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Sources of Advantageous Selection: Evidence from the Medigap Insurance Market

Fang, Hanming, Keane, Michael P., Silverman, Dan·2008·Journal of Political Economy

Abstract

We provide evidence of advantageous selection in the Medigap insurance market and analyze its sources. Conditional on controls for Medigap prices, those with Medigap spend, on average, $4,000 less on medical care than those without. But if we condition on health, those with Medigap spend $2,000 more. The sources of this advantageous selection include income, education, longevity expectations, and financial planning horizons, as well as cognitive ability. Conditional on all these factors, those with higher expected medical expenditures are more likely to purchase Medigap. Risk preferences do not appear as a source of advantageous selection; cognitive ability is particularly important.

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Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 28

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Metadata

Authors
Fang, H., Keane, M. P., & Silverman, D.
Venue
Journal of Political Economy
Published
2008-04
Volume
116
Issue
2
Pages
303-350
ISSN
  • 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-534X
OpenAlex
W3022196478
Cited by
493
References
50
FWCI
57.64
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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