Cited by 266Child and Animal Learning DevelopmentAction Observation and SynchronizationNeural and Behavioral Psychology Studies

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 100 of the 101 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 42 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

Repetition suppression of ventromedial prefrontal activity during judgments of self and others

Open access
Jenkins, Adrianna C., Macrae, C. Neil, Mitchell, Jason P.·2008·Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences

Abstract

One useful strategy for inferring others' mental states (i.e., mentalizing) may be to use one's own thoughts, feelings, and desires as a proxy for those of other people. Such self-referential accounts of social cognition are supported by recent neuroimaging observations that a single brain region, ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vMPFC), is engaged both by tasks that require introspections about self and by tasks that require inferences about the minds of others perceived to be similar to self. To test whether people automatically refer to their own mental states when considering those of a similar other, we examined repetition-related suppression of vMPFC response during self-reflections that followed either an initial reflection about self or a judgment of another person. Consistent with the hypothesis that perceivers spontaneously engage in self-referential processing when mentalizing about particular individuals, vMPFC response was suppressed when self-reflections followed either an initial reflection about self or a judgment of a similar, but not a dissimilar, other. These results suggest that thinking about the mind of another person may rely importantly on reference to one's own mental characteristics.

Overview

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

Using fMRI repetition suppression, the authors found that ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vMPFC) activity during self-reflection was suppressed after either a prior self-reflection or a judgment about a similar other, but not after a judgment about a dissimilar other. This suggests that mentalizing about similar others may spontaneously recruit self-referential processing.

Key findings

  • In 13 participants, vMPFC response to self-reflections was significantly suppressed when self-reflection followed an initial self-reflection (self-after-self) and when it followed a judgment of a similar other (self-after-similar), but not when it followed a judgment of a dissimilar other (self-after-dissimilar).
  • Self-after-dissimilar judgments showed a significant increase in vMPFC response over baseline [t(12) = 4.75, P < 0.0005] and were significantly greater than self-after-self and self-after-similar trials (all P values < 0.008).
  • Self-after-similar trials showed nearly indistinguishable repetition suppression from self-after-self trials for identical judgments [t(12) = 0.06, P > 0.95; different judgments, P > 0.11].
  • A separate behavioral study (n = 14) found participants were faster to self-reflect after judging a similar other (M = 1,990 ms) than a dissimilar other (M = 2,079 ms) [t(13) = 2.84, P < 0.02].

Methods

  • fMRI study: 13 right-handed native English speakers (8 male; mean age 20.7 years, range 19–23) completed an opinion-judging task with 240 paired prime-self trials and 90 singleton trials, followed by an explicit self-reference task (100 trials, self vs. Bush).
  • Primes were self, a liberal target manipulated as similar, or a conservative target manipulated as dissimilar; half the paired trials used the identical opinion question across phases and half used a different question.
  • fMRI data were collected on a 3 Tesla Siemens Trio scanner and analyzed in SPM99 using random-effects analyses; vMPFC ROIs were defined from self > other contrasts, and repetition suppression was indexed by subtracting singleton-trial responses from corresponding paired prime-self trials.

Limitations

  • The paper states that exactly how perceivers determine whether someone is sufficiently similar to justify self-referential mentalizing remains an open question, as does characterization of the cognitive processes supporting mentalizing about dissimilar others.
  • The paper states that secondary analyses subconditionalizing by same vs. different behavioral response were based on a small subset of data with reduced power, and that it remains unclear whether less repetition suppression occurs when a different question is asked about self and a similar other.
  • Evident from the text: the fMRI sample was small (n = 13) and the supporting behavioral sample was also small (n = 14), limiting power and generalizability.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1073/pnas.0708785105

Cites

100 of 100 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Claims the paper makes

28 Own result · 13 Not checked yet · 12 Own interpretation · 8 Own method · 4 No basis given

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  • It may state two separate claims as one. 15
  • Probably not a substantial claim. 19
31 of 31
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Little is known about how exactly one successfully gains insight into the inner workings of another's mind.

    “little is known about how exactly one successfully gains insight into the inner workings of another's mind.”
1 of 1

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Every reported test result, recomputed from its test statistic and degrees of freedom. A result shows as not adding up only once an independent check has confirmed it.

  • Consistentt(12) = 3.25reported p < .01 · recomputed p = .007

    “t (12) = 3.25, p < .01”

  • Consistentt(12) = 0.5reported p > .62 · recomputed p = .626

    “t (12) = 0.50, p > .62”

  • Consistentt(12) = 4.75reported p < .0005 · recomputed p < .001

    “t (12) = 4.75, p < .0005”

3 of 3

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Citations

Cites

Show all 101 references

Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. DL Ames, AC Jenkins, MR Banaji, JP Mitchell Psychol Sci, in press. (2008).

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Metadata

Authors
Jenkins, A. C., Macrae, C. N., & Mitchell, J. P.
Affiliations
  • Harvard University (US)
  • University of Aberdeen (GB)
Venue
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Published
2008-03-18
Volume
105
Issue
11
Pages
4507-4512
ISSN
  • 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
  • 1091-6490
OpenAlex
W2019725315
Cited by
266
References
101
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 18 · 2020: 15 · 2019: 21 · 2018: 17 · 2017: 13 · 2016: 14 · 2015: 16 · 2014: 11 · 2013: 15 · 2012: 25
FWCI
40.78
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Funders
  • National Science Foundation (0642448)
  • Centre d'Imagerie BioMédicale
  • Athinoula A. Martinos Center for Biomedical Imaging, Massachusetts General Hospital
  • National Center for Research Resources (P41-RR-14075, P41RR014075)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Action Observation and Synchronization
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
Keywords
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, repetition suppression, mentalization, self-referential processing, social cognition, self-reflection, self-other similarity, theory of mind
MeSH terms
Adult, Behavior, Ego, Female, Humans, Judgment, Magnetic Resonance Imaging, Male, Prefrontal Cortex

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