The promises and pitfalls of applying computational models to neurological and psychiatric disorders
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Abstract
Computational models have become an integral part of basic neuroscience and have facilitated some of the major advances in the field. More recently, such models have also been applied to the understanding of disruptions in brain function. In this review, using examples and a simple analogy, we discuss the potential for computational models to inform our understanding of brain function and dysfunction. We argue that they may provide, in unprecedented detail, an understanding of the neurobiological and mental basis of brain disorders and that such insights will be key to progress in diagnosis and treatment. However, there are also potential problems attending this approach. We highlight these and identify simple principles that should always govern the use of computational models in clinical neuroscience, noting especially the importance of a clear specification of a model’s purpose and of the mapping between mathematical concepts and reality. Computational models are applied increasingly to the study of brain function and dysfunction. Teufel & Fletcher highlight the promise of this approach, but also some of the problems that can arise from the misapplication of such models. Using a simple analogy, they identify key principles necessary for avoiding common pitfalls.
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TL;DR
Teufel & Fletcher review the promises and pitfalls of applying computational models to neurological and psychiatric disorders, arguing such models can enforce precision, inspire new conceptualizations, and bridge explanatory levels, but can mislead when their purpose and mapping to reality are unclear. They propose two principles—specify the model’s purpose/level and explicitly map mathematical concepts to mental or neurobiological processes—plus simplicity, generality, and breakability.
Key findings
- The paper identifies three main benefits of computational models in clinical neuroscience: (i) enforcing rigour and precision in formalizing conceptual models; (ii) inspiring useful new conceptualizations and synthesizing disparate evidence; and (iii) bridging levels of explanation from basic neurobiology to conscious experience of suffering.
- Examples include the jumping-to-conclusions bias, where a formal model suggested noise in decision-making rather than sampling costs; Plaut and Behrmann’s neural network, which predicted face and word processing impairments in prosopagnosia and pure alexia that were subsequently confirmed empirically; and Bayesian/predictive coding accounts of hallucinations that can support profoundly different conceptualizations.
- The authors propose two key principles: clearly specify the purpose and level of explanation of a model, and explicitly treat the mapping between mental/neurobiological processes and mathematical concepts.
- Good computational models are described as often simple, general, and breakable; only models making specific, testable predictions can be broken, and failures should drive iterative updating.
Methods
- Conceptual/review article; no primary empirical data, sample, or statistical analysis are reported.
- Uses a running/fitness analogy and illustrative examples from computational psychiatry and neurology to discuss benefits and pitfalls.
- Proposes principles and criteria for evaluating computational models rather than testing a specific model.
Limitations
- The paper is a conceptual commentary/review, not an empirical study; no systematic review or primary data are reported (evident from the text).
- The authors state that computational clinical neuroscience is heterogeneous and that models can be opaque, mutable, and inexact; they warn against stretching explanatory power beyond what models can unambiguously support.
- The examples are illustrative and selective; the text does not provide a formal meta-analysis or exhaustive coverage (evident from the text).
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“While this finding is specific to atypical perceptual experiences rather than psychosis in general, the authors point out that such an effect, measured at one level of processing and one point in time, is likely to propagate up and down the hierarchy, inducing changes to inference systems at other levels in the brain.”
§ The promises and pitfalls of applying computational models to neurological and psychiatric disorders > The value of computational models in understanding brain function and dysfunction > Shaping novel conceptualizations and syntheses
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“The fact that existing diagnostic categories group biologically heterogeneous syndromes, with potentially different pathophysiological mechanisms, into one disorder constitutes a real obstacle to developing an understanding of the neurobiological underpinnings of mental illness ( Cuthbert and Insel, 2013 ).”
§ The promises and pitfalls of applying computational models to neurological and psychiatric disorders > The value of computational models in understanding brain function and dysfunction > Enforcing precision through formalization
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- Not checked yetcites Cuthbert and Insel, 2013
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“It gives a glimpse of the unifying potential of computational modelling, a potential that has played a part in inspiring a remarkable growth in the use of such models in our attempts to understand brain dysfunction.”
§ The promises and pitfalls of applying computational models to neurological and psychiatric disorders > The value of computational models in understanding brain function and dysfunction > Shaping novel conceptualizations and syntheses
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“The formalization of associative learning in terms of computational models derived from machine learning ( Sutton and Barto, 1998 ) has been instrumental in relating these two levels of explanation ( Montague et al. , 1996 ).”
§ The promises and pitfalls of applying computational models to neurological and psychiatric disorders > The value of computational models in understanding brain function and dysfunction > Bridging the explanatory gap
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Sutton and Barto, 1998
- Not checked yetcites Montague et al., 1996 source
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“In psychiatry, Fletcher and Frith (2009) recently provided an integrated account of positive symptoms in schizophrenia—hallucinations and delusions—based on ideas derived from computational neuroscience.”
§ The promises and pitfalls of applying computational models to neurological and psychiatric disorders > The value of computational models in understanding brain function and dysfunction > Shaping novel conceptualizations and syntheses
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Fletcher and Frith (2009)
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“The distinct but complementary results provided by the ground truth and computational levels of analysis in our study underwrite the utility of computational approaches in better understanding neuro-developmental and psychiatric conditions with the aim of influencing clinical practice 47–49.”
From Adults with autism overestimate the volatility of the sensory environment (2017) · cites this paper as [49]
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“Since its initial discovery (Huq et al., 1988), this jumping to conclusions (JTC) bias has received a large amount of attention (Fear and Healy, 1997; Garety et al., 2005; Corcoran et al., 2008) as an interesting and informative phenomenon in developing our understanding of delusional thinking.”
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Chambon, V., Pacherie, E., Barbalat, G., Jacquet, P., Franck, N., & Farrer, C. (2011) · Brain · doi:10.1093/brain/awr306 · Cited by 54 · cited 2×
“This growing and increasingly influential way of thinking about psychosis (Aleman et al., 2003; Corlett et al., 2009; Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Chambon et al., 2011; Adams et al., 2013; Schmack et al., 2013; Jardri and Denève, 2014; Teufel et al., 2015; Fineberg and Corlett, 2016) is partly…”
BackgroundThe doxastic shear pin: Delusions as errors of learning and memory
Fineberg, S. K., & Corlett, P. R. (2016) · Cognitive Neuropsychiatry · doi:10.1080/13546805.2015.1136206 · Cited by 48 · cited 1×
“…al., 2003; Corlett et al., 2009; Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Chambon et al., 2011; Adams et al., 2013; Schmack et al., 2013; Jardri and Denève, 2014; Teufel et al., 2015; Fineberg and Corlett, 2016) is partly inspired by new ideas emerging during the search for overarching neurocomputational models.”
BackgroundLinking Animal Models of Psychosis to Computational Models of Dopamine Function
Smith, A. J., Li, M., Becker, S., & Kapur, S. (2006) · Neuropsychopharmacology · doi:10.1038/sj.npp.1301086 · Cited by 46 · cited 2×
“…computational models enabled researchers to relate psychotic symptoms in an animal model to dopaminergic neurons down to the receptor level (Smith et al., 2007) and, using functional MRI in psychotic patients, to abnormal activity in dopaminergic neurons in mesolimbic brain structures…”
BackgroundModulating the granularity of category formation by global cortical states
Kim, Y. (2008) · Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/neuro.10.001.2008 · Cited by 46
Schizophrenia: A Computational Reinforcement Learning Perspective
Frank, M. J. (2008) · Schizophrenia Bulletin · doi:10.1093/schbul/sbn123 · Cited by 37
Distinguishing theory from implementation in predictive coding accounts of brain function
Spratling, M. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12002178 · Cited by 17 · cited 1×
“However, given that predictive coding is a functional scheme, other conceptualizations are possible (Spratling, 2013; Kogo and Trengove, 2015).”
BackgroundComputational Models of Hallucinations
Jardri, R., & Denève, S. (2013) · The Neuroscience of Hallucinations · doi:10.1007/978-1-4614-4121-2_16 · Cited by 16 · cited 1×
“…percept (Adams et al., 2013), and finally, a circularity in inferential processing such that a lack of inhibitory control generates a reverberating effect: an expectation enhances a signal which then acts as additional evidence in favour of that expectation (Jardri and Denève, 2013, 2014).”
ResultESSENTIALS OF STATISTICAL INFERENCE
Royle, J. A., & Dorazio, R. M. (2008) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-374097-7.00004-1 · Cited by 9
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Cited by
Adults with autism overestimate the volatility of the sensory environment
Lawson, R. P., Mathys, C., & Rees, G. (2017) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn.4615 · Cited by 470
Food addiction: a valid concept?
Fletcher, P. C., & Kenny, P. J. (2018) · Neuropsychopharmacology · doi:10.1038/s41386-018-0203-9 · Cited by 221
“This is important because we both feel that current characterizations of the food addiction model lack the specificity that would make the model breakable: a sine qua non for a useful model [57].”
BackgroundSelf-citationThe neural and neurocomputational bases of recovery from post-stroke aphasia
Stefaniak, J. D., Halai, A. D., & Lambon Ralph, M. A. (2020) · Nature Reviews Neurology · doi:10.1038/s41582-019-0282-1 · Cited by 162
Predictive processing, source monitoring, and psychosis
Griffin, J. D., & Fletcher, P. C. (2017) · Annual Review of Clinical Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-clinpsy-032816-045145 · Cited by 133
“Models must be breakable (Teufel & Fletcher 2016).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSelf-citationO’Callaghan, C., Hall, J. M., Tomassini, A., Muller, A. J., Walpola, I. C., Moustafa, A. A., Shine, J. M., & Lewis, S. J. G. (2017) · Biological Psychiatry: Cognitive Neuroscience and Neuroimaging · doi:10.1016/j.bpsc.2017.04.007 · Cited by 81
Metadata
- Authors
- Teufel, C., & Fletcher, P. C.
- Affiliations
- Cardiff University (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Fletcher, Paul C.
- Venue
- Brain
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2016-08-20
- Volume
- 139
- Issue
- 10
- Pages
- 2600-2608
- ISSN
- 0006-8950 (ISSN-L)
- 1460-2156
- PMC
- PMC5035823
- OpenAlex
- W2510894207
- Cited by
- 64
- References
- 66
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 19 · 2017: 7
- FWCI
- 1.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- Locations
- Brain (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- ORCA Online Research @Cardiff (Cardiff University) (acceptedVersion)
- HighWire Press Open Archive (submittedVersion)
- Apollo (University of Cambridge) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Apollo (cc-by)
- Funders
- Wellcome Trust (093875/Z/10/Z, 093875)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural dynamics and brain function
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Functional Brain Connectivity Studies
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
- Keywords
- computational model, neurological disorders, mental illness, brain dysfunction, clinical neuroscience, model specification, diagnosis and treatment
- MeSH terms
- Mental Disorders, Brain Diseases, Computer Simulation, Humans, Nervous System Diseases, Computational Biology
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-09-28, under version 3 of the claim definition (prompt extract-v3).
A second model labelled each claim on 2026-09-28 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.