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Cited by 248

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Intellect as distinct from openness: Differences revealed by fMRI of working memory.

Open access
DeYoung, Colin G., Shamosh, Noah A., Green, Adam E., Braver, Todd S., Gray, Jeremy R. · 2009 · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

Abstract

Relatively little is known about the neural bases of the Big Five personality trait Openness/Intellect. This trait is composed of 2 related but separable aspects, Openness to Experience and Intellect. On the basis of previous behavioral research (C. G. DeYoung, J. B. Peterson, & D. M. Higgins, 2005), the authors hypothesized that brain activity supporting working memory (WM) would be related to Intellect but not to Openness. To test this hypothesis, the authors used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to scan a sample of 104 healthy adults as they performed a difficult WM task. Intellect (and not Openness) was found to correlate with WM accuracy and with accuracy-related brain activity, in left lateral anterior prefrontal cortex and posterior medial frontal cortex. Neural activity in these regions mediated the association between Intellect and WM performance, implicating these regions in the neural substrate of Intellect. Intellect was also correlated significantly with scores on tests of intelligence and WM capacity, but the association of Intellect with brain activity could not be entirely explained by cognitive ability.

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Crossref · 10.1037/a0016615

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Metadata

Authors
DeYoung, C. G., Shamosh, N. A., Green, A. E., Braver, T. S., & Gray, J. R.
Venue
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
Published
2009-11
Volume
97
Issue
5
Pages
883-892
ISSN
  • 0022-3514 (ISSN-L)
  • 1939-1315
OpenAlex
W2169723040
Cited by
248
References
17
FWCI
23.70
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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