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The Nash equilibrium: A perspective
Open accessAbstract
In 1950, John Nash contributed a remarkable one-page PNAS article that defined and characterized a notion of equilibrium for n- person games. This notion, now called the “Nash equilibrium,” has been widely applied and adapted in economics and other behavioral sciences. Indeed, game theory, with the Nash equilibrium as its centerpiece, is becoming the most prominent unifying theory of social science. In this perspective, we summarize the historical context and subsequent impact of Nash's contribution.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Holt, C. A., & Roth, A. E.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 2004-03-15
- Volume
- 101
- Issue
- 12
- Pages
- 3999-4002
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- OpenAlex
- W1967438932
- Cited by
- 296
- References
- 44
- FWCI
- 5.76
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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