Spurious normativity enhances learning of compliance and enforcement behavior in artificial agents
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 60 of the 60 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Significance: The fact that humans enforce and comply with norms is an important reason why humans enjoy higher levels of cooperation and welfare than other animals. Some norms are relatively easy to explain: They may prohibit obviously harmful or uncooperative actions. But many norms are not easy to explain. For example, most cultures prohibit eating certain kinds of foods, and almost all societies have rules about what constitutes appropriate clothing, language, and gestures. Using a computational model focused on learning shows that apparently pointless rules can have an indirect effect on welfare. They can help agents learn how to enforce and comply with norms in general, improving the group’s ability to enforce norms that have a direct effect on welfare.
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“Instead, the use of direct and third-party punishment against norm violators has been proposed as a key factor in the emergence of large-scale non-kin cooperation observed within human societies [13, 15, 27, 31, 32].”
From Investigating the impact of direct punishment on the emergence of cooperation in multi-agent reinforcement learning systems (2025) · cites this paper as [27]
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“for example, agents might need to learn”
From Investigating the impact of direct punishment on the emergence of cooperation in multi-agent reinforcement learning systems (2025) · cites this paper as [27]
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“They show that the frequency of unjust punishment in a population decreases in environments with "silly rules" that do not confer any benefits to individuals or society.”
From Investigating the impact of direct punishment on the emergence of cooperation in multi-agent reinforcement learning systems (2025) · cites this paper as [27]
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“Although reputation and partner selection can facilitate the emergence of cooperation within small groups, they have a negligible impact on larger populations.”
From Investigating the impact of direct punishment on the emergence of cooperation in multi-agent reinforcement learning systems (2025) · cites this paper as [27]
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Metadata
- Authors
- Köster, R., Hadfield-Menell, D., Everett, R., Weidinger, L., Hadfield, G. K., & Leibo, J. Z.
- Affiliations
- DeepMind, London EC4A 3TW, United Kingdom
- MIT Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (US)
- Google DeepMind (United Kingdom) (GB)
- University of Toronto (CA)
- Corresponding author
- Leibo, Joel Z.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Publisher
- National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 2022-01-12
- Volume
- 119
- Issue
- 3
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- PMC
- PMC8784148
- OpenAlex
- W4205912589
- Cited by
- 37
- References
- 50
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 14 · 2022: 5
- FWCI
- 2.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- TSpace (University of Toronto) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- DSpace@MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Reinforcement Learning in Robotics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Keywords
- social norms, rule compliance, rule enforcement, taboos, multi-agent reinforcement learning, credit assignment, delayed rewards, artificial agents, normative behavior
- MeSH terms
- Environment, Humans, Learning, Reinforcement, Psychology, Social Norms
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