Cited by 221Political Conflict and GovernancePolitical Theory and DemocracyElectoral Systems and Political Participation

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 48 of the 48 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 2 of the 24 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Pernicious polarization, autocratization and opposition strategies

Abstract

“Pernicious polarization” – the division of society into mutually distrustful Us versus Them camps in which political identity becomes a social identity – fosters autocratization by incentivizing citizens and political actors alike to endorse non-democratic action. An exploratory analysis of new V-Dem data on polarization indeed shows the negative relationship between the level of political polarization and liberal democracy ratings. How can pernicious polarization be avoided or reversed once present? By drawing on an endogenous explanation of polarization, where the decisions and actions of both opposition actors and incumbents contribute to its evolution, we focus on the question of what democratic opposition actors can do to stop or reverse pernicious polarization. Based on insights from examples across the world and deductive theory-building, along with illustrative cases, we offer a typology of potential opposition goals, strategies and tools, and then analyse how these may affect polarization and in turn democratic quality at early and late stages. We identify goals as either generative or preservative, and we argue that “active-depolarizing” and “transformative-repolarizing” strategies are more promising than “passive-depolarizing” and “reciprocal polarizing” strategies to improve a country's resilience to autocratizing pressures. The specific tools employed to pursue these goals and strategies are also crucial, though the effectiveness of available institutional accountability and mobilizational tools will change as the process of polarization advances. The emerging literatıres on opposition strategies to democratize electoral autocracies and to improve the resilience of democracies should incorporate their impact on polarization as a critical intervening variable.

Overview

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

The paper argues that pernicious polarization fosters autocratization and uses V-Dem data to show polarization is negatively associated with liberal democracy, especially at sustained severe levels. It offers a typology of opposition goals and strategies, arguing that proactive transformative-repolarizing and active-depolarizing strategies are more promising than reactive reciprocal-polarizing or passive-depolarizing strategies.

Key findings

  • In linear regressions with state and year fixed effects for 1900–2019, political polarization is negatively and statistically significantly associated with V-Dem liberal democracy at the analysis year and at one-, two-, and five-year lags: coefficients −0.420, −0.415, −0.391, and −0.305, respectively (p<0.01; N=6,192 for analysis year; 119 states).
  • Periods of rapid polarization were not significantly more damaging to democratic quality than other periods of increased polarization. Sustained severe polarization was more damaging: difference coefficients were −0.640 at the analysis year and −0.654 at one-year lag (p<0.05), while elevated and heightened polarization showed no observable difference from all other cases.
  • The paper’s typology links preservative goals to reactive reciprocal polarization or passive depolarization, and generative goals to proactive transformative repolarization or active depolarization. It expects reciprocal polarization to deepen pernicious polarization, passive depolarization to suspend elite polarization, and proactive strategies to reduce/contain polarization and slow or reverse autocratization if successful.
  • Illustrative cases include South Korea’s 2014–2016 polarization spike and later democratic recovery, Turkey’s 2019 CHP active-depolarizing local campaigns, Hungary’s 2019 Budapest opposition win, and Venezuela’s 2015 opposition overreach after a super-majority win.

Methods

  • Exploratory linear regression analyses with state and year fixed effects on 1900–2019, using V-Dem political polarization normalized to 0–1 and V-Dem liberal democracy scored 0–1; closed autocracies and states with fewer than 30 observation years were excluded, and polarization was lagged at 1, 2, and 5 years.
  • Tests H1–H3: H1 increased polarization decreases liberal democracy; H2 increased rate of polarization disproportionately decreases it; H3 level of polarization disproportionately decreases it. Rapid polarization was coded as an increase of at least 10% (0.1 units) in 5 or fewer years, with two or more years of increase and no declines greater than 0.01. Elevated, Heightened, and Severe thresholds were 0.456, 0.566, and 0.722, each sustained at least five years with no declines greater than 0.01.
  • The opposition-strategy framework is built deductively and illustrated with heuristic examples from across the world; the authors state this is not a systematic comparative case analysis.

Limitations

  • The paper states the quantitative analysis is exploratory and the case examples are heuristic, selected to illustrate strategies and propositions rather than to offer systematic comparative case analysis. It also states it does not explain how and why oppositions choose one strategy over another, and that future research will examine different periods, specifically post-1975 and post-1994.
  • The paper states the V-Dem polarization measure is imperfect and suffers weaknesses like other expert-opinion-survey measures, though it is described as the most appropriate available. It also states assumptions that the effect of polarization is consistent across groups and across time, and it excludes closed autocracies and states with fewer than 30 observation years.
  • Evident from the text: the quantitative findings are associational, not causal; the strategy typology and expected outcomes are not systematically tested; and the illustrative cases are selected, so they cannot establish the general effectiveness of the proposed opposition strategies.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1080/13510347.2020.1865316

Cites

48 of 48 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

80 Own interpretation · 11 Own result · 10 Sources not found · 8 No basis given · 5 No full text of the sources · 4 Own method · 1 Partly supported · 1 Couldn’t confirm · accuracy not yet measured

Show all 64 claims

  • It may state two separate claims as one. 35
  • Probably not a substantial claim. 34
56 of 56
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The effect of polarization is consistent across groups and across time.

    “We assume that the effect of polarization is consistent across groups and across time.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Oppositions to polarizing and autocratizing incumbents seek to gain power.

    “We start by assuming that oppositions to polarizing and autocratizing incumbents seek to gain power”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Oppositions have different goals about using that power.

    “but that they do so with different goals about using that power”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Polarization is an endogenous factor.

    “Because we view polarization as an endogenous factor”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Polarizing politics is a common strategy of intentionally autocratizing actors.

    “Particularly because polarizing politics is a common strategy of intentionally autocratizing actors”
5 of 5

Citations

Cites

Show all 42 references

Research works printed but not linked: 7

  1. Bandeira Luiza, 2019, Disinformation in Democracies: Strengthening Digital Resilience in Latin America
  2. Bates Robert H., 1998, Analytic Narratives
  3. Huntington Samuel P., 1991, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Later 20th Century
  4. Khadiagala Gilbert M., 2019, Democracies Divided: The Global Challenge of Political Polarization, 38
  5. Laebens, Melis G., and Anna Lührmann. "What Stops Democratic Erosion? The Role of Institutions of Accountability." Paper presented at “Berlin Democracy Conference,” Berlin. https://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/64508/1/gupea_2077_64508_1.pdf, 2019.
  6. Pantoulas Dimitris, 2019, Revista de Ciencias Políticas, 32, 391
  7. Selçuk Orçun, 2020, Democratization, 1

Cited by

Sorted by citations

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Metadata

Authors
Somer, M., McCoy, J. L., & Luke, R. E.
Affiliations
  • Koç University (TR)
  • Georgia State University (US)
Corresponding author
McCoy, Jennifer L.
Venue
Democratization
Published
2021-01-12
Volume
28
Issue
5
Pages
929-948
ISSN
  • 1351-0347 (ISSN-L)
  • 1743-890X
OpenAlex
W3120050906
Cited by
220
References
42
Citations by year
2026: 38 · 2025: 37 · 2024: 46 · 2023: 68 · 2022: 21 · 2021: 10
FWCI
50.34
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Democratization (publishedVersion)
  • Digital Collections portal (Koç University) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Theory and Democracy
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
Keywords
autocratization, democratic opposition, opposition strategy, political polarization, liberal democracy, institutional accountability, mobilization, electoral autocracy, democratic resilience, political identity

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