Egocentrism versus protocentrism: The status of self in social prediction.
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In this article, the author discusses the limitations of the egocentric view of self in which self serves as an automatic filter, inhibiting access to alternative representations of others' thoughts and feelings. The author then outlines a protocentric model, the self-as-distinct (SAD) model, in which generic representations of prototypic others serve as the default; representations of self, specific others, or categories encode only distinctiveness from generic knowledge about prototypic others. Thus, self-knowledge is distributed both in generic representations in which self and prototypic others are undifferentiated and in a self-representation that encodes distinctiveness. The self-representation does not serve to make predictions about others because it encodes how self differs from the generic representation of others. Predictions that are the same about self and others are protocentric, based on generic knowledge that serves as the default. The SAD model parsimoniously accounts for many inconsistent findings across various domains in social cognition.
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Citations
Cites
Measuring individual differences in empathy: Evidence for a multidimensional approach.
Davis, M. H. (1983) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.44.1.113 · Cited by 10,272
Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?
Premack, D., & Woodruff, G. (1978) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00076512 · Cited by 8,743
Tversky, A. (1977) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.84.4.327 · Cited by 7,414
The Social Self: On Being the Same and Different at the Same Time
Brewer, M. B. (1991) · Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin · doi:10.1177/0146167291175001 · Cited by 5,107
Who is this "We"? Levels of collective identity and self representations.
Brewer, M. B., & Gardner, W. (1996) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.71.1.83 · Cited by 3,401 · cited 1×
“…the SAD model contrasts with models in which two types of self-representation are assumed to exist, the personal self and the social self (e.g., Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Stapel & Koomen, 2001), where the former represents those aspects of the self that differentiate self from others and the…”
MethodPretense and representation: The origins of "theory of mind."
Leslie, A. M. (1987) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.94.4.412 · Cited by 3,379
The “false consensus effect”: An egocentric bias in social perception and attribution processes
Ross, L., Greene, D., & House, P. (1977) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/0022-1031(77)90049-x · Cited by 3,139
Ironic processes of mental control.
Wegner, D. M. (1994) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037//0033-295x.101.1.34 · Cited by 2,609
Effect of subjective perspective taking during simulation of action: a PET investigation of agency
Ruby, P., & Decety, J. (2001) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/87510 · Cited by 1,182
Intentional relations and social understanding
Barresi, J., & Moore, C. (1996) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00041790 · Cited by 523 · cited 1×
“Second, as the SAD model specifies, it is possible for such identity to arise because knowledge about other people is used to make predictions both about others and about self (cf. Barresi & Moore, 1996).”
Background
Cited by
Perspective Taking as Egocentric Anchoring and Adjustment.
Epley, N., Keysar, B., Van Boven, L., & Gilovich, T. (2004) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.87.3.327 · Cited by 1,315
Perspective taking in children and adults: equivalent egocentrism but differential correction
Epley, N., Morewedge, C. K., & Keysar, B. (2004) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2004.02.002 · Cited by 594
The neural correlates of direct and reflected self-knowledge
Ochsner, K. N., Beer, J. S., Robertson, E. R., Cooper, J. C., Gabrieli, J. D. E., Kihsltrom, J. F., & D'Esposito, M. (2005) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2005.06.069 · Cited by 562
“Others have argued that judgments of others involve the use of abstract person knowledge and/or theories about they way in which individuals behave in general (e.g., Gopnik and Wellman, 1992; Karniol, 2003; Perner et al., 1999).”
BackgroundSocial Projection to Ingroups and Outgroups: A Review and Meta-Analysis
Robbins, J. M., & Krueger, J. I. (2005) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr0901_3 · Cited by 552
Spontaneous Inferences, Implicit Impressions, and Implicit Theories
Uleman, J. S., Adil Saribay, S., & Gonzalez, C. M. (2008) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093707 · Cited by 505
Metadata
- Authors
- Karniol, R.
- Venue
- Psychological Review
- Published
- 2003
- Volume
- 110
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 564-580
- ISSN
- 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1471
- OpenAlex
- W2153968669
- Cited by
- 129
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 23.13
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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