Egocentrism versus protocentrism: The status of self in social prediction.
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In this article, the author discusses the limitations of the egocentric view of self in which self serves as an automatic filter, inhibiting access to alternative representations of others' thoughts and feelings. The author then outlines a protocentric model, the self-as-distinct (SAD) model, in which generic representations of prototypic others serve as the default; representations of self, specific others, or categories encode only distinctiveness from generic knowledge about prototypic others. Thus, self-knowledge is distributed both in generic representations in which self and prototypic others are undifferentiated and in a self-representation that encodes distinctiveness. The self-representation does not serve to make predictions about others because it encodes how self differs from the generic representation of others. Predictions that are the same about self and others are protocentric, based on generic knowledge that serves as the default. The SAD model parsimoniously accounts for many inconsistent findings across various domains in social cognition.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
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The neural correlates of direct and reflected self-knowledge
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Metadata
- Authors
- Karniol, R.
- Venue
- Psychological Review
- Published
- 2003
- Volume
- 110
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 564-580
- ISSN
- 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1471
- OpenAlex
- W2153968669
- Cited by
- 129
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 23.13
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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