The DOI matches its Crossref record; 46 of the 46 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Violence risk assessment and risk communication: The effects of using actual cases, providing instruction, and employing probability versus frequency formats.
Abstract
This article describes studies designed to inform policy makers and practitioners about factors influencing the validity of violence risk assessment and risk communication. Forensic psychologists and psychiatrists were shown case summaries of patients hospitalized with mental disorder and were asked to judge the likelihood that the patient would harm someone within six months after discharge from the hospital. They also judged whether the patient posed a high risk, medium risk, or low risk of harming someone after discharge. Studies 1 and 2 replicated, with real case summaries as stimuli, the response-scale effects found by Slovic and Monahan (1995). Providing clinicians with response scales allowing more discriminability among smaller probabilities led patients to be judged as posing lower probabilities of committing harmful acts. This format effect was not eliminated by having clinicians judge relative frequencies rather than probabilities or by providing them with instruction in how to make these types of judgments. In addition, frequency scales led to lower mean likelihood judgments than did probability scales, but, at any given level of likelihood, a patient was judged as posing higher risk if that likelihood was derived from a frequency scale (e.g., 10 out of 100) than if it was derived from a probability scale (e.g., 10%). Similarly, communicating a patient's dangerousness as a relative frequency (e.g., 2 out of 10) led to much higher perceived risk than did communicating a comparable probability (e.g., 20%). The different reactions to probability and frequency formats appear to be attributable to the more frightening images evoked by frequencies. Implications for risk assessment and risk communication are discussed.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1975) · Utility, Probability, and Human Decision Making · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-1834-0_8 · Cited by 22,650
(1994) · DigitalGeorgetown (Georgetown University Library) · Cited by 10,542
Simple Heuristics That Make Us SmartPreprint
Gigerenzer, G., & Todd, P. M. (1999) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 6,398
Loewenstein, G. F., Weber, E. U., Hsee, C. K., & Welch, N. (2001) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.127.2.267 · Cited by 5,955
Integration of the cognitive and the psychodynamic unconscious
Epstein, S. (1994) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.49.8.709 · Cited by 2,883 · cited 4×
“In this regard, 20 out of 100 may seem even worse than 2 out of 10 (see, e.g., Table 8). Epstein (1994) has similarly relied upon imagery to explain why his subjects preferred to draw from bowls with 10 or fewer winning beans out of 100 rather than a bowl with 1 winner out of 10.”
BackgroundInfluentialHow to improve Bayesian reasoning without instruction: Frequency formats.
Gigerenzer, G., & Hoffrage, U. (1995) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037//0033-295x.102.4.684 · Cited by 2,127
Gonzalez, R. C., & Mowrer, O. H. (1962) · The American Journal of Psychology · doi:10.2307/1419634 · Cited by 1,583
Probabilistic mental models: a Brunswikian theory of confidence
Gigerenzer, G., Hoffrage, U., & Kleinbölting, H. (1991) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.98.4.506 · Cited by 1,506
On the reality of cognitive illusions.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1996) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037//0033-295x.103.3.582 · Cited by 1,464
Steadman, H. J., Mulvey, E. P., Monahan, J., Robbins, P. C., Appelbaum, P. S., Grisso, T., Roth, L. H., & Silver, E. (1998) · Archives of General Psychiatry · doi:10.1001/archpsyc.55.5.393 · Cited by 1,442
Self-citation
Cited by
Risk as Analysis and Risk as Feelings: Some Thoughts about Affect, Reason, Risk, and Rationality
Slovic, P., Finucane, M. L., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2004) · Risk Analysis · doi:10.1111/j.0272-4332.2004.00433.x · Cited by 3,885
Self-citationHeuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
Bottom, W. P., Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., & Kahneman, D. (2004) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/20159081 · Cited by 3,536
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.025 · Cited by 2,349
Self-citationHeuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
(2002) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098 · Cited by 2,192
Slovic, P., Finucane, M. L., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2007) · European Journal of Operational Research · doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2005.04.006 · Cited by 1,537
Self-citationSlovic, P., & Peters, E. (2006) · Current Directions in Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8721.2006.00461.x · Cited by 1,443
Self-citationHelping Doctors and Patients Make Sense of Health Statistics
Gigerenzer, G., Gaissmaier, W., Kurz-Milcke, E., Schwartz, L. M., & Woloshin, S. (2007) · Psychological Science in the Public Interest · doi:10.1111/j.1539-6053.2008.00033.x · Cited by 1,336
Peters, E., Västfjäll, D., Slovic, P., Mertz, C. K., Mazzocco, K., & Dickert, S. (2006) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01720.x · Cited by 1,180
Self-citationAffect, risk, and decision making.
Slovic, P., Peters, E., Finucane, M. L., & MacGregor, D. G. (2005) · Health Psychology · doi:10.1037/0278-6133.24.4.s35 · Cited by 1,041
Self-citationMoney, Kisses, and Electric Shocks: On the Affective Psychology of Risk
Rottenstreich, Y., & Hsee, C. K. (2001) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/1467-9280.00334 · Cited by 825
Dunning, D., Meyerowitz, J. A., & Holzberg, A. D. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.020 · Cited by 678
Violent offenders: Appraising and managing risk (2nd ed.).
Quinsey, V. L., Harris, G. T., Rice, M. E., & Cormier, C. A. (2006) · American Psychological Association eBooks · doi:10.1037/11367-000 · Cited by 667
Rational actors or rational fools: implications of the affect heuristic for behavioral economics
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002) · The Journal of Socio-Economics · doi:10.1016/s1053-5357(02)00174-9 · Cited by 579
Self-citationThe Role of the Affect and Availability Heuristics in Risk Communication
Keller, C., Siegrist, M., & Gutscher, H. (2006) · Risk Analysis · doi:10.1111/j.1539-6924.2006.00773.x · Cited by 551
“Results of Study 1 are in line with other studies in which frequency and probability formats were used (Siegrist, 1997; Slovic et al., 2000).”
ResultBlumenthal-Barby, J. S., & Krieger, H. (2015) · Medical Decision Making · doi:10.1177/0272989x14547740 · Cited by 545
Risks and decisions for conservation and environmental management
(2005) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.43-2184 · Cited by 523
Risks and Decisions for Conservation and Environmental Management
Burgman, M. (2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511614279 · Cited by 498
Numeracy, Ratio Bias, and Denominator Neglect in Judgments of Risk and Probability
Reyna, V. F., & Brainerd, C. J. (2008) · Learning and Individual Differences · doi:10.1016/j.lindif.2007.03.011 · Cited by 481
Rationality for mortals: how people cope with uncertainty
(2009) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.46-4133 · Cited by 469
Incorporating the Irrelevant: Anchors in Judgments of Belief and Value
Chapman, G. B., & Johnson, E. J. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.008 · Cited by 410
Hibbard, J. H., & Peters, E. (2003) · Annual Review of Public Health · doi:10.1146/annurev.publhealth.24.100901.141005 · Cited by 405
Using icon arrays to communicate medical risks: Overcoming low numeracy.
Galesic, M., Garcia-Retamero, R., & Gigerenzer, G. (2009) · Health Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0014474 · Cited by 397
Sloman, S. A. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.024 · Cited by 395
Terrorism and Probability Neglect
Sunstein, C. R. (2003) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1023/a:1024111006336 · Cited by 370
“A 30% Chance of Rain Tomorrow”: How Does the Public Understand Probabilistic Weather Forecasts?
Gigerenzer, G., Hertwig, R., Van Den Broek, E., Fasolo, B., & Katsikopoulos, K. V. (2005) · Risk Analysis · doi:10.1111/j.1539-6924.2005.00608.x · Cited by 343
Introduction – Heuristics and Biases: Then and Now
Gilovich, T., & Griffin, D. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.002 · Cited by 305
Norm Theory: Comparing Reality to Its Alternatives
Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.022 · Cited by 289
Terrorism and Probability Neglect
Sunstein, C. R. (2003) · The Risks of Terrorism · doi:10.1007/978-1-4757-6787-2_2 · Cited by 287
A Prevention-Based Paradigm for Violence Risk Assessment: Clinical and Research Applications
Douglas, K. S., & Kropp, P. R. (2002) · Criminal Justice and Behavior · doi:10.1177/009385402236735 · Cited by 286
Koriat, A., Sheffer, L., & Ma’ayan, H. (2002) · Journal of Experimental Psychology General · doi:10.1037//0096-3445.131.2.147 · Cited by 285
Decision-Making Processes in Social Contexts
Bruch, E., & Feinberg, F. (2017) · Annual Review of Sociology · doi:10.1146/annurev-soc-060116-053622 · Cited by 269
A dual system model of preferences under risk
Mukherjee, K. (2010) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/a0017884 · Cited by 198
Mental Contamination and the Debiasing Problem
Wilson, T. D., Centerbar, D. B., & Brekke, N. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.012 · Cited by 160
The calibration of expert judgment: heuristics and biases beyond the laboratory
Koehler, D. J., Brenner, L., & Griffin, D. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.041 · Cited by 146
How fear-arousing news messages affect risk perceptions and intention to talk about risk
Paek, H.-J., Oh, S.-H., & Hove, T. (2016) · Health Communication · doi:10.1080/10410236.2015.1037419 · Cited by 115
Variables influencing the neural correlates of perceived risk of physical harm
Coaster, M., Rogers, B. P., Jones, O. D., Viscusi, W. K., Merkle, K. L., Zald, D. H., & Gore, J. C. (2011) · Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience · doi:10.3758/s13415-011-0047-9 · Cited by 24
“From prior behavioral studies, it is known that the frequency format elicits a higher perception of risk than does the probability format for equivalent harm contexts (Siegrist, 1997; Slovic et al., 2000; Yamagishi, 1997).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Slovic, P., Monahan, J., & MacGregor, D. G.
- Venue
- Law and Human Behavior
- Published
- 2000-06
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 271-296
- ISSN
- 0147-7307 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-661X
- OpenAlex
- W2002306964
- Cited by
- 502
- References
- 46
- FWCI
- 35.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.