paper as [115]
The cited paper’s sections on violent political action and its conjoint experiment do not discuss mortality-salience (MS) essay primes or the explanatory limits of that method. I searched for mortality salience, essay primes, and perceived threat. In the printed sentence, the citation also precedes the quoted claim rather than following it. (LLM, conf=0.76)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Capitol insurrection is dated January 6 and January 7
MinorThe figure notes date the Capitol insurrection January 7, whereas the text refers to the same events as occurring on January 6.
“C = Capitol insurrection, Jan. 7”
“the events of January 6”
Self-esteem results are attributed to the conjoint figure
MinorThe text directs readers to the bottom panel of figure 7 for self-esteem, but figure 7 is captioned as the conjoint experiment. The self-esteem figure is captioned figure 6.
“we observe sizable increases in self-esteem among Republicans as a group over the course of the election, as shown in the bottom panel of figure 7.”
“Figure: Figure 7 Results of Conjoint Experiment”
Six weighting characteristics are called five
MinorThe weighting scheme lists six characteristics, but the next sentence calls them five.
“included information on gender, age, race, partisanship, education, and region (Hainmueller 2012).”
“This process resulted in weighted daily samples that all had the same composition of these five core demographic characteristics”
Cites
The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale
Zigmond, A. S., & Snaith, R. P. (1983) · Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica · doi:10.1111/j.1600-0447.1983.tb09716.x · Cited by 47,139 · cited 1× · see citing works
“…question batteries to measure support for political violence (Moskalenko and McCauley, 2009); the need for chaos (Petersen, Osmundsen and Arceneaux, 2018); anxiety and depression (Zigmond and Snaith, 1983); self-esteem (Schmitt and Allik, 2005); and support for democratic norms (Inglehart, 2003).”
The spread of true and false news online
Vosoughi, S., Roy, D., & Aral, S. (2018) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.aap9559 · Cited by 8,847 · see citing works
The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion
Zaller, J. R. (1992) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511818691 · Cited by 7,785 · see citing works
Hainmueller, J. (2012) · Political Analysis · doi:10.1093/pan/mpr025 · Cited by 6,026 · see citing works
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Przeworski, A. (1991) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139172493 · Cited by 3,494 · see citing works
When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of Political Misperceptions
Nyhan, B., & Reifler, J. (2010) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-010-9112-2 · Cited by 3,173 · see citing works
Iyengar, S., Sood, G., & Lelkes, Y. (2012) · Public Opinion Quarterly · doi:10.1093/poq/nfs038 · Cited by 2,748 · see citing works
The spreading of misinformation online
Del Vicario, M., Bessi, A., Zollo, F., Petroni, F., Scala, A., Caldarelli, G., Stanley, H. E., & Quattrociocchi, W. (2016) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1517441113 · Cited by 2,407 · see citing works
Basking in reflected glory: Three (football) field studies.
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Bermeo, N. (2016) · Journal of Democracy · doi:10.1353/jod.2016.0012 · Cited by 2,331 · see citing works
Hainmueller, J., Hopkins, D. J., & Yamamoto, T. (2014) · Political Analysis · doi:10.1093/pan/mpt024 · Cited by 1,990 · cited 3× · see citing works
“Because these attributes were randomly assigned, we can recover the average marginal component effect (AMCE) of the attribute on selection for political office using a simple linear regression, clustering the standard errors at the respondent level (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 2014).”
Schmitt, D. P., & Allik, J. (2005) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.89.4.623 · Cited by 1,665 · see citing works
Magaloni, B. (2006) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510274 · Cited by 1,572 · see citing works
How Elite Partisan Polarization Affects Public Opinion Formation
DRUCKMAN, J. N., PETERSON, E., & SLOTHUUS, R. (2013) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055412000500 · Cited by 1,569 · see citing works
Now out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989
Kuran, T. (1991) · World Politics · doi:10.2307/2010422 · Cited by 1,435 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Many come to internalize those lies, though some do not, and it is difficult to discern who really believes what (Kuran, 1991; Shen and Truex, 2020).”
Expressive Partisanship: Campaign Involvement, Political Emotion, and Partisan Identity
HUDDY, L., MASON, L., & AARØE, L. (2015) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055414000604 · Cited by 1,415 · see citing works
Validating vignette and conjoint survey experiments against real-world behavior
Hainmueller, J., Hangartner, D., & Yamamoto, T. (2015) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1416587112 · Cited by 1,344 · cited 2× · see citing works
“Starting in January 2021, we began including a simple paired conjoint design in the survey (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 2014; Hainmueller, Hangartner and Yamamoto, 2015; Teele, Kalla and Rosenbluth, 2018), presenting Republican voters with hypothetical primary candidates for an upcoming…”
The Psychology of Conspiracy Theories
Douglas, K. M., Sutton, R. M., & Cichocka, A. (2017) · Current Directions in Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0963721417718261 · Cited by 1,316 · see citing works
Status threat, not economic hardship, explains the 2016 presidential vote
Mutz, D. C. (2018) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1718155115 · Cited by 1,236 · see citing works
Framing Public Opinion in Competitive Democracies
Chong, D., & Druckman, J. N. (2007) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055407070554 · Cited by 1,127 · cited 1× · see citing works
“On the one hand, the presence of robust political competition and a free press often works to limit the ability of politicians to manipulate public opinion (Chong and Druckman, 2007; Zaller, 1992).”
Conspiracy theories: Causes and cures
Sunstein, C. R., & Vermeule, A. (2009) · Journal of Political Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9760.2008.00325.x · Cited by 1,050 · see citing works
GRAHAM, M. H., & SVOLIK, M. W. (2020) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055420000052 · Cited by 1,044 · see citing works
Horowitz, D. L. (2001) · University of California Press eBooks · doi:10.1525/9780520342057 · Cited by 937 · see citing works
Political Sectarianism in America
Finkel, E. J., Bail, C. A., Cikara, M., Ditto, P. H., Iyengar, S., Klar, S., Mason, L., McGrath, M. C., Nyhan, B., Rand, D. G., et al. (2020) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.abe1715 · Cited by 931 · cited 1× · see citing works
“On the other, as partisan polarization transmogrifies into partisan sectarianism in the United States, it provides fertile ground for lies pedaled by politicians to take root and go unchecked by their partisans (Finkel et al., 2020; Druckman, Peterson and Slothuus, 2013; Van Bavel and Pereira, 2018).”
Unwelcome Change: Coming to Terms with Democratic Backsliding
Waldner, D., & Lust, E. (2018) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-050517-114628 · Cited by 889 · see citing works
Outcome Bias in Decision Evaluation
Baron, J., & Hershey, J. C. (1988) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.54.4.569 · Cited by 873 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Voters are sometimes willing to indulge a form of outcome bias in which they judge the integrity of an election based on whether their party’s candidate won or lost (Baron and Hershey, 1988; Cant´u and Garc´ıa-Ponce, 2015).”
Anderson, C. J., Blais, A., Bowler, S., Donovan, T., & Listhaug, O. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0199276382.001.0001 · Cited by 825 · see citing works
The Partisan Brain: An Identity-Based Model of Political Belief
Van Bavel, J. J., & Pereira, A. (2018) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2018.01.004 · Cited by 743 · cited 1× · see citing works
“On the other, as partisan polarization transmogrifies into partisan sectarianism in the United States, it provides fertile ground for lies pedaled by politicians to take root and go unchecked by their partisans (Finkel et al., 2020; Druckman, Peterson and Slothuus, 2013; Van Bavel and Pereira, 2018).”
OSMUNDSEN, M., BOR, A., VAHLSTRUP, P. B., BECHMANN, A., & PETERSEN, M. B. (2021) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055421000290 · Cited by 614 · see citing works
Przeworski, A. (2019) · doi:10.1017/9781108671019 · Cited by 599 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Many democracies are experiencing an increase in polarization and the loosening of universal commitment to democratic norms (Przeworski, 2019).”
Boas, T. C., Christenson, D. P., & Glick, D. M. (2020) · Political Science Research and Methods · doi:10.1017/psrm.2018.28 · Cited by 570 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Importantly, the data quality and representativeness of Qualtrics samples have been independently verified by scholars to be in line with probability samples like the General Social Survey and the American National Election Studies (Boas, Christenson and Glick, 2020).”
Svolik, M. W. (2019) · Journal of Democracy · doi:10.1353/jod.2019.0039 · Cited by 565 · see citing works
Bias in Perceptions of Public Opinion among Political Elites
Broockman, D., & Skovron, C. (2018) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055418000011 · Cited by 505 · see citing works
Measuring Political Mobilization: The Distinction Between Activism and Radicalism
Moskalenko, S., & McCauley, C. R. (2009) · Terrorism and Political Violence · doi:10.1080/09546550902765508 · Cited by 500 · cited 4× · see citing works
“The remainder of the survey included several standard question batteries to measure support for political violence (Moskalenko and McCauley, 2009); the need for chaos (Petersen, Osmundsen and Arceneaux, 2018); anxiety and depression (Zigmond and Snaith, 1983); self-esteem (Schmitt and Allik, 2005);…”
InfluentialHirt, E. R., Zillmann, D., Erickson, G. A., & Kennedy, C. J. (1992) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.63.5.724 · Cited by 433 · see citing works
Huang, H. (2015) · Comparative Politics · doi:10.5129/001041515816103220 · Cited by 423 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Dictators create an atmosphere in which their regime is continually portrayed as powerful, infallible, and the only viable option (Huang, 2015).”
How Solid is Mass Support for Democracy—And How Can We Measure It?
Inglehart, R. (2003) · PS Political Science & Politics · doi:10.1017/s1049096503001689 · Cited by 410 · cited 1× · see citing works
“…question batteries to measure support for political violence (Moskalenko and McCauley, 2009); the need for chaos (Petersen, Osmundsen and Arceneaux, 2018); anxiety and depression (Zigmond and Snaith, 1983); self-esteem (Schmitt and Allik, 2005); and support for democratic norms (Inglehart, 2003).”
Belief in conspiracy theories: The influence of uncertainty and perceived morality
van Prooijen, J., & Jostmann, N. B. (2013) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.1922 · Cited by 403 · see citing works
How affective polarization undermines support for democratic norms
Kingzette, J., Druckman, J. N., Klar, S., Krupnikov, Y., Levendusky, M., & Ryan, J. B. (2021) · Public Opinion Quarterly · doi:10.1093/poq/nfab029 · Cited by 401 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Fourth, if claims of fraud become a regular feature of American elections in the future, they could stoke violence and undermine support for the democratic system (Albertson and Guiler 2020; Kingzette et al. 2021).”
BackgroundPrzeworski, A. (2005) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-005-7163-4 · Cited by 393 · cited 4× · see citing works
“Third, in line with evidence from less consolidated democracies (Przeworski, 1991, 2005), we find circumstantial evidence that perpetuating the lie that the election was stolen increased many Americans’ expressed willingness to engage in violent activism aimed at attacking the state.”
InfluentialThe Ties That Double Bind: Social Roles and Women's Underrepresentation in Politics
Teele, D. L., Kalla, J., & Rosenbluth, F. M. (2018) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055418000217 · Cited by 382 · see citing works
Wedeen, L. (2015) · University of Chicago Press eBooks · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226345536.001.0001 · Cited by 324 · see citing works
Misinformation, Disinformation, and Online Propaganda
Guess, A. M., & Lyons, B. A. (2020) · Social Media and Democracy · doi:10.1017/9781108890960.003 · Cited by 284 · see citing works
Are Americans Confident Their Ballots Are Counted?
Alvarez, R. M., Hall, T. E., & Llewellyn, M. H. (2008) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381608080730 · Cited by 233 · see citing works
The roles of information deficits and identity threat in the prevalence of misperceptions
Nyhan, B. J., & Reifler, J. (2018) · Journal of Elections Public Opinion and Parties · doi:10.1080/17457289.2018.1465061 · Cited by 230 · see citing works
Elite rhetoric can undermine democratic norms
Clayton, K., Davis, N. T., Nyhan, B., Porter, E., Ryan, T. J., & Wood, T. J. (2021) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2024125118 · Cited by 226 · see citing works
Measuring Democratic Consolidation
Schedler, A. (2001) · Studies in Comparative International Development · doi:10.1007/bf02687585 · Cited by 208 · see citing works
Misinformation or Expressive Responding?
Schaffner, B. F., & Luks, S. (2017) · Public Opinion Quarterly · doi:10.1093/poq/nfx042 · Cited by 188 · see citing works
Searching for Bright Lines in the Trump Presidency
Carey, J. M., Helmke, G., Nyhan, B., Sanders, M., & Stokes, S. (2019) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s153759271900001x · Cited by 159 · see citing works
Narrowing the Legitimacy Gap: Turnovers as a Cause of Democratic Consolidation
Moehler, D. C., & Lindberg, S. I. (2009) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381609990120 · Cited by 138 · cited 1× · see citing works
“The “two-turnover-test” holds that democracy is more or less established after two uncontro-versial alternations in power among political parties (Moehler and Lindberg, 2009).”
Carey, J., Clayton, K., Helmke, G., Nyhan, B., Sanders, M. S., & Stokes, S. (2019) · Journal of Elections, Public Opinion, and Parties · doi:10.1080/17457289.2020.1790577 · Cited by 135 · see citing works
False Memories for Fake News During Ireland’s Abortion Referendum
Murphy, G., Loftus, E. F., Grady, R. H., Levine, L. J., & Greene, C. M. (2019) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797619864887 · Cited by 134 · see citing works
Partisanship and confidence in the vote count: Evidence from U.S. national elections since 2000
Sances, M., & Stewart, C. H., III (2015) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2015.08.004 · Cited by 128 · cited 3× · see citing works
“Politicians and voters alike do not like to be on the losing side (Anderson et al., 2005; Sances and Stewart, 2015).”
Pennycook, G., & Rand, D. G. (2021) · Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review · doi:10.37016/mr-2020-51 · Cited by 124 · see citing works
Conspiracy theories, election rigging, and support for democratic norms
Albertson, B. L., & Guiler, K. (2020) · Research & Politics · doi:10.1177/2053168020959859 · Cited by 108 · see citing works
Support for radical parties in Western Europe: Structural conflicts and political dynamics
Kriesi, H., & Schulte-Cloos, J. (2020) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2020.102138 · Cited by 103 · see citing works
Partisan losers' effects: Perceptions of electoral integrity in Mexico
Cantú, F., & García‐Ponce, O. (2015) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2015.03.004 · Cited by 100 · see citing works
“It’s Largely a Rigged System”: Voter Confidence and the Winner Effect in 2016
Sinclair, B., Smith, S. S., & Tucker, P. (2018) · Political Research Quarterly · doi:10.1177/1065912918768006 · Cited by 96 · see citing works
Abou‐Chadi, T., & Hix, S. (2021) · British Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1111/1468-4446.12834 · Cited by 96 · see citing works
Blaine, T., & Boyer, P. (2017) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2017.10.001 · Cited by 95 · see citing works
The “Need for Chaos” and Motivations to Share Hostile Political RumorsPreprint
Petersen, M. B., Osmundsen, M., & Arceneaux, K. (2018) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/6m4ts · Cited by 79 · see citing works
Self-citationShen, X., & Truex, R. (2020) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123419000735 · Cited by 79 · see citing works
Self-citationIdentifying the Effect of Political Rumor Diffusion Using Variations in Survey Timing
Kim, J. W., & Kim, E. (2019) · Quarterly Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1561/100.00017138 · Cited by 52 · see citing works
The Institutional Roots of Democratic Backsliding
Gandhi, J. (2018) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/700653 · Cited by 49 · see citing works
Politics and Basking-in-Reflected-Glory: A Field Study in Flanders
Boen, F., Vanbeselaere, N., Pandelaere, M., et al. (2002) · Basic and Applied Social Psychology · doi:10.1207/s15324834basp2403_3 · Cited by 43 · see citing works
Havel, V. (2018) · East European Politics and Societies and Cultures · doi:10.1177/0888325418766625 · Cited by 30 · cited 2× · see citing works
“To borrow from the authoritarian politics literature, people are behaving “as-if” they believe and choosing to “live within the lie” (Havel, 2018; Wedeen, 2015).”
Duran, N. D., Nicholson, S. P., & Dale, R. A. C. (2017) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2017.07.008 · Cited by 26 · see citing works
Kalmoe, N. P. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108870504 · Cited by 18 · see citing works
Self-Affirmation and Identity-Driven Political Behavior
Lyons, B. A., Farhart, C. E., Hall, M. P., Kotcher, J., Levendusky, M., Miller, J. M., Nyhan, B., Raimi, K., Reifler, J., Saunders, K. L., et al. (2021) · Journal of Experimental Political Science · doi:10.1017/xps.2020.46 · Cited by 17 · see citing works
How Much Does a Belief Cost?: Revisiting the Marketplace of IdeasPreprint
Brazeal, G. (2012) · SSRN Electronic Journal · Cited by 8 · see citing works
Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters
(2003) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.40-5486
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The psychological and political correlates of conspiracy theory beliefs
Uscinski, J. E., Enders, A., Diekman, A., Funchion, J., Klofstad, C. A., Kübler, S., Murthi, M., Premaratne, K., Seelig, M. I., Verdear, D., et al. (2022) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-022-25617-0 · Cited by 86 · see citing works
How to study democratic backsliding
Druckman, J. N. (2024) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12942 · Cited by 56 · see citing works
Negative Downstream Effects of Alarmist Disinformation Discourse: Evidence from the United States
Jungherr, A. M., & Rauchfleisch, A. (2024) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-024-09911-3 · Cited by 53 · see citing works
“Furthermore, the 2020 U.S. election, for example, has demonstrated that a sizable segment of the population claims to believe the election was stolen from incumbent candidate Donald Trump (Arceneaux & Truex, 2022 ).”
Expressive Responding and Belief in 2020 Election Fraud
Graham, M. H., & Yair, O. (2023) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-023-09875-w · Cited by 31 · see citing works
Online engagement with 2020 election misinformation and turnout in the 2021 Georgia runoff election
Green, J., Hobbs, W., McCabe, S., & Lazer, D. M. J. (2022) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2115900119 · Cited by 42 · see citing works
Shah, S. B., Thapa, S., Acharya, A., Rauniyar, K., Poudel, S., Jain, S., Masood, A., & Naseem, U. (2024) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2024.3406644 · Cited by 41 · see citing works
“Notably, in the 2020 US presidential elections, multiple campaigns were organized to spread disinformation about candidates [117].”
Mauk, M., & Grömping, M. (2023) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/00104140231193008 · Cited by 36 · see citing works
“Disinformation disseminated by agenda-setting elites – including for instance presidents – is particularly sticky and has substantial impact on citizens ’ evaluation of electoral conduct (Arceneaux and Truex, 2022).”
BackgroundEnders, A. M., Klofstad, C., Stoler, J. B., & Uscinski, J. E. (2022) · American Politics Research · doi:10.1177/1532673x221139434 · Cited by 33 · see citing works
“…triad, conspiracy theory, QAnon, COVID-19 Despite widespread corrective efforts, many Americans continue to believe conspiracy theories and misinformation (CTM) related to COVID-19, QAnon, and the 2020 U.S. election (e.g., Arceneaux & Truex, 2022; Bierwiaczonek et al., 2022; Enders et al., 2021c).”
BackgroundMethodEndorsements from Republican politicians can increase confidence in U.S. elections
Clayton, K., & Willer, R. (2023) · Research & Politics · doi:10.1177/20531680221148967 · Cited by 27 · see citing works
“Moreover, we do not measure outcomes that speak directly to reelection, which may motivate Republicans more than party favorability ratings (e.g., Arceneaux and Truex, 2022).”
BackgroundTreger, S., Benau, E. M., & Timko, C. A. (2023) · PLOS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0285267 · Cited by 25 · see citing works
Liars know they are lying: differentiating disinformation from disagreement
Lewandowsky, S., Ecker, U. K. H., Cook, J., van der Linden, S., Roozenbeek, J., Орескес, Н., & McIntyre, L. (2024) · Humanities and Social Sciences Communications · doi:10.1057/s41599-024-03503-6 · Cited by 32 · see citing works
“The entrenchment of the big lie erodes the core of American democracy and puts pressure on Republican politicians to cater to antidemocratic forces (Arceneaux and Truex, 2022; Jacobson, 2021, 2023).”
Both‐Sideology Endangers Democracy and Social Science
Jost, J. T. (2024) · Journal of Social Issues · doi:10.1111/josi.12633 · Cited by 19 · see citing works
Null Effects of Pro-Democracy Speeches by U.S. Republicans in the Aftermath of January 6th
Wuttke, A., Sichart, F., & Foos, F. (2023) · Journal of Experimental Political Science · doi:10.1017/xps.2023.17 · Cited by 22 · see citing works
Hall, M. E. K., & Druckman, J. N. (2023) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2311005120 · Cited by 14 · see citing works
Understanding the impact of misinformation on adolescents
Ma, I., Sultan, M., Kozyreva, A., & van den Bos, W. (2025) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-025-02338-8 · Cited by 15 · see citing works
“For example, political elites undermined the threat of COVID-19 and the efficacy of interventions 26,27 .”
Jacobson, G. C. (2024) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009495387 · Cited by 10 · see citing works
Citizens as a democratic safeguard? The sequence of sanctioning elite attacks on democracy
Jacob, M. S. (2024) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12847 · Cited by 11 · see citing works
Can Elite Allegations of Election Fraud Demobilize Supporters?
Fraga, B. L., Peskowitz, Z., & Szewczyk, J. (2024) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-024-09952-8 · Cited by 10 · see citing works
“Using 40 large-sample polls from Oct. 2020 to Jan. 2021, Arceneaux and Truex (2022) document dramatic decreases in the proportion or Republicans who accept the 2020 election results as legitimate between election day and its aftermath.”
Problematizing Modern Democracy in the United States:
Simon, J. (2023) · Politische Vierteljahresschrift · doi:10.1007/s11615-023-00486-y · Cited by 11 · see citing works
Levendusky, M. S., Patterson, S., Margolis, M. F., et al. (2024) · Public Opinion Quarterly · doi:10.1093/poq/nfae047 · Cited by 9 · see citing works
Conspiracy Theories and their Believers
Stockemer, D., & Bordeleau, J.-N. (2025) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009570794 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
The Power of Trump’s Big Lie: Identity Fusion, Internalizing Misinformation, and Support for Trump
Moniz, P., & Swann, W. B. (2025) · PS Political Science & Politics · doi:10.1017/s1049096524001203 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
Rush, T., Jones, C., Herndon, M. K., & Barreto, M. A. (2025) · The Journal of Race Ethnicity and Politics · doi:10.1017/rep.2025.9 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
“Some scholars attribute the crisis of diminishing trust in elections to elite cues and the role of Donald Trump as the messenger (Arceneaux and Truex 2023; Berlinski et al. 2023; Clayton et al. 2021; Pennycook and Rand 2021).”
Nteta, T., Rhodes, J. H., Wall, G., Dixon-Gordon, K., Raja, R. J. L., Lickel, B., Mah, A., Macwilliams, M., Markowitz, E., Reid, A. E., et al. (2023) · Political research quarterly · doi:10.1177/10659129231151413 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
How rational inference about authority debunking can curtail, sustain, or spread belief polarization
Radkani, S., Landau-Wells, M., & Saxe, R. R. (2024) · PNAS Nexus · doi:10.1093/pnasnexus/pgae393 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Liars Know They Are Lying: Differentiating Disinformation from DisagreementPreprint
Lewandowsky, S., Ecker, U. K. H., Cook, J., et al. (2024) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/q7vbr · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Election Denial as a News Coverage Dilemma: A Survey Experiment with Local Journalists
Peterson, E., McGregor, S. C., & Block, R. (2025) · Political Communication · doi:10.1080/10584609.2025.2456524 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
“Despite important studies of expert perceptions of democracy (Carey et al., 2019), the public’s commitment to democratic norms (Arceneaux & Truex, 2023; Daniller & Mutz, 2019) statements from politicians promoting voter fraud conspiracies (Clayton et al., 2021; Lyons & Workman, 2022), evidence on…”
Gross, J., Baltz, S., & Stewart, C. H., III (2022) · Election Law Journal Rules Politics and Policy · doi:10.1089/elj.2022.0058 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
The Racial Gap in Trust in Elections (and How to Close It)
Uribe, L., Aldridge, K., Kousser, T. B., Nichols-Smith, K., & Rush, T. (2025) · Political Research Quarterly · doi:10.1177/10659129251363201 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
The Political (A)Symmetry of Metacognitive Insight Into Detecting MisinformationPreprint
Geers, M., Fischer, H., Lewandowsky, S., et al. (2023) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/5mc8s · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Support for liberal democracy in times of crisis: Evidence from the COVID-19 pandemic
Arceneaux, K., Bakker, B. N., HOBOLT, S. B., & Vries, C. E. D. (2025) · European Journal of Political Research · doi:10.1017/s1475676525100145 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
“Yet , recent experiences of democratic backsliding due to intense partisan politicization in the US context (Arceneaux and Truex 2023; Carey et al. 2019; Dickson and Hobolt 2024; Druckman et al. 2020; Kalmoe and Mason 2022), may lead us to expect more malleability of liberal democratic views along…”
Self-citationGori, L., Sacco, P. L., Teti, E., & Triveri, F. (2023) · International Journal of Business Communication · doi:10.1177/23294884231156903 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
“This includes the unwillingness to concede the presidential race against Joe Biden (Arcenaux & Truex, 2022), and the alleged attempt to rebel against the electoral outcome, as cul-minated in the January 6, 2021 Capitol Hill incident (Taylor, 2021).”
BackgroundToward a DuBoisian theorization of school curricula
Cadena, R. S. (2023) · Sociology Compass · doi:10.1111/soc4.13135 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Illiberal attitudes among US state legislative candidates
Barber, M. J., Hassell, H. J. G., & Miller, M. G. (2024) · Humanities and Social Sciences Communications · doi:10.1057/s41599-024-03529-w · Cited by 2 · see citing works
“In this vein, a growing body of research has described illiberal attitudes and behaviors among the mass public (e.g. Arceneaux and Truex 2023; Berlinski et al. 2023; Broockman et al. 2023; Cassese 2021; Chong et al. 2022; Graham and Svolik, 2020; Kalmoe and Mason 2022; Kingzette et al. 2021;…”
U.S. Democratic Backsliding and the Decline of Democratic Support Abroad
Cavari, A., Magen, A., & Yoel, B. (2024) · International Journal of Public Opinion Research · doi:10.1093/ijpor/edae026 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Understanding the Impact of Military Service on Support for Insurrection in the United States
Pape, R. A., Ruby, K., Larson, K. D., & Nakamura, K. (2024) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/00220027241267216 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
“…of non-Whites and the spread of “ liberal ” values are threats to society (Jardina and Mickey 2022), and the belief that the government is corrupt and evil and actively subverting American democracy, a central tenet of the QAnon conspiracy theory (Arceneaux and Truex 2022; Enders et al. 2022).”
Garry, J., & O’Leary, B. (2024) · Political Studies · doi:10.1177/00323217241266045 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
“Donald Trump’s refusal to accept that he had lost the 2020 Presidential election and the storming of the Capitol by a mob of Trump supporters (Arceneaux and Truex, 2023), dramatically highlighted the importance of ‘losers’ consent’ in the peaceful transition of executive power within a democracy.”
Does Hard Propaganda (Also) Work in Democracies? Evidence from the United States
Lutscher, P. M., & Donnay, K. (2025) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s153759272400272x · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Stockemer, D., & Bordeleau, J.-N. (2025) · Social Science Quarterly · doi:10.1111/ssqu.70042 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Analyse du rôle de la mésinformation lors de l'élection provinciale québécoise de 2022
Lavigne, M., Blanchard, M., Imouza, A., Bridgman, A., Staller, C., Namahoro, K., Noel, E., Perron, C., de Saint-rome, P., & Owen, T. (2023) · doi:10.66536/quebec-election-misinfo_2023 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
AuBuchon, K. E., Stock, M. L., Raibley, E., Carter‐Sowell, A. R., & Poppen, P. J. (2025) · Journal of Applied Social Psychology · doi:10.1111/jasp.13092 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Is Democracy Broken? Disinformation Wants You to Think That It Is
Cirone, A. E. (2025) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009602570.012 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Bordeleau, J. (2025) · Policy Studies · doi:10.1080/01442872.2025.2540427 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Lana-Blond, R., & García-Saiz, M. (2025) · The Spanish Journal of Psychology · doi:10.1017/sjp.2025.10010 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
“Actual political propaganda, “ real ” FN, claims, and social media accounts or posts have also been used as stimuli when analyzing the effects of disin-formation (Arceneaux & Truex, 2023; Bali et al., 2020; Chipidza et al., 2022; Dourado & Salgado, 2021; Overgaard & Collier, 2023).”
Савин, Н. Ю., & Treisman, D. S. (2025) · Presidential Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/psq.70016 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
“Some scholars focus on the extent to which lies and inconsistencies in Trump's speeches are persuasive, exploring whether his controversial statements sway listeners (Arceneaux and Truex 2023; Evers et al. 2019).”
McKee, S. C., Hood, M. V., & Pittman, B. (2025) · American Politics Research · doi:10.1177/1532673x251409647 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
“…upset victory in 2016, but his messaging (Borah et al., 2025; Enders et al., 2021) has been embraced by a large contingent of fervent supporters (Arceneaux & Truex, 2023; Berlinski et al., 2023; Bowler & Donovan, 2024; Enders et al., 2021; Jacobson, 2023; Levendusky et al., 2024; Moniz & Swann,…”
Trends and Harms of Election Denialism: The United States and Australia
Hill, L. (2026) · Representation · doi:10.1080/00344893.2026.2647840 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Criminal Prosecution of Political Leaders: Narrative Analysis of Modern Power Elite Crimes
Kirilenko, V. P., & Алексеев, Г. В. (2023) · Russian Journal of Criminology · doi:10.17150/2500-4255.2023.17(6).523-535 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Perceived Democraticness of Parties From Citizens’ Perspectives: Evidence From Canada
Chan, K. M., & Stephenson, L. B. (2025) · Political Studies · doi:10.1177/00323217251324025 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
“…has adopted this perspective to explain why partisans hold divergent assessments on the quality of their domestic democracy (Carey et al., 2019; Flavin and Shufeldt, 2024), the legitimacy of an election (Arceneaux and Truex, 2023) and politicians’ undemocratic behaviour (Krishnarajan, 2022).”
InfluentialPodmiotowość polityczna w erze depolityzacji
Turska–Kawa, A. (2025) · doi:10.31261/pn.4276 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Bowler, S., & Donovan, T. (2025) · American Politics Research · doi:10.1177/1532673x251352552 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
“Current discussion of con fi dence in US elections validly emphasizes the important role played by Donald Trump and his supporters in spreading claims that the 2020 election was ‘ stolen ’ (e.g., Arceneaux & Truex, 2023; Berlinski et al., 2023).”
Gomez, D. M., & Jenkins, M. D. (2025) · Journal of Elections Public Opinion and Parties · doi:10.1080/17457289.2025.2514203 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
“The United States specifically has been plagued by strong messaging from former leaders undercutting the belief that the democratic process is functioning normally (Arceneaux and Truex 2023; Berlinski et al. 2021).”
Donald Trump in US Show Saturday Night Live (1988-2022)
Arkhangelskaya, I. (2022) · Theoretical and Practical Issues of Journalism · doi:10.17150/2308-6203.2022.11(3).545-563 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Why Partisans Feel Hated: Distinct Static and Dynamic Relationships with Animosity Meta-PerceptionsPreprint
Lees, J. M., Cikara, M., & Druckman, J. N. (2023) · doi:10.31219/osf.io/k2fes
Partisan differences in perceived levels of democracy across presidential administrations
Cheng, G. D., Does, S., & Shih, M. J. (2024) · Humanities and Social Sciences Communications · doi:10.1057/s41599-024-03451-1 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
“As such, these Trump supporters will not feel that democratic principles are violated after the Capitol attack, and instead be disappointed in the democratic system when Congress con fi rms Biden ’ s victory after the attack (Arceneaux and Truex, 2022).”
The Public Consequences of Presidential Legitimacy Rhetoric
Wise, S. (2025) · Social Science Quarterly · doi:10.1111/ssqu.13490
Fahey, J. J. (2025) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/736803
Political Disinformation: “Fake News,” Bots, and Deep Fakes
Jungherr, A. M. (2026) · Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Communication · doi:10.1093/9780197851395.003.1516
Stockemer, D., & Bordeleau, J. (2025) · Social Science Quarterly · doi:10.1111/ssqu.70050
Lu, Y. (2025) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-025-10073-z
“…role of political partisanship, showing that Republicans are more likely than Democrats to believe the narratives that the election is manipulated (Arceneaux and Truex 2023 ; Benkler et al. 2020 ; Blanchar and Norris 2021; Clayton et al. 2021; Drutman 2021; Enders et al. 2021; Graham and Yair…”
InfluentialKallestrup, J., & Michelini, M. (2025) · Episteme · doi:10.1017/epi.2025.10081
Wager, E. (2025) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/739293
Good Sports or Sore Losers: Sports Fans and Perceptions of Election Legitimacy
Tolkin, A. (2025) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-025-10077-9
92 Affective Polarization and Public Trust in Government
Lamberth, T., & Nicholson, S. P. (2025) · De Gruyter eBooks · doi:10.1515/9783111591902-002
Clinton, J. D. (2025) · PS Political Science & Politics · doi:10.1017/s1049096525101662
An Analysis of Trump’s Securitization Strategy (2015-2016)
Filho, L. A. (2025) · Revista Brasileira de Estudos de Defesa · doi:10.26792/rbed.v12i1.75472
Boudreau, C., Gaudette, J., Kousser, T. B., et al. (2026) · Politics and Governance · doi:10.17645/pag.11692
Levels of Office and Voter Accountability for Democratic Norm Violations
Cely, T., Jacob, M. S., & Westwood, S. J. (2026) · Public Opinion Quarterly · doi:10.1093/poq/nfag004
Yair, O., Hebel‐Sela, S., Cavari, A., & Efrat, A. (2026) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.70131
“…trust in public institutions and election results, increased partisan hostility and polarization, and even willingness to engage in violent and illegal activities against those who supposedly con-spired (e.g., Arceneaux & Truex, 2023; Bertin et al., 2022; Mao et al., 2024; Oleksy et al., 2021).”
The Politics of Enmity: Outgroup Hostility and Support for the Big Lie
Benegal, S. D., Hayes, T. J., & Ugues, A. (2026) · Political Research Quarterly · doi:10.1177/10659129261434612 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
van Lit, J., Meijers, M. J., & van Ham, C. (2026) · Journal of European Public Policy · doi:10.1080/13501763.2026.2659798
The Dynamics of Anti-Establishment Politics
Enders, A. M., Klofstad, C., Stoler, J. B., & Uscinski, J. E. (2026) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-026-10161-8
Partisan polarization, populist attitudes, and anti-democratic behaviors
Kang, M., & Kim, J. (2026) · Frontiers in Political Science · doi:10.3389/fpos.2026.1743027
FEDORIAK, M. (2026) · Epistemological Studies in Philosophy Social and Political Sciences · doi:10.15421/342623
(Mis)information, Polarization, and Trust in Elections: Longitudinal Evidence from Canada
Lavigne, M., Garnett, H. A., & Bridgman, A. (2026) · Public Opinion Quarterly · doi:10.1093/poq/nfag035
Outgroup Empathy and Opposition to Restrictive Voting Laws
Şirin, Ç. V., Valentino, N. A., & Villalobos, J. D. (2026) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-026-10192-1
Can a public information campaign increase trust in American elections?
Kousser, T. B., Hill, S. J., Malhotra, N. A., & Stein, R. M. (2026) · Science Advances · doi:10.1126/sciadv.aec8703
“These studies build on other survey experimental evidence that yield a mixture of results ( 1 , 3 , 5 , 6 , 10 , 17 , 30 , 31 ), along with laboratory experiments uncovering important dynamics in trust ( 12 , 13 ).”
Bernhard, L., & Kübler, D. (2026) · Political Research Exchange · doi:10.1080/2474736x.2026.2728513
Armaly, M., & Schaaf, S. D. (2026) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2026.103162
Akande, A. (2026) · Medienkulturen im digitalen Zeitalter · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-35115-9_1
- Authors
- Arceneaux, K., & Truex, R.
- Affiliations
- Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (FR)
- Princeton University (US)
- Venue
- Perspectives on Politics
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2022-03-29
- Volume
- 21
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 863-879
- ISSN
- 1537-5927 (ISSN-L)
- 1541-0986
- OpenAlex
- W4220943511
- Semantic Scholar
- 5028f365d3ce3dc26f4ffbc31d48ca3ba64bc4de
- Cited by
- 97
- References
- 81
- Citations by year
- 2026: 18 · 2025: 29 · 2024: 22 · 2023: 18 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 2
- FWCI
- 63.58
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Locations
- Perspectives on Politics (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- HAL (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Princeton University
- Temple University
- University Center for Human Values, Princeton University
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Populism, Right-Wing Movements
- Keywords
- Donald Trump, election fraud claims, 2020 US presidential election, transfer of power, public opinion, political violence, Democratic voters, Republican voters, electoral incentives, democratic fragility
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