Correlations of cognitive reflection with judgments and choices
Open accessAbstract
We investigated the role of individual differences in cognitive reflection in decision making. We measured the performance of 157 participants in the cognitive reflection test (Frederick, 2005) and a number of decision-making tasks. We examined the relation of cognitive reflection with performance in tasks that assess correspondence (as distinct from coherence), such as predicting the ratings of chess players. We found significant correlations between cognitive reflection and all the estimation measures in correspondence tasks. Our results suggest that cognitive reflection is a thinking disposition that includes more characteristics than originally proposed by Frederick (2005). We proposed that cognitive reflection is related to the concept of actively open-minded thinking (Baron, 1985, 2008). We concluded that cognitive reflection is a thinking disposition that interacts with knowledge, domain-specific heuristics and characteristics of the environment and that it may play an essential role in the adaptation of the decision maker to different environments and situations.
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Campitelli and Labollita (2010) found little relation between CRT performance and the choice of high-expected-value gambles.
“In contrast, Campitelli and Labollita (2010) found little relation between CRT performance and the choice of high-expected-value gambles.”
From The Cognitive Reflection Test as a predictor of performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks (2011) · cites this paper as Campitelli & Labollita, 2010
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The Cognitive Reflection Test as a predictor of performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks
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- Authors
- Campitelli, G., & Labollita, M.
- Affiliations
- Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (AR)
- Universidad de Buenos Aires (AR)
- Corresponding author
- Campitelli, Guillermo
- Venue
- Judgment and Decision Making
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2010-06
- Volume
- 5
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 182-191
- ISSN
- 1930-2975 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1575392358
- Cited by
- 166
- References
- 40
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 15 · 2022: 11 · 2021: 14 · 2020: 12 · 2019: 22 · 2018: 14 · 2017: 10 · 2016: 9 · 2015: 15 · 2014: 7 · 2013: 8 · 2012: 5
- FWCI
- 4.03
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Locations
- Judgment and Decision Making (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Murdoch University Research Portal (submittedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Health Sciences › Medicine › Family Practice › Clinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Cognitive Abilities and Testing
- Keywords
- cognitive reflection, Cognitive Reflection Test, individual differences, decision-making, open-mindedness, thinking dispositions, domain-specific heuristics, environmental adaptation
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