Unconscious mental imagery
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Historically, mental imagery has been defined as an experiential state—as something necessarily conscious. But most behavioural or neuroimaging experiments on mental imagery—including the most famous ones—do not actually take the conscious experience of the subject into consideration. Further, recent research highlights that there are very few behavioural or neural differences between conscious and unconscious mental imagery. I argue that treating mental imagery as not necessarily conscious (as potentially unconscious) would bring much needed explanatory unification to mental imagery research. It would also help us to reassess some of the recent aphantasia findings inasmuch as at least some subjects with aphantasia would be best described as having unconscious mental imagery. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Offline perception: voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation’.
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Citations
Cites
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Background
Cited by
Aphantasia and hyperphantasia: exploring imagery vividness extremes
Zeman, A. (2024) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2024.02.007 · Cited by 148
Visual mental imagery in typical imagers and in aphantasia: A millimeter-scale 7-T fMRI study
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Takahashi, J., Saito, G., Omura, K., Yasunaga, D., Sugimura, S., Sakamoto, S., Horikawa, T., & Gyoba, J. (2023) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1174873 · Cited by 41
The role of visual imagery in story reading: Evidence from aphantasia
Speed, L. J., Eekhof, L. S., & Mak, M. (2024) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2024.103645 · Cited by 31
“Indeed, the mental imagery literature distinguishes between conscious versus unconscious imagery, as well as voluntary versus involuntary imagery (note that involuntary imagery can still be either conscious or unconscious; Nanay, 2021).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Nanay, B.
- Venue
- Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
- Publisher
- The Royal Society
- Published
- 2020-12-14
- Volume
- 376
- Issue
- 1817
- Pages
- 20190689
- ISSN
- 0962-8436 (ISSN-L)
- 1471-2970
- OpenAlex
- W3112386457
- Cited by
- 169
- References
- 23
- FWCI
- 20.13
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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