Effects of detector efficiency mismatch on security of quantum cryptosystems
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 42 of the 42 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We suggest a type of attack on quantum cryptosystems that exploits variations in detector efficiency as a function of a control parameter accessible to an eavesdropper. With gated single-photon detectors, this control parameter can be the timing of the incoming pulse. When the eavesdropper sends short pulses using the appropriate timing so that the two gated detectors in Bob's setup have different efficiencies, the security of quantum key distribution can be compromised. Specifically, we show for the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol that if the efficiency mismatch between 0 and 1 detectors for some value of the control parameter gets large enough (roughly 15:1 or larger), Eve can construct a successful faked-states attack causing a quantum bit error rate lower than 11%. We also derive a general security bound as a function of the detector sensitivity mismatch for the BB84 protocol. Experimental data for two different detectors are presented, and protection measures against this attack are discussed.
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“The attack [22] becomes more efficient than the standard intercept-resend attack for r < 0.”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Makarov, V., Anisimov, A., & Skaar, J.
- Venue
- Physical Review A
- Publisher
- American Physical Society (APS)
- Published
- 2006-08-17
- Volume
- 74
- Issue
- 2
- ISSN
- 0556-2791 (ISSN-L)
- 1050-2947
- 1094-1622
- OpenAlex
- W2011682372
- Cited by
- 395
- References
- 42
- FWCI
- 11.48
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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