The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Learning to Love Democracy: Electoral Accountability and the Success of Democracy
Abstract
This article explains why dissatisfaction with the performance of individual politicians in new democracies often turns into disillusionment with democracy as a political system. The demands on elections as an instrument of political accountability are much greater in new than established democracies: politicians have yet to form reputations, a condition that facilitates the entry into politics of undesirable candidates who view this period as their “one‐time opportunity to get rich.” After a repeatedly disappointing government performance, voters may rationally conclude that “all politicians are crooks” and stop discriminating among them, to which all politicians rationally respond by “acting like crooks,” even if most may be willing to perform well in office if given appropriate incentives. Such an expectation‐driven failure of accountability, which I call the “trap of pessimistic expectations,” may precipitate the breakdown of democracy. Once politicians establish reputations for good performance, however, these act as barriers to the entry into politics of low‐quality politicians. The resulting improvement in government performance reinforces voters’ belief that democracy can deliver accountability, a process that I associate with democratic consolidation. These arguments provide theoretical microfoundations for several prominent empirical associations between the economic performance of new democracies, public attitudes toward democracy, and democratic stability.
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Cites
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Economic Performance And Survival In New Democracies: Is There a Honeymoon Effect?
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Cited by
The relationship between affective polarization and democratic backsliding: comparative evidence
Orhan, Y. E. (2022) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2021.2008912 · Cited by 198
Poland: A Case of Top-Down Polarization
Tworzecki, H. (2019) · The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science · doi:10.1177/0002716218809322 · Cited by 143
Metadata
- Authors
- Svolik, M. W.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2013-04-17
- Volume
- 57
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 685-702
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-5907
- OpenAlex
- W2131417967
- Cited by
- 176
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 59.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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