The DOI matches its Crossref record; 46 of the 46 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Violence risk assessment and risk communication: The effects of using actual cases, providing instruction, and employing probability versus frequency formats.
Abstract
This article describes studies designed to inform policy makers and practitioners about factors influencing the validity of violence risk assessment and risk communication. Forensic psychologists and psychiatrists were shown case summaries of patients hospitalized with mental disorder and were asked to judge the likelihood that the patient would harm someone within six months after discharge from the hospital. They also judged whether the patient posed a high risk, medium risk, or low risk of harming someone after discharge. Studies 1 and 2 replicated, with real case summaries as stimuli, the response-scale effects found by Slovic and Monahan (1995). Providing clinicians with response scales allowing more discriminability among smaller probabilities led patients to be judged as posing lower probabilities of committing harmful acts. This format effect was not eliminated by having clinicians judge relative frequencies rather than probabilities or by providing them with instruction in how to make these types of judgments. In addition, frequency scales led to lower mean likelihood judgments than did probability scales, but, at any given level of likelihood, a patient was judged as posing higher risk if that likelihood was derived from a frequency scale (e.g., 10 out of 100) than if it was derived from a probability scale (e.g., 10%). Similarly, communicating a patient's dangerousness as a relative frequency (e.g., 2 out of 10) led to much higher perceived risk than did communicating a comparable probability (e.g., 20%). The different reactions to probability and frequency formats appear to be attributable to the more frightening images evoked by frequencies. Implications for risk assessment and risk communication are discussed.
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Cites
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“In this regard, 20 out of 100 may seem even worse than 2 out of 10 (see, e.g., Table 8). Epstein (1994) has similarly relied upon imagery to explain why his subjects preferred to draw from bowls with 10 or fewer winning beans out of 100 rather than a bowl with 1 winner out of 10.”
BackgroundInfluentialHow to improve Bayesian reasoning without instruction: Frequency formats.
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Cited by
Risk as Analysis and Risk as Feelings: Some Thoughts about Affect, Reason, Risk, and Rationality
Slovic, P., Finucane, M. L., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2004) · Risk Analysis · doi:10.1111/j.0272-4332.2004.00433.x · Cited by 3,885
Self-citationRepresentativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.025 · Cited by 2,349
Self-citationSlovic, P., Finucane, M. L., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2007) · European Journal of Operational Research · doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2005.04.006 · Cited by 1,537
Self-citationSlovic, P., & Peters, E. (2006) · Current Directions in Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8721.2006.00461.x · Cited by 1,443
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Slovic, P., Monahan, J., & MacGregor, D. G.
- Venue
- Law and Human Behavior
- Published
- 2000-06
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 271-296
- ISSN
- 0147-7307 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-661X
- OpenAlex
- W2002306964
- Cited by
- 502
- References
- 46
- FWCI
- 35.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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