Blockchain Disruption and Smart Contracts
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 37 of the 37 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Blockchain technology provides decentralized consensus and potentially enlarges the contracting space through smart contracts. Meanwhile, generating decentralized consensus entails distributing information that necessarily alters the informational environment. We analyze how decentralization relates to consensus quality and how the quintessential features of blockchain remold the landscape of competition. Smart contracts can mitigate informational asymmetry and improve welfare and consumer surplus through enhanced entry and competition, yet distributing information during consensus generation may encourage greater collusion. In general, blockchains sustain market equilibria with a wider range of economic outcomes. We further discuss the implications for antitrust policies targeted at blockchain applications. Received May 31, 2017; editorial decision May 29, 2018 by Editor Itay Goldstein.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Cong, L. W., & He, Z.
- Venue
- The Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2019-04-04
- Volume
- 32
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1754-1797
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W3122636688
- Cited by
- 1,089
- References
- 37
- FWCI
- 145.90
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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