Cited by 201Hallucinations in medical conditionsVisual perception and processing mechanismsNeural dynamics and brain function

Hallucinations and perceptual inference

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Friston, Karl J.·2005·Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Abstract

This commentary takes a closer look at how “constructive models of subjective perception,” referred to by Collerton et al. (sect. 2), might contribute to the Perception and Attention Deficit (PAD) model. It focuses on the neuronal mechanisms that could mediate hallucinations, or false inference – in particular, the role of cholinergic systems in encoding uncertainty in the context of hierarchical Bayesian models of perceptual inference (Friston 2002b; Yu & Dayan 2002).

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  • The main problem in schizophrenia lies not with the prediction of sensory input per se, but in the delicate balance of precision ascribed to prior beliefs and sensory evidence.

    “the main problem in schizophrenia lies not with the prediction of sensory input per se, but in the delicate balance of precision ascribed to prior beliefs and sensory evidence (Friston, 2005; Corlett et al., 2011).”

    From The Computational Anatomy of Psychosis (2013) · cites this paper as Friston, 2005

    The passage indexed under Abstract (page unavailable) says that the relative uncertainty or precision of sensory evidence and prior beliefs matters for hallucinations. It draws connections to schizophrenia, but describes abnormal synaptic integration—not a precision imbalance—as the primary mechanism in schizophrenia. The claim therefore extends the hallucination account to schizophrenia more strongly than this paper does. (LLM, conf=0.86)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • MMN is widely considered a robust marker of psychosis, thought to reflect an attempt to minimize prediction error and capture its disruption.

    “MMN is widely considered to be a robust marker of psychosis15, thought to reflect an attempt to minimize this prediction error and capture its disruption16–19.”

    From Deviations in effective connectivity explain different hallucination subtypes in Parkinson's disease psychosis (2026) · cites this paper as [18]

    The copy’s Abstract describes prediction errors in perceptual inference and how failed integration of sensory evidence and prior expectations can lead to hallucinations. It does not mention MMN or establish that MMN measures prediction-error minimization or its disruption. The separate claim that MMN is a robust marker of psychosis is attached to citation 15, not to this source’s apparent citation group (16–19). (LLM, conf=0.82)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Hallucinations can be understood as the result of an increase in the relative precision of prior beliefs, such that posterior beliefs are impervious to contradictory but imprecise sensory evidence.

    “Hallucinations could be understood as the result of an increase in the relative precision of prior beliefs, such that the posterior beliefs are impervious to contradictory – but imprecise – sensory evidence.”

    From The Computational Anatomy of Psychosis (2013) · cites this paper as Friston, 2005

  • Hallucinations may result from enhanced rather than weakened top-down predictive signaling, i.e. increased precision of priors, on neural activity in sensory cortices.

    “Alternatively, hallucinations may result from enhanced rather than weakened top-down predictive signaling (i.e. increased precision of priors) on neural activity in sensory cortices (83).”

    From The Predictive Coding Account of Psychosis (2018) · cites this paper as [83]

  • One possibility is that hallucinations result from an overly strong effect of top-down predictive signals on neural activity in sensory cortices.

    “One possibility is that hallucinations result from an overly strong effect of top-down predictive signals on neural activity in sensory cortices.133,134”

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Authors
Friston, K. J.
Affiliations
UCL Queen Square Institute of Neurology (GB)
Corresponding author
Friston, Karl J.
Venue
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Published
2005-12
Volume
28
Issue
6
Pages
764-766
ISSN
  • 0140-525X (ISSN-L)
  • 1469-1825
OpenAlex
W2011459890
Cited by
196
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 4 · 2025: 12 · 2024: 17 · 2023: 10 · 2022: 13 · 2021: 51 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 12 · 2018: 9 · 2017: 10 · 2016: 10 · 2015: 8 · 2014: 5 · 2013: 5 · 2012: 9
FWCI
0.66
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Behavioral and Brain Sciences (publishedVersion)
  • UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Hallucinations in medical conditions
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Visual perception and processing mechanisms
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural dynamics and brain function
Keywords
hallucinations, perceptual inference, cholinergic system, uncertainty encoding, Bayesian hierarchical model

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