Third-party punishment increases cooperation in children through (misaligned) expectations and conditional cooperation
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Significance: Cooperation among humans depends upon the willingness of others to take costly action to enforce the social norm to cooperate. Such behavior is often coined third-party punishment. Here we show that third-party punishment is already effective as means to increase cooperation in children. Most importantly, we identify why this is the case. First, children expect (mistakenly) third parties to punish quite often and therefore they become more cooperative. Second, the presence of third parties lets children become (rightfully) more optimistic about the cooperation levels of the interaction partner in a simple prisoner’s dilemma game. As a reaction to more optimistic expectations, children cooperate more themselves. The experiment has been run with about 1,100 children aged 7 to 11 y.
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Citations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Lergetporer, P., Angerer, S., Glätzle-Rützler, D., & Sutter, M.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 2014-04-28
- Volume
- 111
- Issue
- 19
- Pages
- 6916-6921
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- OpenAlex
- W1987636267
- Cited by
- 97
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 24.94
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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