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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 39 of the 39 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Distillation as a Defense to Adversarial Perturbations Against Deep Neural Networks

Open access
Papernot, Nicolas, McDaniel, Patrick, Wu, Xi, Jha, Somesh, Swami, Ananthram·2016·2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)

Abstract

Deep learning algorithms have been shown to perform extremely well on many classical machine learning problems. However, recent studies have shown that deep learning, like other machine learning techniques, is vulnerable to adversarial samples: inputs crafted to force a deep neural network (DNN) to provide adversary-selected outputs. Such attacks can seriously undermine the security of the system supported by the DNN, sometimes with devastating consequences. For example, autonomous vehicles can be crashed, illicit or illegal content can bypass content filters, or biometric authentication systems can be manipulated to allow improper access. In this work, we introduce a defensive mechanism called defensive distillation to reduce the effectiveness of adversarial samples on DNNs. We analytically investigate the generalizability and robustness properties granted by the use of defensive distillation when training DNNs. We also empirically study the effectiveness of our defense mechanisms on two DNNs placed in adversarial settings. The study shows that defensive distillation can reduce effectiveness of sample creation from 95% to less than 0.5% on a studied DNN. Such dramatic gains can be explained by the fact that distillation leads gradients used in adversarial sample creation to be reduced by a factor of 1030. We also find that distillation increases the average minimum number of features that need to be modified to create adversarial samples by about 800% on one of the DNNs we tested.

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Research works printed but not linked: 6

  1. fawzi, 2015, Analysis of classifiers' robustness to adversarial perturbations, Deep Learning Workshop at ICML 2015 arXiv preprint arXiv 1502 02590
  2. bergstra, 2010, Theano: a cpu and gpu math expression compiler, Proceedings of the Python for Scientific Computing Conference (SciPy), 4, 3
  3. 2015, Nvidia tegra drive px: Self-driving car computer, Nvidia
  4. sermanet, 2014, Overfeat: Integrated recognition, localization and detection using convolutional networks, International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR 2014) arXiv preprint arXiv 1312 6229
  5. miyato, 2015, Distributional smoothing by virtual adversarial examples, CoRR vol abs/1507 00677
  6. krizhevsky, 2012, Imagenet classification with deep convolutional neural networks, Advances in neural information processing systems, 1097

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Items 101–137 of 137

Metadata

Authors
Papernot, N., McDaniel, P., Wu, X., Jha, S., & Swami, A.
Venue
2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2016-05
Pages
582-597
ISSN
1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2174868984
Cited by
2,982
References
39
FWCI
132.14
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
green

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