On the axiomatic foundations of the integrated information theory of consciousness
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Abstract
The integrated information theory (IIT) is one of the most influential scientific theories of consciousness. It functions as a guiding framework for a great deal of research into the neural basis of consciousness and for attempts to develop a consciousness meter. In light of these developments, it is important to examine whether its foundations are secure. This article does just that by examining the axiomatic method that the architects of IIT appeal to. I begin by asking what exactly the axiomatic method involves, arguing that it is open to multiple interpretations. I then examine the five axioms of IIT, asking: what each axiom means, whether it is indeed axiomatic and whether it could constrain a theory of consciousness. I argue that none of the five alleged axioms is able to play the role that is required of it, either because it fails to qualify as axiomatic or because it fails to impose a substantive constraint on a theory of consciousness. The article concludes by briefly sketching an alternative methodology for the science of consciousness: the natural kind approach.
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“However, this criterion is at least partly arbitrary, since the axioms do not uniquely specify the complexity measure, i.e., other measures than Φ ful fi l the axioms as well (Bayne, 2018), but lead to very di ff erent empirical results (Mediano et al., 2019).”
From Hard criteria for empirical theories of consciousness (2021) · cites this paper as Bayne, 2018
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“However, to date, no such derivation exists, as phenomenology seems to generally underdetermine the postulates of IIT (Bayne 2018; Barrett and Mediano 2019), and because it is unknown what the scope and nature of nonhuman experience is.”
From Falsification and consciousness (2021) · cites this paper as Bayne 2018
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“The implications of a theory of consciousness for specific phenomena may be ambiguous or underdetermined (see, e.g., Bayne, 2018).”
From Integrated information and predictive processing theories of consciousness: An adversarial collaborative review (2026) · cites this paper as Bayne, 2018
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“These postulates are stipulated to be not only necessary, but also, controversially (Bayne, 2018; Lau and Michel, 2019), jointly sufficient conditions for conscious experience (Table 2).”
From An Integrated World Modeling Theory (IWMT) of Consciousness (2020) · cites this paper as Bayne, 2018
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Metadata
- Authors
- Bayne, T.
- Affiliations
- Monash University (AU)
- Corresponding author
- Bayne, Tim
- ORCID
- Bayne, Tim
- Venue
- Neuroscience of Consciousness
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2018-01-01
- Volume
- 2018
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- niy007-niy007
- ISSN
- 2057-2107 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC6030813
- OpenAlex
- W2810581259
- Cited by
- 132
- References
- 59
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 14 · 2024: 39 · 2023: 10 · 2022: 22 · 2021: 13 · 2020: 15 · 2019: 11 · 2018: 3
- FWCI
- 13.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Neuroscience of Consciousness (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Monash University Research Portal (Monash University) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Funders
- Australian Research Council Future Fellowship (FT 150100266)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Keywords
- integrated information theory, consciousness, axiomatic method, axioms, philosophy of science, consciousness studies, natural kinds, neural basis of consciousness
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