The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders
Open accessAbstract
Posttakeover moral hazard by the acquirer and free‐riding by the target shareholders lead the former to acquire as few sharcs as necessary to gain control. As moral hazard is most severe under such low ownership concentration, inefficiencies arise in successful takeovers. Moreover, share supply is shown to be upward‐sloping. Rules promoting ownership concentration limit both agency costs and the occurrence of takeovers. Furthermore, higher takeover premia induced by competition translate into higher ownership concen‐tration and are thus beneficial. Finally, one share‐one vote and simple majority are generally not optimal, and socially optimal rules need not emerge through private contracting.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x · Cited by 71,491
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243
Management ownership and market valuation
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90048-7 · Cited by 6,895
Theory of the firm; managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1996) · Firms, Organizations and Contracts · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198774358.003.0006 · Cited by 4,245
Takeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1980) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003400 · Cited by 3,098
Managerial control of voting rights
Stulz, R. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90039-6 · Cited by 2,429
Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control
Manne, H. G. (1965) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259000 · Cited by 2,364
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1989) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(89)90099-8 · Cited by 2,151
Eclipse of the Public Corporation
Jensen, M. C. (1999) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.146149 · Cited by 1,656
Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm
Burkart, M., Gromb, D., & Panunzi, F. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355397555325 · Cited by 1,509
Self-citationOne-share-one-vote and the market for corporate control
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90044-x · Cited by 1,342
The effects of management buyouts on operating performance and value
Kaplan, S. (1989) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(89)90047-0 · Cited by 1,319
Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis
Mørck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998) · LA Referencia (Red Federada de Repositorios Institucionales de Publicaciones Científicas) · Cited by 1,108
Harris, M., & Raviv, A. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90045-1 · Cited by 670
The law of large numbers with a continuum of IID random variables
Judd, K. L. (1985) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(85)90059-6 · Cited by 492
The wealth effects of second-generation state takeover legislation
Karpoff, J. M., & Malatesta, P. H. (1989) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(89)90085-8 · Cited by 323
Share Tendering Strategies and the Success of Hostile Takeover Bids
Hirshleifer, D., & Titman, S. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261679 · Cited by 263
Initial Shareholdings and Overbidding in Takeover Contests
BURKART, M. (1995) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb05186.x · Cited by 262
Self-citationSuccessful Takeovers without Exclusion
Bagnoli, M., & Lipman, B. L. (1988) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/1.1.89 · Cited by 212
T o T he R aider G oes T he S urplus ? A R eexamination of t he F ree ‐R ider P roblem
Holmstrom, B. R., & Nalebuff, B. (1992) · Journal of Economics & Management Strategy · doi:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1992.00037.x · Cited by 152
Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers
Bebchuk, L. A. (1985) · Harvard Law Review · doi:10.2307/1341064 · Cited by 89
Takeover Bids Below the Expected Value of Minority Shares
Bebchuk, L. A. (1989) · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.2307/2330770 · Cited by 56
Cited by
Corporate Ownership Around the World
La Porta, R., Lopez‐De‐Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00115 · Cited by 10,541
Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation
La Porta, R., Lopez‐De‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2002) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00457 · Cited by 4,050
Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison
Dyck, A., & Zingales, L. (2004) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00642.x · Cited by 2,509
Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of accounting earnings in East Asia
Fan, J. P. H., & Wong, T. J. (2002) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(02)00047-2 · Cited by 1,918
Corporate Ownership Around the World
La Porta, R., Lopez de Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1998) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.103130 · Cited by 1,902
Metadata
- Authors
- Burkart, M., Gromb, D., & Panunzi, F.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1998-02
- Volume
- 106
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 172-204
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W1968663026
- Cited by
- 354
- References
- 22
- FWCI
- 66.36
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.